Berkeley’s idealism
Berkeley’s attack on the Primary/secondary quality distinction
Berkeley’s master argument
Idealism and the issue of illusions
Idealism claims we perceive ideas directly as they are because to be is to be perceived. The result seems to be that, for example, when we perceive an object like a stick in water appearing bent that it really is bent. Yet, If we reach into the glass to feel that the stick is straight, while also looking at the stick appearing bent, then we perceive two inconstant properties at the same time. It cannot be the case that the stick is both bent and straight. At most one of those properties can be the reality and the other must therefore be an appearance, i.e., sense data. It follows that there is a distinction between appearance and reality. So, it is not the case that to be is to be perceived and therefore Berkeley’s Idealism is false.
Integration: Idealism fails in its claim that to be is to be perceived, which means it is not the case that the objects of perception are mind-dependent ideas.
Berkeley responds that this is a mistake in the language we use to talk about the situation. When we say ‘the stick is bent’ what Berkeley argues we really mean is that it would look bent under normal conditions, which is clearly false. Berkeley suggests instead saying “the stick looks bent”, which is clearly true. An indirect realist would want to insist that although the stick ‘looks’ bent, it isn’t ‘really’ bent – but that is to presuppose that there is a distinction between appearance and reality, which Berkeley has already denied in his attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction. Illusion is only a problem for a theory if it claims that the stick looks bent but is really straight. For Berkeley, there is no way a thing “really is” aside from how it is perceived. It’s not that he denies that it is “really” straight, it’s that he denies there is any way the stick “really is” aside from how it “looks”; how it is perceived.
Integration: Berkeley denies the inference from the stick looking bent to the claim that the stick really is straight. This is a confusion over what Berkeley meant by ‘to be is to be perceived’. To be bent is merely to look bent, not to possess a quality of bentness.
The argument from illusion against idealism begs the question by assuming that there is a distinction between appearance and reality, i.e., a way the stick really is aside from how it appears. The conclusion that idealism leads to an inconsistency between appearance and reality is based on that assumption, which Berkeley does not have to accept. Indeed, in his master argument and attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction he thinks he has given us reason to disregard that assumption.
Idealism and the issue of hallucinations
A hallucination is the perception of an object which doesn’t exist. The possibility of hallucinations pose a problem for idealism because they are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptions. For Berkeley, a veridical perception is when we perceive an idea that is in the mind of God. Yet, hallucinations according to Berkeley come from our imagination, not from God’s mind. While the imagination normally produces voluntary and relatively dim perceptions which are not vivid, Berkeley argues that at times it can produce involuntary and vivid perceptions.
The problem is, if some perceptions are hallucinations from our imagination and they are subjectively indistinguishable from other perceptions, then we can’t tell the difference between hallucination and reality (reality being an idea in the mind of God).
Integration: Berkeley has an epistemological issue, an issue with scepticism, which is a problem for Berkeley as he claimed that defeating scepticism was a reason to accept his theory over indirect realism.
Berkeley responds that hallucinations lack logical connection to the rest of our experience.
However, this response is unsuccessful because some hallucinations might be logically connected to the rest of our experience however. Someone with a fever might look out a window and hallucinate a person walking down the street. There is nothing illogical about that and so no way to tell.
Idealism and the issue of solipsism
Berkeley’s arguments for Idealism conclude that the the objects of perception are mind dependent ideas. When we perceive a mountain or a tree, they have no mind-independent existence as they are just ideas in my mind. The problem is that it’s difficult to see how this would not apply to other people too. It follows that other people are therefore just ideas in my mind. This is called solipsism, the sceptical view that I can only know that my mind exists.
Integration: this issue does not suggest that Idealism is false. It only shows that Idealism leads to this sceptical issue. It somewhat undermines Berkeley’s claim that his theory is superior to the realist theories because it solves issues of epistemological scepticism.
However, Berkeley thinks that Idealism provides an argument for God’s existence which would show that solipsism is false since God also exists, not just my mind.
In the Dialogues, Berkeley argues that God must exist because our ideas must exist in God when not perceived by us. The complexity and regularity of the ideas we perceive shows that they come from God’s mind.
Idealism faces the issue of explaining the regularity of our perceptions, including their apparent continued existence when unperceived.
If I throw a lit match into an empty room, leave it and come back later, the room will have changed.
According to Berkeley however, ‘to be is to be perceived’. Since the room is unperceived it does not exist, yet Idealism is then left with the problem of explaining how it could have undergone change.
Berkeley solves this problem by claiming that God perceives the room and indeed everything other idea, thereby keeping them in existence regardless of whether any human is observing them.
In the Principles, Berkeley argues that once Idealism is established to be true, an argument for God follows as the required causal explanation of our ideas.
If Idealism is true, our ideas cannot be caused by mind-independent objects. The only other options are that they are caused by other ideas, our own minds or another mind.
Ideas are perceived to be passive, to have no causal power, and since to be is to be perceived, ideas have no causal power.
I can cause some ideas through imagination, but others are involuntary and therefore cannot come from my mind.
So by process of elimination, the third option must be true. The involuntary ideas we experience must come from another mind. Berkeley argues that the immeasurable complexity and regularity of the ideas we experience shows that this other mind must be far greater than our own, i.e., God.
This alone counters Solipsism since if God’s mind exists then my mind is not the only mind. However, Berkeley also argues we at least have some evidence to justify thinking other people have minds too. We can infer that on the basis of our own experience of them.
However, If Berkeley’s attack on the primary/secondary quality distinction and master argument fail to establish idealism, or if some other argument proves idealism false, however, then his inference of God would likewise fail. Berkeley’s defence against solipsism relies on his proof of God, which relies on his arguments for idealism. It’s only if Idealism is true that God’s existence is required to explain the regularity of our perceptions and that therefore my mind is not the only one which exists.
Whether God can be used to play the role that he does in Berkeley’s idealism
In Berkeley’s Idealism, God plays the role of perceiving all ideas and causing our ideas. However, since this involves those ideas being in God’s mind, this leads to an issue.
The idea that God could have the same ideas as us is problematic for the traditional view of God. It would mean that God could experience pain, for example. God cannot suffer. Furthermore, God’s ideas are eternal yet ours are transient. God also has ideas of all possible objects, not just the ones that we experience.
Integration: so, it cannot be the case that our ideas originate from God’s mind. Berkeley is therefore left with the sceptical issues of solipsism and accounting for the origin and regularity of our ideas, including their changing when unperceived.