Summary notes for Cosmological arguments

The Kalam argument (temporal causation)

The Kalam cosmological argument focuses on the coming into being of the universe, explicitly involving temporal causation. Temporal causation is a sequence of temporal events, each having the independent causal power to produce the next effect. The causal power in a temporal series can continue independently of the causal activity of the temporally first cause.
P1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
P2. The universe began to exist (an infinite regress is not possible).
C1. So, the universe has a cause of its existence.
The first premise is justified by the causal principle, which Craig claims is based on the metaphysical principle that something cannot come from nothing.
Craig’s second premise is justified through a priori arguments against an actual infinite, such as the absurdity of an infinite library where half the books would be both less than and equal to the number of total books.
To show the cause of the universe is God:
Scientific explanation applies within the universe and therefore cannot apply to its actual creation. The only other option is that it would have a personal explanation, i.e., intentionally created by an intelligent mind.
This being must have the power to create a universe from nothing (ex nihilo), which means it is omnipotent. It’s impossible for it to be spatially or temporally bounded if space and time did not exist without the universe. A timeless is eternal, meaning it didn’t begin to exist. So, it doesn’t contradict P1 to say it doesn’t have a cause. Ultimately, these are qualities that God would have, so the cause of the universe is God.

Aquinas’ 1st way (motion)

Following Aristotle, by motion Aquinas means any kind of change. Something can only change if it has the potential to change. So, we can understand change as the actualisation of a potential to change in a certain way.
P1. We observe motion.
P2. Motion is the actualization of a thing’s potential to be in motion.
P3. A thing can only come to be in motion by being moved.
P4. A mover must be something that is actual.
P5. A thing cannot move itself.
C1. So, all things in motion must have been moved by something else.
P6. If there were no first mover, there would be no motion now.
C2. Therefore, there must be a first mover which must itself be unmoved (pure actuality). That thing we call God.
Aquinas’ 1st & 2nd ways involve ‘sustaining’ causation. A first primary cause is at the top of a ‘vertical’ hierarchy and brings about all further causes and effects continuously.
Sustaining causation is atemporal as it doesn’t necessarily involve sequenced events occurring one after the other.
Aquinas’ example is a hand (primary cause) moving a stick (secondary cause) which is also moving a stone (effect).
They all move simultaneously, so the hand is not temporally ‘first’. It is first in that the stick and stone derive their motion or causal power from it.
The hand is just an analogy, God is the only primary cause. God sustains the existence of the world and the causal power of all secondary causes within it which we observe.
So the ‘first’ cause/mover is ontologically first in that all further causes depend on it.
This explains his premise that if there is no first cause or mover, there cannot be any further causes or motion.

Aquinas’ 2nd way (atemporal causation)

P1. We observe efficient causation.
P2. Nothing can cause itself.
P3. There is a logical order to sustaining causes: the first cause, then intermediate causes, then an ultimate effect.
P4. If A is the efficient cause of B, then if A doesn’t exist neither does B.
C1. There must be a first sustaining cause, otherwise P1 would be false as there would be no further sustaining causes or effects.
C2. As there is a first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes.
C3. The first cause must itself be uncaused. That thing we call God.
Aquinas’ 1st & 2nd ways involve ‘sustaining’ causation. A first primary cause is at the top of a ‘vertical’ hierarchy and brings about all further causes and effects continuously.
Sustaining causation is atemporal as it doesn’t necessarily involve sequenced events occurring one after the other.
Aquinas’ example is a hand (primary cause) moving a stick (secondary cause) which is also moving a stone (effect).
They all move simultaneously, so the hand is not temporally ‘first’. It is first in that the stick and stone derive their motion or causal power from it.
The hand is just an analogy, God is the only primary cause. God sustains the existence of the world and the causal power of all secondary causes within it which we observe.
So the ‘first’ cause/mover is ontologically first in that all further causes depend on it.
This explains his premise that if there is no first cause or mover, there cannot be any further causes or motion.

Aquinas’ 3rd way (contingency)

A posteriori, based on our experience of contingent beings, which depend on something else for their existence.
Aquinas’ 3rd way (contingency)
P1. We observe that there are contingent beings (things that can possibly not exist).
P2. If it is possible for something to not exist, then there is some time in which it doesn’t exist.
C1. If everything were contingent, then at one time nothing existed.
P2. If nothing once existed, nothing could begin to exist, so nothing would exist now.
C2. So, there must be something that is not contingent, “having of itself its own necessity … That thing we call God.”
Philosophers often interpret the inference from P2 to C1 as involving the impossibility of an infinite regress of explanation, which Aquinas had argued for elsewhere.
An infinite regress of contingent beings would have no explanation. So, it would have to come from nothing, which is absurd.
From there the argument can proceed that since nothing comes from nothing, yet there is something now, we can conclude that it cannot be the case that everything is contingent.

Descartes’ cosmological argument

Descartes’ cosmological argument is made during the second stage of his intuition and deduction thesis, after the cogito but before the proof of the external world.
As a result, there is no mention of causation of objects or motion of objects in the external world, since that has not yet been proven in Descartes’ epistemology.
Instead, Descartes creates a variety of the cosmological argument that uses his own existence to infer God’s existence as the sustaining cause of his own existence.
P1. I am not the cause of my own existence, or I would make myself perfect
P2. My existence at one time does not necessitate my existence at a future time
C1. therefore there must be a cause and sustainer of my existence.
P3. I do not have that power so I depend on something that does
P4. The trademark argument shows that the cause of me must be God
P5. There cannot be an infinite chain of dependency because whatever caused my existence also sustains my existence.
C2. The cause and sustainer of my existence must be God

Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason (contingency)

P1. For every true fact or assertion, there is a “sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise.” (PSR)
P2. A contingent series is itself contingent
C1. So, the contingent series that exists must have a sufficient explanation.
P3. The sufficient reason for contingent beings cannot be found in other contingent beings
C2. So, it must be found in a necessary being, which is God.
C3. So, God exists
Leibniz claims that the principle of sufficient reason (P1) can be known as a necessary truth. Even if we can’t know or even find out what the reason for a true fact is, there must be one.
Any series of contingent beings requires a reason to explain it, even if it’s infinite. That reason cannot be found in any contingent being, since they by definition are explained by something else.
Leibniz illustrates with a geometry book which could have ‘always existed’, being copied from previous versions, yet an explanation is still needed about “why there have always been such books”.
The same is true of the world. Even if the world had always existed, we can still ask why it has always existed.
The chain of explanation can only terminate and be ultimately sufficient in a being that contains its own reason for existence. A necessary being.

The possibility of an infinite series

Hume argues there could be an infinite regress and therefore no first cause. The universe could simply have always existed in some form. God’s existence cannot be appealed to as the explanation of the origin of what exists if there was no origin.
Hume argues that an infinite series doesn’t need an explanation. The series itself is nothing over and above its members, which are each fully explained by the member which came before them.
Modern science also has theories about an infinite regress being possible.
It could be that the universe eternally cycles between expansion and collapse and that a new timeline begins each cycle. In that case, an infinite amount of time never passes. Yet, an infinite series of cycles happened (just not on any particular time-line).
Physicist A. Guth’s ‘inflation’ theory proposes an eternally existing ‘quantum soup’ of energy. The energy fluctuations can sometimes create a universe, which would explain the big bang.
The big bang was the beginning of our time-line.

Hume’s objection to the causal principle

The causal principle is the claim that every event has a cause.
Hume argues the causal principle is not an analytic truth because it can be denied without contradiction.
E.g. we could conceive of an event with no cause.
Swinburne and Leibniz (at times) argue a causal principle could be known a posteriori. Every event we have experienced has a cause. So, the evidence supports the causal principle as an empirical inference.
But Hume still objects.
We can’t assume that conditions we observe within the universe are relevant to its ultimate origin.
To infer from evidence that the universe had a cause requires observing its origin or the origin of other universes, which we currently can’t do.
So, there is no basis, either a priori or a posteriori, for believing the universe had a cause/mover.

The fallacy of composition

Just because something is true of a thing’s parts, doesn’t mean it’s true of the whole.
Russell’s illustration: just because every human has a mother, doesn’t mean the human race has a mother.
We only experience that the parts of the universe have an explanation (like a cause, mover or contingent status)
So, it’s possible the universe has no explanation.
This is an informal fallacy, meaning the error lies in the content and context of the argument, rather than the logical form of the argument.
Sometimes, inferring from parts to whole is valid. So it’s not formally, i.e., necessarily illogical.
However in the case of the cosmological argument, the issue is that we have no basis for thinking that what’s true of the parts is true of the whole. This is argued to make inferring from the parts to the whole a fallacy in this case because of that context.

The impossibility of a necessary being

Hume calls the concept of a necessary being “meaningless”.
A necessary being is one which must exist, that is impossibility non-existent.
However, Hume insists that whatever we can imagine existing, we can imagine not existing. We can mentally picture a thing existing, or simply imagine reality without that thing.
Our mind can never “have to” suppose a being to remain always in existence, in the way that our mind has to conceive that 2+2=4 (Hume’s illustration).
So, there is no being whose non-existence is an inconceivable contradiction.
Our mind is incapable of giving meaning to the idea of a being existing necessarily.
So, the idea of a necessary being is ‘meaningless’ because we cannot even conceptualise such a thing.

Cosmological arguments model essay plan

Note that this model essay plan is merely one possible way to write an essay on this topic.

Points highlighted in light blue are integration points
Points highlighted in green are weighting points

Intro

This essay will argue…

A strength of cosmological arguments from causation are their appeal to the causal principle, that every event must have a cause. W. L. Craig claims this is based on the rational intuition that something cannot come from nothing.

Cosmological arguments from causation

Aquinas’ 2nd way from atemporal causation
P1. We observe efficient causation.
P2. Nothing can cause itself.
P3. There is a logical order to sustaining causes: the first cause, then intermediate causes, then an ultimate effect.
P4. If A is the efficient cause of B, then if A doesn’t exist neither does B.
C1. There must be a first sustaining cause, otherwise P1 would be false as there would be no further sustaining causes or effects.
C2. As there is a first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes.
C3. The first cause must itself be uncaused. That thing we call God.
By ‘first’ cause, Aquinas does not mean temporally first in time. He means ‘primary’, in the ontological sense that all other motion and causation depend on its continued sustaining causal operation.
Things we observe are ‘secondary’ causes. They do not have the power to generate causation or motion themselves, because they cannot cause or move themselves. All secondary causation depends on the continued causal operation of a primary cause.
That’s what Aquinas means when he says if there is no first primary cause, there would be none of the causation or motion we observe now.
God must exist to explain the origin of the motion or causal power we observe.

Hume’s critique of the causal principle

Cosmological arguments seem to assume that every event has a cause (the causal principle).
Hume argues the causal principle is not analytic as it can be coherently denied. An uncaused event is not an inconceivable contradiction.
Swinburne and at times Leibniz argue a causal principle could be synthetic a posteriori.
Every event we experience has a cause. That is empirical evidence for a causal principle as a metaphysical principle, rather than a logical one.
Hume objects.
The only relevant evidence for the universe having a cause would be observing the origin of our or other universes.
We can’t assume conditions within the universe are like its ultimate origin.
So, there seems no logical nor evidential basis for the universe having a cause.

Counter

Aquinas’ use of atemporal causation seems to avoid Hume’s critique and is thus stronger than temporal versions like the kalam.
Aquinas’ point is that we observe ‘secondary causes’, beings which lack the power to generate causal power. That’s why they cannot cause/move themselves.
Their causal power could be inherited from other secondary causes, but must ultimately originate from a being which can generate causal power; a primary cause.
So, a secondary cause with no cause is an inconceivable contradiction.
We can’t conceive of a secondary cause that came from nothing because then it wouldn’t have the causal power to be what it is; a secondary cause.

Evaluation:

However, there is no reason to believe sustaining causation exists.
All supposed sustaining causation like Aquinas’ hand example could be explained temporally. Each moment involves a simultaneous transition of kinetic energy between different objects at multiple points in space.
If the universe only involved temporal causes, then it would not need continuous sustaining in the way Aquinas thinks.
Alan Guth’s inflation theory claims the universe has zero total energy, requiring no energy to be created, describing it as the ‘ultimate free lunch’. L. Krauss says this shows how a universe can come from nothing.
This shows Hume took the right position. The universe’s origin could be a radically strange event.
The universe or the causal power we observe in either temporal or sustaining causes could have no ultimate causal explanation. So it needn’t have been caused by a God.

Cosmological arguments from contingency

Stronger because they manage to conclude more about God, that God is a necessary being.
Aquinas’ 3rd way (contingency)
P1. We observe that there are contingent beings (things that can possibly not exist).
P2. If it is possible for something to not exist, then there is some time in which it doesn’t exist.
C1. If everything were contingent, then at one time nothing existed.
P2. If nothing once existed, nothing could begin to exist, so nothing would exist now.
C2. So, there must be something that is not contingent, “having of itself its own necessity … That thing we call God.”

The fallacy of composition

Just because something is true of a thing’s parts, doesn’t mean it’s true of the whole.
Russell: Just because every human has a mother, doesn’t mean the human race has a mother.
Parts of the universe we experience have an explanation (a cause, mover or contingent status)
But that doesn’t mean the whole universe has such an explanation.
This criticism is the strongest as it applies to all versions of the cosmological argument.

This is an informal fallacy, meaning the error lies in the content and context of the argument, rather than its logical form.
Sometimes, inferring from parts to whole is valid. E.g., inferring that a brick wall is made of brick because its parts are.
So it’s not formally, i.e., necessarily fallacious.
However in the case of the cosmological argument, the issue is that we have no basis for thinking that what’s true of the parts is true of the whole. This is argued to make inferring from the parts to the whole a fallacy in this case because of that context.

Hume develops a similar argument: imagine a finite collection of contingent beings, 20 particles, each with their own explanation.
Once you’ve explained each particle, you’ve explained the whole collection.
Hume argues the same is true of an infinite series of contingent beings. Each part is explained by what came before it. The ‘whole’ is explained by the parts.
Russell agrees, noting it’s an assumption that the whole world must have a cause, not merely everything in it.

Counter

Copleston counters:
Cosmological arguments don’t claim the whole has a cause because its parts do. They argue the whole must have a cause because things must have an explanation (or a sufficient reason).
Leibniz’ only begins with an a priori principle of sufficient reason, making his version seem strongest at avoiding this fallacy as it doesn’t even begin with observation of parts.
Edward Feser adds that Aquinas is only making a claim about the things we experience, not the whole universe.
The secondary causes we observe cannot generate their own causal power or contingent existence, but only derive it from prior things like them, making a series.
Copleston argues that a series of events must either be necessary or have an external explanation.
A chain of contingent objects, even if infinite, cannot be necessary. No number of contingent beings can be necessary.

So, even if a series were infinite, it still needs an external explanation.
As Aristotle put it, we could always ask why an infinite series exists.
The existence of a series and/or the motion/causal power in it requires a primary cause or necessary being.

Evaluation

However, Russell & Hume develop this argument into the ‘reification’ fallacy: mistakenly treating an abstract concept as a concrete thing.
In this case, thinking a series is a concrete thing like its parts and thus in need of its own explanation.
Copleston argues all things must have an explanation.
This misses Hume’s point that a series is not a thing, but a mental construction.

This is because a series is nothing over and above its parts.
So, it doesn’t need any further explanation than its parts.
In an infinite series, its parts each have an explanation (in prior causes, potentially ad infinitum).
So, no further explanation of that causal power/contingent existence status is needed, since it simply has always existed.
Aristotle’s question of ‘why’ it has always existed is superfluous. It’s like asking “what causes the totality of causes?” when the totality could just be those causes.
As Russell puts it, our concept of a cause comes from experience of individual things. Copleston fallaciously assumes ‘cause’ applies to a whole series.

The Im/possibility of a necessary being

Hume argues that whatever we can imagine existing, we can imagine not existing.
Our mind never “has to” conceive a being as necessarily remaining in existence, in the way that it has to always conceive that 2+2=4 (Hume’s illustration).
Our mind is not capable of conceptualising or therefore giving meaning to the idea of a being existing necessarily.
So, we can have no idea of a being whose non-existence implies an inconceivable contradiction.
Kant argued existence is not an attribute or property which defines a thing.
Defining a being as ‘necessarily existing’ mistakes existence for a predicate.
Existence cannot be an inalienable property of a being, which further explains why any being could not exist.

Russell concludes necessity is a property of propositions, not beings.
Following Hume and Kant, God’s non-existence is possible.
So the proposition “God exists” cannot be necessary.

Counter

Copleston responds that this critique only applies to the ontological argument.
Anselm argued God’s existence is logically necessary because of what God is. That led to the critique that existence is not a predicate.
By contrast, the cosmological argument is arguing that if a (contingent) world exists, then there must be a necessary being.
Unlike the ontological argument, the cosmological argument doesn’t rely on God’s existence being logically necessary, only metaphysically necessary (as the ultimate explanation of motion, causation, or contingent beings).
Some proponents (Swinburne & Hick) even accept that God is only metaphysically necessary, not logically necessary.
For Copleston, metaphysical necessity means a being that must exist by its nature, not by definition. So Kant’s critique does not apply.
Copleston accuses Russell of reducing metaphysics to logic, treating questions about being as if they were merely about language or propositions.

Evaluation

However, Hume adds a point to his argument which can be used to protect his critique against even these modern defences.
Suppose we were to grant meaning to the concept of a necessary being.
It could simply be the universe itself or some sort of matter that is necessary, rather than God.
This resonates with the ideas from modern cosmology about the possibility of eternal quantum energy which sometimes creates universes.
This illustrates how naturalistic explanations could fill the same role Copleston assigns to a necessary being
Cosmological arguments have no reason to think the necessary being must be God.
So, they cannot give us a reason to believe God exists.