Teleological argument: Eduqas A* grade notes

Eduqas
Philosophy

For AO1 you need to know:

Aquinas’ 5th way
Paley’s design argument
Tennant’s anthropic and aesthetic arguments
Hume’s criticisms
Alternative scientific explanations e.g. evolution

For AO2 you need to be able to debate:

Whether inductive arguments for God are persuasive
The effectiveness of the teleological argument for God’s existence
Whether teleological arguments for God are persuasive in the 21st century
The effectiveness of the challenges to the teleological argument
Whether scientific explanations are more persuasive than philosophical explanations for the universe’s existence

AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way

Aquinas’ 5th way is a posteriori because it is an argument that reasons to a conclusion on the basis of experience. It begins with the observation that natural objects/beings do not behave randomly, but move towards a certain goal or purpose (end/telos).
We can observe that things act ‘always, or nearly always’ in the same way to ‘obtain the best result’, meaning to attain their purpose.
The idea is that things we observe in the world are goal-directed.
E.g., flowers move in alignment with the sun to get more sunlight, acorns grow into oak trees, and the planets orbit the Sun.
Everywhere we look, Aquinas wants us to notice that objects do not behave randomly but with regularity in a goal-directed way.
This shows that it is not mere chance that objects behave in this way.
However, things in the world cannot have directed themselves towards their end because they are non-intelligent or insufficiently intelligent.
Such things cannot move towards an end unless directed by a being which does have intelligence.
A thing cannot reliably move with a purpose unless an intelligent being had that purpose in mind and directed its behaviour.
Aquinas illustrates this with an archer directing an arrow.
An arrow hits a target even though it isn’t intelligent and cannot comprehend what it’s doing.
There must be something which comprehends the goal/end of the arrow and directs it: the archer.
God’s ability to direct the behaviour of things in the world is of a much greater type than ours.
God directs behaviour by creating natural laws which govern objects and direct them towards the end that God has in mind.
Just as an archer has the power to make an arrow goal-directed, God has the power to make everything in the world goal-directed.
So, there must be an archer for the arrow of the universe, which must be a God.
P1: The behaviour of objects is goal-directed towards an end, because they follow natural laws.
P2: Natural laws cannot have been created by objects themselves, since they are non-intelligent or insufficiently intelligent.
C1: Natural laws must have an intelligent designer. ‘That thing we call God.’
The argument is inductive because it treats what we experience as evidence for the conclusion.
It is an example of Aquinas’ natural theology, his attempt to show how reason can support faith.
The arguments are not intended by Aquinas to deductively prove the Christian God in particular.
Reason can discover arguments in support of a higher power, which strengthens faith in the Christian God.

AO1: William Paley’s design argument

Paley’s design qua Purpose argument claims that the combination of complexity and purpose, which we observe in natural objects/beings, is best explained by a designer.
The argument is a posteriori because it reasons from experience to a conclusion.
Paley illustrates this with the example of a watch.
If you were walking on a heath and came across a rock, you could think it had always been lying there, since nothing about it suggests otherwise.
However, the situation is quite different if we came across a watch.
There is something about a watch which suggests it had not always been lying there.
It is composed of parts intricately formed so as to produce a motion which is regulated to point out the hour and minute.
It has complexity arranged so as to perform a purpose.
If the parts were differently shaped, composed of other materials, or arranged differently, the purpose of telling the time would not result.
The watch could not have come about by chance nor been there forever because it has Complexity & Purpose.
This must mean it had a designer, a watch maker.
Paley then points out there are also things in the universe that are complex and have a purpose, such as the human eye, wings of a bird, and fins of a fish, which are fitted together to perform purposes like seeing, flying, and swimming.
“Every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature.” – Paley.
Since complexity and purpose in a watch tells us there must have been a watch maker, similarly, the complexity and purpose in the universe tells us that there must have been a universe designer.
This designer must have a mind, because design requires a purpose and knowledge of how parts bring about that purpose.
The argument is inductive as the complexity and purpose we experience functions as evidence for the conclusion of God’s existence.
Paley follows natural theology, viewing reason as supporting faith, and accepts the argument shows evidence for a generic higher power rather than proving the Christian God.
Some philosophers interpret Paley’s argument as analogical, inferring a designer from the analogy between the universe and the watch.
However, most philosophers do not read Paley this way.
Paley seems to argue that the property of complexity and purpose is best explained by a designing mind.
Since we find this in the universe, we can infer it has a designer, with the watch serving only as an illustration rather than an analogy.

AO1: F. R. Tennent’s aesthetic argument

As part of his wider teleological case, F. R. Tennant proposed an aesthetic argument for God’s existence.
Tennant accepts evolution as the mechanism producing human beings, but argues that the emergence of aesthetic consciousness fits more naturally within a theistic worldview.
Humans possess a capacity to appreciate beauty in nature, art, music, and mathematical elegance, which seems to go beyond what is required for biological survival.
Natural selection can only select for traits which confer a survival advantage.
We could have lived and reproduced without being moved by sunsets, inspired by music, or able to create art.
The richness of our aesthetic life doesn’t seem to help us survive.
So, it’s unclear how the aesthetic sense could have emerged through natural selection.
This is evidence for the existence of a God who designed this sense into us.
Beauty is a pervasive feature of the world, and humans uniquely possess the capacity to recognise and respond to it.
Tennant treats this as part of a broader pattern: the universe seems “hospitable” not only to biological life, but to value, including moral and aesthetic value.
For Tennant, this suggests that the cosmos is not mere natural machinery, but a value-laden environment intended to give rise to beings capable of appreciating higher goods.
Our aesthetic sensitivity, one of the highest and most significant aspects of human experience, thus forms one strand of his cumulative argument that the world is not accidental but purposely ordered by God.

AO1: F. R. Tennent’s anthropic argument

F. R. Tennant developed the design argument to avoid it being undermined by Darwin.
He argues that for evolution to be possible requires a very precise type of universe, suggestive of design.
So evolution highlights design “on a grander scale” than merely the biology of organisms.
He identifies several strands of evidence supporting theism, calling this an anthropic argument because each concerns conditions that make rational human life possible.
First, Tennant highlights the cosmic order and intelligibility of the universe.
Nature operates through stable, rational laws that make science possible, and there is no necessity that reality should be orderly rather than chaotic.
Second, Tennant develops the fine-tuning strand.
Life requires extremely precise values of fundamental laws and constants, e.g., gravity, electromagnetism, nuclear forces, atomic stability, and conditions such as water and carbon.
These factors “coincide” in “unique assemblages” that make life possible.
Tennant likens the universe to a single throw of dice that lands exactly right for life; “common sense is not foolish in suspecting the dice to have been loaded.”
Third, Tennant argues evolution displays large-scale teleology.
There’s a trend from simple life toward complexity, consciousness, rationality, and moral awareness.
There’s no guarantee evolution would produce these traits, so their emergence adds evidence for design.
Tennant concludes these strands, cosmic intelligibility, fine-tuning, and evolutionary directionality, combine into a cumulative anthropic argument that the universe appears designed to produce rational life.

AO2: The validity of analogy

Swinburne supports design arguments by arguing analogical argumentation is scientifically valid.
Imagine a scientist doesn’t know the cause of X, but they know X is similar to Y, which they do know the cause of.
It is rational to hypothesise that the cause of X is similar (analogous to) the cause of Y.
Design arguments employ exactly the same form of inductive reasoning:
Things in nature are like things humans create (Paley’s watch) or direct (Aquinas’ arrow).
So, the cause of those natural things is analogous, i.e., an intelligent mind.

Counter:

Hume objects that like effects do not imply like causes.
E.g. Dry ice and fire are not alike as causes, but their effect (smoke) is alike.
So,things in nature being like a watch or an arrow doesn’t prove their causes are alike (i.e., an intelligent mind).
Hume further argues it doesn’t even provide probabilistic evidence, as Swinburne claimed.
He attacks the analogy between artefacts and natural beings as weak, because of their significant disanalogies.
Artefacts are mechanical, mathematically precisely constructed.
Whereas the universe is more like an organic thing, more messy, less precise.
So, the analogy between watches and eyes, or between arrows and the behaviour of birds/flowers is weak.

Evaluation:

However, Hume’s critique of analogy doesn’t work against versions of the design argument which avoid analogical reasoning in favor of standard inductive probability and/or abductive inference to the best explanation.
Paley is often interpreted as taking one of those forms today.
On this reading, design arguments identify a property which is so unlikely to have come about by chance that design is a better explanation.
The universe is like the watch (or the arrow), but that’s not what makes it designed.
It’s designed because it has the property of complexity and purpose, or goal-directedness (or fine-tuning etc).
The watch & arrows are just illustrations of how we infer design from that property.
So, Hume’s critique of analogy fails.

AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation

Hume argues that even if the design argument succeeded, it cannot prove the Christian God in particular.
Just as possible is a committee of Gods (polytheism), a junior God, or even a God who then died.
There is no basis for preferring the Christian God as an explanation of the design in the universe, compared to those other options.
So, the design argument could be inductively cogent, meaning its premises are well-supported and it provides strong probabilistic support for its conclusion.
And yet, it would still be limited in scope, as it cannot justify belief in any particular God.

Counter:

Swinburne counters Hume, using the abductive reasoning of Ockham’s razor, since one God is simpler than multiple.
However the main problem for Hume is that Aquinas, Paley and Swinburne aren’t trying to prove the Christian God in particular.
They know the design argument is limited to proving some generic designer.
They all broadly follow the approach laid out by Aquinas’ Natural theology.
This involves inductive a posteriori argument aimed at supporting faith.
Belief in a particular God is still made more reasonable by an argument that only shows there is some kind of God.

Evaluation

So, sophisticated proponents of design arguments are appropriately careful about the scope of their conclusion.
Hume overreached with this critique and risks committing a straw man fallacy.
As Aquinas says in the end of all his 5 ways, ‘that thing we call God’.
This indicates awareness that the argument doesn’t prove exactly what that designer is.
That’s where the proper role of faith comes in, that the designer he’s found evidence for is the Christian God.
This minimal support for faith through evidence of some higher power is the sole purpose of the argument.
Hume incorrectly assumed it aimed to do more.

AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse

Hume’s epicurean hypothesis claims an eternal universe made of atoms is guaranteed to sometimes assemble into orderliness by chance.
In infinite time, every possibility becomes certain to occur at some point.
Hume’s not claiming this is true, just that it is possible.
It’s an abductive counter-example which breaks the necessity of inferring from order to God.

Of course, the current evidence for the big bang suggests the universe isn’t eternal.
Nonetheless, we can use the multiverse in the same way.
Rather than infinite time, it involves infinite space (universes).
Some versions claim all metaphysically possible permutations of beings (spatial order) and physical laws (temporal order) exist.
This attacks all possible versions of the design argument.
Whatever they could point to (organisms, natural laws or fine-tuning) can be explained by the hypothesis that every possible state or thing exists somewhere in the multiverse.

Counter

Defenders of fine-tuning argue that the multiverse relies on very speculative physics, has no evidence for it, and seems potentially unfalsifiable.
Swinburne argues a scientific explanation is impossible, since science can only discover which laws exist, not explain why there are such laws.

Evaluation

However, the multiverse hypothesis is taken seriously by physicists.
It’s not incoherent, so Swinburne can’t dismiss scientific explanation as impossible.
Regarding its lack of evidence, we can follow Hume’s method and deploy it as an abductive counter-example which breaks the inference to God.
This treats the multiverse as a competing hypothesis to God.
Both are equal in explanatory power regarding the world.
This is not a stalemate, since it shows design is not the only reasonable explanation of our universe.
So, the teleological argument loses its persuasive force.
It cannot give us a reason to believe that a God is the explanation of the way the universe is.

AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design

Paley and Aquinas appealed to the complexity and purpose of organisms.
However, evolution by natural selection can also explain that.
There is variation in species. Members that are better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and pass on the genes which code for that adaptation.
Over time, this causes a greater prevalence of those traits in the species as it becomes increasingly adapted to its environment.
This makes animals appear designed for survival. Really, those traits evolved over millions of years due to natural selection causing increasing adaptation.
This includes traits like instincts guiding animal behaviour, which explains Aquinas’ claim that they have a telos.
Dawkins wrote ‘the blind watchmaker’ referencing Paley. Taking Paley’s example of the eye, Dawkins explains how it could have evolved part by part over hundreds of millions of years.
So yes there is a watchmaker, but it is ‘blind’, meaning merely the blind mechanical force of natural selection.
Dawkins concludes complexity and purpose in organisms can be explained through simpler, more scientific means. This suggests belief in a designer is unnecessary.

AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil

Darwin noted how vicious natural selection is, concluding “I cannot see evidence of design”.
He illustrates with digger wasps which lay eggs inside caterpillars that are eaten from the inside when they hatch.
He concludes it’s not credible to think a perfect God designed this world.
Hume’s evidential problem of evil makes this point more philosophically.
Excessive and dysteleological suffering could have been avoided if nature were designed differently.
So, natural evil is evidence against a perfect creator and designer.
This is a stronger critique than Hume’s ‘committee of God’s’ objection.
It claims the world could not have been designed by the Christian God, not merely that it could have been another God.

Counter

Religious philosophers attempt to respond with theodicies.
These generally claim it is logically impossible for God to remove evil without also removing some greater good necessarily connected to evil.
E.g., our deserved punishment for Augustine, free will for Plantinga or soul-making for Hick.

Evaluation

However, natural evil kills innocent children and animals.
Free will or punishment cannot excuse such cases.
Hick would insist random evil is how a perfect God would design the world, to maintain the epistemic distance which enables soul-making.
However, by definition there can’t be evidence for that claim; it is unfalsifiable.
So all theodicies are vulnerable to Hume’s evidential argument.
God may be consistent with the evidence, but can’t be inferred from the evidence.
Design arguments are intended by natural theologians (Aquinas, Paley etc) to support faith in the Christian God, through providing evidence for a generic designer.
Hume’s critique undermines this aim.
It shows the only rational inference from observation of an imperfect world, would be to an imperfect designer.
When we make a full accounting of all the evidence, including evil, we see that inference from imperfection to perfection is empirically invalid.

AO2: Design arguments after Darwin

Tennant broadened the design argument to the overall structure, regularity and intelligibility of the universe.
Swinburne developed this, arguing Aquinas’ focus on temporal order was ‘wiser’ than Paley’s focus on spatial order..
Evolution can explain spatial order (e.g., the eye), but not the laws of nature.
Physical constants like the charge of the electron must be extremely precise for our universe to be life-permitting..
A tiny degree different and there would be chaos.
So, fine-tuning by a God is more reasonable than chance.

Counter

However, anthropic fine tuning relies on the assumption that the constants of nature are contingent.
The assumption is that while laws of logic are necessary, there’s no contradiction in a universe with different laws.
This overlooks that the laws of nature could be a metaphysical necessity.
There could be a deeper reason why our constants just are what reality must be.
Physicists seek a Grand Unified Theory of Everything, which could show that our physical laws arise from mathematical necessity.
So, just because we can mathematically conceive of different laws, doesn’t mean different laws are metaphysically possible.

Evaluation

Evolution demonstrates a broader critique of the bad design of design arguments, which modern ideas of necessary laws and multiverses merely extends.
Design arguments point to current scientific ignorance and claim God must explain it.
Despite their best efforts to avoid being a God-of-the-gaps style argument, they do fall into that fallacy.
Advances in biology undermined Paley’s argument.
But crucially, Paley’s argument was never justified to begin with.
A lack of scientific explanation doesn’t justify inferring God.
So, lacking explanation for the intelligibility or laws of nature doesn’t justify inferring God.
It’s not justified to believe God explains X, just because we can’t think how else X could be explained.