Summary notes for The problem of evil

The nature of moral evil and natural evil

Natural evil is the suffering caused to humans by the workings of the natural world. E.g., natural disasters and disease.
God is supposedly a being which designed and created the natural world, which seems to make God responsible for natural evil.
There’s no obvious reason why nature couldn’t have been designed differently so as to prevent or at least reduce the amount of natural evil.
Nor is there any clear reason why an omnipotent God couldn’t intervene in nature to prevent instances of natural evil.
So, natural evil is often argued to be a problem for belief in God.
Moral evil is suffering caused to humans by human action.
There are infamous examples throughout history of evil actions, sometimes on a mass scale, such as wars and the holocaust.
This is argued to be a problem for God’s existence because God could intervene to prevent these actions
There are cases which seem to blend the two types together. Some natural disasters are partly due to nature but also partly due to human-made climate change.

The logical problem of evil

The logical problem of evil is a deductive argument, meaning if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true.
It aims to show that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the God of classical theism, defined as omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.
A modern logical problem of evil is Mackie’s inconsistent triad:
P1. An omnipotent God has the power to eliminate evil.
P2. An omnibenevolent God has the motivation to eliminate evil.
C1. Evil, omnipotence and omnibenevolence thus form an inconsistent triad such that God (as classically defined) and evil cannot possibly co-exist.
The argument operates on the point that a thing cannot exist if there is a being with the power and motivation to eliminate it.
This is an a priori argument because it doesn’t reference experience. It involves the logical analysis of the meaning of the concepts ‘omnipotent’, ‘omnibenevolent’ and ‘evil’ and concludes they cannot all possibly co-exist
The conclusion of the logical problem is that if evil exists, then it is impossible that God exists.

The evidential problem of evil

Hume put forward a version of the evidential problem of evil, based on his empiricism.
Hume accepts that it’s logically possible for a perfect God to have created an imperfect world due to having reasons for allowing evil. His point is that the evidence is against such a being existing.
Some versions of the evidential problem (like one of Rowe’s) are probabilistic, arguing evil makes God unlikely. Hume’s version however, argues that one cannot empirically infer from evidence of imperfection to a perfect God.
Hume points out the evidence of evil in the world, such as animal and human suffering due to natural disasters and the difficulty of avoiding suffering and surviving due to the way our bodies are constructed and the harshness of the environment.
P1. We are only justified in believing what the evidence suggests (empiricism).
P2. We only have evidence of imperfection (a world with both good and evil).
C1. So, we are only justified in believing that imperfection exists.
C2. So, belief in a perfectly powerful and good being is not justified.
The evidential problem is a posteriori, based on our experience of the evil in the world.
It is inductive, claiming that belief in God is unjustified on the basis of the evidence of imperfection we experience.

The free will defence (Plantinga)

Plantinga intended his ‘free will defence’ to target the logical problem of evil.
He claims that God could have good reasons for allowing evil, such that Mackie’s premise that an all-loving God would be motivated to eliminate evil is false.
Plantinga argues it is logically possible that all evil is the result of free will.
Moral evil clearly results from our abuse of free will.
Natural evil also results from the abuse of free will of demons/satan and the actions of Adam and Eve causing us to live in a fallen world.
This means that God could not remove evil without removing free will.
Plantinga then argues that free will is so valuable that without it our lives would be meaningless.
So, it is actually better to allow evil, for the sake of allowing us to have free will.
Since that is the better action, an all-loving God would do it.
Plantinga only puts this argument forward as a logical possibility, aimed at defeating Mackie’s claim about the logical impossibility of God and evil’s co-existence.

Issue with the free will defence

Mackie responds that a world where free creatures always choose good is logically possible, so a perfect God would have created it.
Plantinga relies on the ‘libertarian’ definition of free will as the ability to have done otherwise.
Mackie rejects that definition as incoherent because our choices must have a cause. That cause could be randomness, external causes or our own character.
Terms like ‘responsibility’ relate to choices that come from our character.
So, the only valid definition of free will is the compatibilist one. We act freely when causally determined by our predetermined character.
When our actions are caused by our desires/wants, such actions are free in the compatibilist sense.
So, a perfect God could and would have created free creatures with good characters that determined them to make good choices.
Such creatures do not exist.
So, God does not exist.

Soul-making (Hick)

Hick argues that God allows evil because evil serves the good purpose of soul-making, which means development of virtue.
Virtue is having a character with the disposition and habits of doing good.
By choosing good over evil, people develop virtue.
Getting into heaven requires moral virtue, which is only developed through choosing good over evil.
So, we require a world with both good and evil in it.
Hick isn’t saying every case of evil serves a good purpose.
Hick’s epistemic distance is the idea that if God made it obvious that he exists, we would just obey him out of obedience – but that would not develop our personal virtue.
If every case of evil we experienced was perfectly aligned with the soul-making requirements of those who suffered from it, we would know there was a God controlling the process – which would break the epistemic distance and ruin our soul-making opportunities.
He’s saying that living in a world full of evil is necessary for soul-making to be possible.
So God puts us in a world with evil that appears random because that is necessary for soul-making.

Issue with soul-making

The distribution of evil in the world does not appear designed for soul-making.
Some evil is dysteleological, having no chance of leading to spiritual development.
E.g., a child who dies of cancer is too young to even understand what is happening, let alone learn anything from it.
Most animal suffering is also dysteleological for the same reason.
Some evil is soul-breaking, meaning it undermines and breaks a person’s character rather than enabling growth.
The amount of evil in the world also appears disproportionate to what would be necessary for soul-making.
The holocaust is an example of evil which is dysteleological, disproportionate and soul-breaking.
D Z Phillips criticised Hick, questioning whether anyone in their “right mind” could say the holocaust was justified because a few survivors were strengthened by it.

The problem of evil model essay plan

Note that this model essay plan is merely one possible way to write an essay on this topic.

Points highlighted in light blue are integration points
Points highlighted in green are weighting points

The logical problem of evil is a deductive argument, meaning if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true.
It aims to show that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the God of classical theism, defined as omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.
A modern logical problem of evil is Mackie’s inconsistent triad:
P1. An omnipotent God has the power to eliminate evil.
P2. An omnibenevolent God has the motivation to eliminate evil.
C1. Evil, omnipotence and omnibenevolence thus form an inconsistent triad such that God (as classically defined) and evil cannot possibly co-exist.

Plantinga’s free will defence

Plantinga intended his ‘free will defence’ to target the logical problem of evil.
He claims that God could have good reasons for allowing evil, such that Mackie’s premise that an all-loving God would be motivated to eliminate evil is false.
Plantinga argues it is logically possible that all evil is the result of free will.
Moral evil clearly results from our abuse of free will.
Natural evil also results from the abuse of free will of demons/satan and the actions of Adam and Eve causing us to live in a fallen world.
This means that God could not remove evil without removing free will.
Plantinga then argues that free will is so valuable that without it our lives would be meaningless.
So, it is actually better to allow evil, for the sake of allowing us to have free will.
Since that is the better action, an all-loving God would do it.
Plantinga only puts this argument forward as a logical possibility, aimed at defeating Mackie’s claim about the logical impossibility of God and evil’s co-existence.

Counter

Mackie responds that a world where free creatures always choose good is logically possible, so a perfect God would have created it.
However, Plantinga counters that just because such a world is logically possible, it doesn’t follow that God could create it.
God cannot create a world where free creatures only choose good without forcing them to choose good – which undermines their having made a choice.
God can only do logically possible things – it’s not logically possible to ‘make’ people ‘choose’ good – since that would undermine their free will.

Evaluation

Mackie responds that a world where free creatures always choose good is logically possible, so a perfect God would have created it.
Plantinga relies on the ‘libertarian’ definition of free will as the ability to have done otherwise.
Mackie rejects that definition as incoherent because our choices must have a cause. That cause could be randomness, external causes or our own character.
Terms like ‘responsibility’ relate to choices that come from our character.
So, the only valid definition of free will is the compatibilist one. We act freely when causally determined by our predetermined character.
When our actions are caused by our desires/wants, such actions are free in the compatibilist sense.
So, a perfect God could and would have created free creatures with good characters that determined them to make good choices.
Such creatures do not exist.
So, God does not exist.

The evidential problem

The evidential problem is an a posteriori inductive argument which claims that evil we experience is evidence against God’s existence such that belief in God is unjustified.
This argument does not deny the logical possibility of God’s co-existence with evil.
Hume put forward this argument.
P1. We are only justified in believing what the evidence suggests (empiricism).
P2. We only have evidence of imperfection (a world with both good and evil).
C1. So, we are only justified in believing that imperfection exists.
C2. So, belief in a perfectly powerful and good being is not justified.
The evidential problem is stronger than the logical as it doesn’t make the unnecessarily bold assumption that the co-exitence of God and evil is impossible. Hume accepts that it’s logically possible for a perfect God to co-exist with evil due to having reasons for allowing evil. His point is that we have no evidence that such a being with such reasons exists. That is a sufficient basis on which to undermine religious belief in favor of atheism. The atheist need not go as far as Mackie attempted to.
Responses to the evidential problem are called ‘theodicies’. A theodicy must not merely be logically possible, it has the extra burden of being supported by evidence.

Soul-making theodicy

Hick argues that God allows evil because evil serves the good purpose of soul-making, which means development of virtue.
Virtue is having a character with the disposition and habits of doing good.
By choosing good over evil, people develop virtue.
Getting into heaven requires moral virtue, which is only developed through choosing good over evil.
So, we require a world with both good and evil in it.
The strength of soul-making vs the evidential problem is that there is evidence that encountering and overcoming evil develops a person’s character and virtue.
This is behind the idea of character development in literature. It is also behind the idea that people become spoiled if they have too much luxury and not enough responsibility or difficulty to overcome.
By going through harsh struggles, a person becomes stronger and gains compassion for others. This does seem to be a factual occurrence in life.

Counter

The distribution of evil in the world does not appear designed for soul-making.
Some evil is dysteleological, having no chance of leading to spiritual development.
E.g., a child who dies of cancer is too young to even understand what is happening, let alone learn anything from it.
Most animal suffering is also dysteleological for the same reason.
Some evil is soul-breaking, meaning it undermines and breaks a person’s character rather than enabling growth.
The amount of evil in the world also appears disproportionate to what would be necessary for soul-making.
The holocaust is an example of evil which is dysteleological, disproportionate and soul-breaking.
D Z Phillips criticised Hick, questioning whether anyone in their “right mind” could say the holocaust was justified because a few survivors were strengthened by it.

Evaluation

However, this criticism misunderstands Hick’s theodicy.
Hick isn’t saying every case of evil serves a good purpose.
Hick’s epistemic distance is the idea that if God made it obvious that he exists, we would just obey him out of obedience – but that would not develop our personal virtue.
If every case of evil we experienced was perfectly aligned with the soul-making requirements of those who suffered from it, we would know there was a God controlling the process – which would break the epistemic distance and ruin our soul-making opportunities.
He’s saying that living in a world full of evil is necessary for soul-making to be possible.
So God puts us in a world with evil that appears random because that is necessary for soul-making.

Evaluation

Hick’s epistemic distance theory is logically coherent. It is logically possible that a perfect God would allow seemingly random evil for the good purpose of soul-making. So Hick solves Mackie’s logical problem of evil. An all-loving God might not be motivated to eliminate evil.
However, there is no evidence for the epistemic distance. In fact by definition there can’t be evidence for it.
Hick is saying he knows evil doesn’t appear geared towards soul-making, but he insists that’s how it would have to appear for soul-making to work.
In that case, there can’t be any evidence for soul-making theodicy.
There would be no observable difference between a world where a perfect God allows random evil to exist because it serves the purpose of soul-making, and a world where there is random evil because there is no God.
No evidence could help us decide which world we are living in.
So, evidence cannot support Hick’s theodicy and thus he fails to solve the evidential problem of evil.

Conclusion:

Plantinga fails to solve the logical problem, but Hick does solve it.
Nonetheless, Hick fails to solve the evidential problem – so that is the successful version of the problem of evil. So, we can conclude that belief in God is not justified because of evil.