AQA Philosophy
Metaphysics of God

Summary notes for The concept and nature of God

God as omniscient

Omniscience means all-knowing.
Philosophically, truth is generally considered a necessary condition of knowledge.
So we can define omniscience like so:
S is omniscient if for every true proposition p, if p is true then S knows p.
Omniscience also involves the impossibility of being mistaken. So, God knows all true propositions infallibly
Aquinas’ analogy: God has direct awareness of everything, analogous to the way we have direct awareness of our perceptions. He calls this God’s ‘knowledge of vision’. This is just meant to be an analogy, ultimately omniscience is beyond our comprehension.
Aquinas thinks God knows propositions and concepts, but only because he knows the contents and powers of human minds. God perfectly knows the essence of our power of intelligence, such that God knows every thought, concept or proposition that could possibly be formed by human intelligence.
But God’s knowledge is not propositional or conceptual. It isn’t gained from nor at all dependent on making inferences from propositions like we do. God’s knowledge functions through infallible direct awareness.

God as omnipotent

Most Christian philosophers accept Aquinas’ account of omnipotence, that it means the power to bring about any logically possible state of affairs.
Aquinas argued that God’s attributes have to be understood as a function of God’s perfection.
God has an infinite divine nature which is the perfection of being.
Being omnipotent is therefore having the power of a perfect being.
Aquinas concludes that God cannot do things that contradict his perfect nature.
Aquinas gives the example that God cannot create something which both exists and does not exist.
That would be to encompass a contradiction within himself, since that would contradict his perfect nature.
Another example is that God cannot destroy himself, since that would contradict his perfection of necessary existence.
Aquinas insists God being unable to do these things cannot be thought of as due to any ‘defect’ in the concept of God. It is because logically impossible things, like a four-sided triangle or a destroyed necessary being “have not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.”
Omnipotence, or the greatest amount of power possible, has to be understood as the power held by a perfect being. It therefore cannot bring about anything contrary to its perfection as a perfect being cannot be imperfect.

God as supremely good (omnibenevolent)

Omnibenevolence is the idea that God is perfectly good.
One aspect is metaphysical, that goodness = perfection.
So, to say God is omnibenevolent is to say something about God’s metaphysical status; that God is a supremely perfect being.
Another aspect is moral, where perfectly good means that the will (intention) is always in alignment with what is morally good.
Plato & Augustine connect these two senses of goodness.
They argue evil, or immorality has no ‘positive’ existence in itself, it is simply a lack of goodness ‘privatio boni’. Augustine illustrated with blindness which is not a thing, but simply the absence of sight.
God’s moral perfection is bound up with his metaphysically perfect status. Since God is a metaphysically perfect being, God’s will is perfectly moral, i.e., always aligns with what is good.
Christian theology typically holds that God’s omnibenevolence means God is both the source of and standard for moral value and rightness.

God as timeless (eternal)

God as timeless is the view that God is an atemporal being, meaning existing outside of time.
Some philosophers like Anselm argue for God’s eternity rather than temporality because they think it follows from his status as the greatest conceivable being, or simply from his omnipotence.
Anselm argues existing within time would limit or confine God to being within time.
It is also argued to follow from God’s perfection, since a perfect being would be unchangeable, yet temporal beings are subject to change since time changes.
God is also thought to have created time, which means God could not have existed within time sans creation.
An eternal God would not see time unfolding moment by moment like temporal beings do.
Instead, God apprehends all of time at once, in the ‘eternal present’.
Within time, events can be temporally (T-) simultaneous or non-simultaneous.
In eternity, all events are eternally (E-) simultaneous with one another.
An eternal God is ET simultaneous with all events. This means that even two events that are temporally distinct in time are nonetheless simultaneous with God in eternity.

God as within time (everlasting)

God as within time is the view that God is a temporal being, meaning existing within time.
God’s necessity is unlike other temporal beings though in that God has no beginning or end, meaning God is everlasting, i.e., lasts forever in time.
Some philosophers argue for God as everlasting because they think it helps to make sense of God being able to act in the world within time.
It’s easy to see how an everlasting God would respond to prayers or perform miracles, for example.
Being everlasting is also thought to help explain how God could have knowledge of tensed propositions, such as what time it is ‘now’.
An everlasting God exists in time like we do, so perceives time unfolding moment by moment.

The paradox of the stone

A paradox is a proposition or concept which might appear consistent but which upon further analysis seems to entail incoherence.
Paradox of the stone (Mackie’s omnipotence paradox):
Can God create a stone so heavy that God cannot lift it?
If God can create the stone, then God can’t lift it, which means he cannot do everything.
If God can’t create the stone, then it’s also the case that God cannot do everything.
Whatever answer we give, it looks like there is at least one thing that God cannot do.
So, there is at least one thing God cannot do.
Aquinas has the most popular definition of omnipotence, that God can do any logically possible thing.
This stone isn’t conspicuously impossible though, like a four-sided triangle. So there’s no obvious reason why God shouldn’t be able to create it.
So, the idea of an omnipotent being which is all-powerful or could do anything or any logically possible thing is paradoxical.
The God of classical theism is therefore incoherent.

The Euthyphro dilemma

The Euthyphro dilemma Comes from Plato’s works.
A Dilemma is when there are two ways something could be, each way leading to a problem. The two options are called horns.
God’s Omnibenevolence involves God being the source of perfect moral goodness.
The Euthyphro dilemma challenges that there are two ways that could be.
In its modern form, the Euthyphro dilemma asks:
Is what God commands good because it is good (1st horn), or is it good because God commands it? (2nd horn).
The first horn is that what God commands is intrinsically good independently of God. God is at best a messenger, perfectly good only because he perfectly follows an intrinsically good moral standard that is separate from God. This undermines the essential relationship between God and morality presupposed by omnibenevolence. This also conflicts with omnipotence, since that external moral standard is beyond God’s power to control.
The second horn is that it is God’s act of commanding something that makes it good. This implies that God is the source of perfect goodness because perfectly good is whatever God commands it to be. This leads to the arbitrariness problem, that God could change his mind about what is good and e.g., tomorrow command murder to be good and then it would be good.
So, whichever way we understand God being the source of all moral goodness due to being omnibenevolent appears to lead to a philosophical problem.

The issue of whether omniscience is compatible with free will

Omniscience means all-knowing, that God infallibly knows everything.
Christian doctrine typically holds that humans have ‘libertarian’ free will.
This defines free will as the ability to have done otherwise than what we did.
The issue is that if God is all-knowing, it seems God would know all future human actions.
Since God is infallible, God cannot be wrong.
So, if God knows in every case what I’m going to do next, then I can’t possibly do otherwise.
So, in no cases can my actions be free.
Omniscience appears incompatible with free will.

The concept and nature of God model essay plan

Note that this model essay plan is merely one possible way to write an essay on this topic.

Points highlighted in light blue are integration points
Points highlighted in green are weighting points

This essay will argue…

The Euthyphro dilemma

A Dilemma is when there are two ways something could be, each way leading to a problem. The two options are called horns.
God’s Omnibenevolence involves God being the source of perfect moral goodness.
The Euthyphro dilemma challenges that there are two ways that could be.
In its modern form, the Euthyphro dilemma asks:
Is what God commands good because it is good (1st horn), or is it good because God commands it? (2nd horn).
The first horn is that what God commands is intrinsically good independently of God. This implies that God is the source of perfect goodness because he perfectly follows an intrinsically good moral standard that is separate from God. The problem is this conflicts with omnipotence, since that external moral standard is beyond God’s power to control.
The second horn is that it is God’s act of commanding something that makes it good. This implies that God is the source of perfect goodness because perfectly good is whatever God commands it to be. This leads to the arbitrariness problem, that God could change his mind about what is good and e.g., tomorrow command murder to be good and then it would be good.
So, whichever way we understand God being the source of all moral goodness due to being omnibenevolent appears to lead to a philosophical problem.
The first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma claims a conflict between omnibenevolence and omnipotence.
However the second horn seems weaker because it doesn’t attack the coherence of the concept of God itself.
It attacks a particular Christian doctrine, that God’s commands are arbitrary and thus changeable.
Some Christians could simply accept that God could change morality, and then the Euthyphro dilemma would be no issue for them.
E.g., W. L. Craig say that if God commanded genocide, as God appeared to in the Bible towards the Canaanites, then it would become morally good. He admits that would feel very uncomfortable to him, but nonetheless points out there is no logical incoherence there.

Counter:

Swinburne has an effective solution to the first horn.
He defines omnipotence as the power to do any logically possible thing.
It is logically possible that the separate standard of goodness is necessary. It’s not logically possible to change it, even for an omnipotent being.
So, God’s inability to change it would not contradict his omnipotence.
This is enough to solve the euthyphro dilemma, since the first horn can be accepted without difficulty.

Evaluation

However there is a stronger response which shows it to be a false dilemma and avoids both horns.
This popular response made by Aquinas, Anselm, Augustine and more recently Adams, involves appealing to a third option of God’s nature, making the Euthyphro a false dilemma.
A false dilemma is one which poses two options when really there are more. The third option is that what God commands is good because it accords with God’s omnibenevolent nature.
This avoids the arbitrariness problem because God’s choices of what to command are not arbitrary but a consequence of his perfect unchanging loving nature.
This also avoids the other horn of the Euthyphro dilemma; that God commands what is good because it is good. What makes God’s commands good is their accordance with God’s omnibenevolent nature. This avoids the threat to omnipotence made by an external standard to which God must conform. The standard is God himself.
So, the Euthyphro dilemma fails to undermine omnibenevolence.

omniscience vs free will

Omniscience typically means knowing everything.
It seems that would include future human actions.
The issue is, in that case, God knows what I’m going to do next.
So, I can’t have a choice to do otherwise (because God cannot be wrong if God is omniscient).
So, we can’t have free will.
Free will is a doctrine in mainstream Christianity but isn’t absolutely necessary to the religion. Ultimately, this issue attacks the compatibility between mainstream Christian theology and the God of classical theism. It doesn’t directly target the coherence of such a God.

Counter

One response option is to simply give up on the idea that God knows what we’re going to do next.
To preserve our free will, Swinburne argues God must engage in cognitive self-limitation.
God could know our actions if he wanted to, but chooses to limit his knowledge of the future to only that which is physically determined. This would not include actions that are free.
So, God doesn’t know what we’re going to do next
Swinburne’s view is traditionally rejected because being limited within time seems to detract from God’s omnipotence. Anselm views it as a limitation to have certain parts of yourself confined to certain space/time. The greatest conceivable being would be outside of time – not stuck/trapped within. If God can’t get outside of time, he’s not all powerful.
Proposing a self-limited God is also contentious. If God could be limited, then God isn’t unlimited. Aquinas’ account of omnipotence suggests is unable to destroy himself, do evil, or anything which would contradict God’s perfection. This seems to imply God couldn’t limit themselves either.
The eternal view seems stronger as it avoids these controversies and also finds a way for God’s knowledge of our future actions to be compatible with free will.
Anselm and Boethius solve the free will issue by proposing that God is outside time and thus sees all of time in one moment – including our future actions.
God is ET-simultaneous with all temporal events, including our future actions, and thus knows what they are.
This means God knows what we will do next, but only because God eternally sees what we do with our free will at all the times of our life. God’s knowledge does not determine our actions, so we still have free will.
The eternal God solution is criticised as incoherent. God’s knowledge may not force our action, but it still means our actions are fixed or set in stone or necessary.
If God knows I will choose X and God cannot be wrong, then I can’t be free to do otherwise.
However, this objection is defeated by Boethius’ distinction between simple and conditional necessity.
Boethius asks us to imagine seeing someone walking. It’s necessary that they are walking, but they could have chosen not to walk, and then it wouldn’t have become necessary that they are walking.
So sometimes our actions can become necessary yet their necessity still be dependent, conditional on our having freely chosen them.
Similarly, when God views our future actions, this does make them necessary and fixed, but only because, only conditionally on, the fact that we chose them.
It might seem that you can’t be free if your future choices are known by an omniscient being.
But Boethius is drawing attention to the way God knows them, which is eternally observing our future free choices. God wouldn’t know that I’m going to choose X over Y unless I actually freely choose that.
God only eternally sees the future choices he does because God eternally sees the free choices we make at all the times of our life.
So, omniscience does not conflict with free will.

The paradox of the stone

The idea of omnipotence is argued to be paradoxical.
Can God create a stone too heavy for God to lift?
If he can create the stone, he can’t lift it – but if he can’t create it, then he can’t create it.
Whatever answer we give, it looks like there is at least one thing God cannot do.
This undermines God’s omnipotence because he cannot do everything.
Without omnipotence, the ‘God of classical theism’ cannot exist.
This is the strongest issue as it’s the only one which directly and solely attacks the concept of the God of classical theism. The other issues attacked the compatibility of the God of classical theism with certain Christian doctrines. Doctrines which are not even universally held among all Christians.
So, the paradox of the stone is the most crucial issue faced by the concept of God.

Counter:

Descartes’ argument that God created everything, including logic – God is beyond logic. Logic is a human limitation.
So, God could create the stone too heavy for him to lift, and then also lift it.

Evaluation

Philosophers overwhelmingly reject Descartes’ view. This is because they argue he contradicts and undermines himself. If we say that God can do logically impossible things, then they must be possible. Saying God can do the logically impossible is an incoherent statement, since by saying it, it suggests such things actually are possible.
A stronger response which doesn’t violate our intuitions about logic utilises Aquinas’ view of omnipotence.
This states that omnipotence is the power to do anything logically possible.
Aquinas argues we will get to an understanding of omnipotence through an analysis of what it means to be a perfect being. God’s attributes are a function of being a perfect being.
Omnipotence is the power held by a perfect being. It therefore cannot bring about anything contrary to its perfection, such as Illogical things which are imperfect.
This doesn’t detract from omnipotence, in fact it is in the nature of perfect power that it cannot do anything imperfect. Just as God cannot do evil, change, or destroy himself without contradicting perfect omnibenevolence, unchangedness or omnipotence.
So, God cannot create the stone, but that does not detract from his omnipotence if the stone is a logically impossible object.
As Mavrodes points out, an omnipotent being could lift any stone. There can be no such thing as a stone too heavy for God to lift. It’s just as illogical as a four sided triangle.
So Aquinas’ definition of omnipotence is not undermined by God’s not being able to create such a stone.