AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way
- A posteriori observation shows that Natural beings do not behave chaotically or randomly but almost always goal-directedly, towards their good end.
- E.g., flowers move towards the sun. Birds fly south in winter. The motion of planets.
- Natural beings are not sufficiently intelligent to direct their own behaviour.
- So, there must be some intelligent being which designed natural beings with this orientation to their good end.
- To illustrate, Aquinas points out that humans can give an inanimate object goal-directed behaviour through exerting force on it, like an archer does with an arrow.
- If we see an arrow directed towards a target, we infer that there must be an archer who shot it.
- Similarly, we can infer there must be an intelligent mind responsible for the goal-directed behaviour of non-intelligent natural beings.
- This mind is directing objects in a much greater way than we can.
- It uses natural laws (laws of nature/physics).
- All beings have a nature which inclines their behaviour towards their goal (telos).
- E.g. bird nature is to fly south in winter.
- Objects are directed towards their good end through the design and creation of natural laws.
- So, a designer of natural laws exists: “That thing, we call God.”
AO1: Paley’s design qua purpose (watch)
- Imagine walking on a heath and seeing a rock. The rock seems like it could have existed forever. Nothing about it suggests otherwise.
- However Paley claims we would think differently if we found a watch, because it has complexity enabling purpose.
- Its purpose depends on the exact individually intricate structure of its parts and their precise arrangement in relation to each other.
- Complexity by itself is not enough, since it can occur by chance. E.g. if we come across sand on a beach, it forms a complex pattern but does not indicate design.
- However if we came across a sand castle, that complex arrangement of the sand serves a purpose. It’s so unlikely to occur by chance that it’s more reasonable to infer design.
- So we can infer design when a thing has the property of purpose enabled by complexity.
- This property we observe in the watch, we also observe in nature.
- E.g. the human eye, wings of a bird and fins of a fish are made of individually complex parts precisely arranged to enable the purpose of sight.
- So, nature must have a designer.
- Nature is much grander and greater than any human design, so the designer of the nature must be greater and more powerful than any human designer.
- Furthermore, a designer is a mind which is distinct from what is designed.
- So, a mind which designed the world and is distinct from it exists.
- This argument is typically interpreted as inductive and a posteriori, because its premises involve observations of the world which are used as evidence for the conclusion that God exists.
AO2: The validity of analogy
- Swinburne supports design arguments by arguing analogical argumentation is scientifically valid.
- Imagine a scientist doesn’t know the cause of X, but they know X is similar to Y, which they do know the cause of.
- It is rational to hypothesise that the cause of X is similar (analogous to) the cause of Y.
- Design arguments employ exactly the same form of inductive reasoning:
- Things in nature are like things humans create (Paley’s watch) or direct (Aquinas’ arrow).
- So, the cause of those natural things is analogous, i.e., an intelligent mind.
Counter:
- Hume objects that like effects do not imply like causes.
- E.g. Dry ice and fire are not alike as causes, but their effect (smoke) is alike.
- So,things in nature being like a watch or an arrow doesn’t prove their causes are alike (i.e., an intelligent mind).
- Hume further argues it doesn’t even provide probabilistic evidence, as Swinburne claimed.
- He attacks the analogy between artefacts and natural beings as weak, because of their significant disanalogies.
- Artefacts are mechanical, mathematically precisely constructed.
- Whereas the universe is more like an organic thing, more messy, less precise.
- So, the analogy between watches and eyes, or between arrows and the behaviour of birds/flowers is weak.
Evaluation:
- However, Hume’s critique of analogy doesn’t work against versions of the design argument which avoid analogical reasoning in favor of standard inductive probability and/or abductive inference to the best explanation.
- Paley is often interpreted as taking one of those forms today.
- On this reading, design arguments identify a property which is so unlikely to have come about by chance that design is a better explanation.
- The universe is like the watch (or the arrow), but that’s not what makes it designed.
- It’s designed because it has the property of complexity and purpose, or goal-directedness (or fine-tuning etc).
- The watch & arrows are just illustrations of how we infer design from that property.
- So, Hume’s critique of analogy fails.
AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
- Hume argues that even if the design argument succeeded, it cannot prove the Christian God in particular.
- Just as possible is a committee of Gods (polytheism), a junior God, or even a God who then died.
- There is no basis for preferring the Christian God as an explanation of the design in the universe, compared to those other options.
- So, the design argument could be inductively cogent, meaning its premises are well-supported and it provides strong probabilistic support for its conclusion.
- And yet, it would still be limited in scope, as it cannot justify belief in any particular God.
Counter:
- Swinburne counters Hume, using the abductive reasoning of Ockham’s razor, since one God is simpler than multiple.
- However the main problem for Hume is that Aquinas, Paley and Swinburne aren’t trying to prove the Christian God in particular.
- They know the design argument is limited to proving some generic designer.
- They all broadly follow the approach laid out by Aquinas’ Natural theology.
- This involves inductive a posteriori argument aimed at supporting faith.
- Belief in a particular God is still made more reasonable by an argument that only shows there is some kind of God.
Evaluation
- So, sophisticated proponents of design arguments are appropriately careful about the scope of their conclusion.
- Hume overreached with this critique and risks committing a straw man fallacy.
- As Aquinas says in the end of all his 5 ways, ‘that thing we call God’.
- This indicates awareness that the argument doesn’t prove exactly what that designer is.
- That’s where the proper role of faith comes in, that the designer he’s found evidence for is the Christian God.
- This minimal support for faith through evidence of some higher power is the sole purpose of the argument.
- Hume incorrectly assumed it aimed to do more.
AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
- Hume’s epicurean hypothesis claims an eternal universe made of atoms is guaranteed to sometimes assemble into orderliness by chance.
- In infinite time, every possibility becomes certain to occur at some point.
- Hume’s not claiming this is true, just that it is possible.
- It’s an abductive counter-example which breaks the necessity of inferring from order to God.
- Of course, the current evidence for the big bang suggests the universe isn’t eternal.
- Nonetheless, we can use the multiverse in the same way.
- Rather than infinite time, it involves infinite space (universes).
- Some versions claim all metaphysically possible permutations of beings (spatial order) and physical laws (temporal order) exist.
- This attacks all possible versions of the design argument.
- Whatever they could point to (organisms, natural laws or fine-tuning) can be explained by the hypothesis that every possible state or thing exists somewhere in the multiverse.
Counter
- Defenders of fine-tuning argue that the multiverse relies on very speculative physics, has no evidence for it, and seems potentially unfalsifiable.
- Swinburne argues a scientific explanation is impossible, since science can only discover which laws exist, not explain why there are such laws.
Evaluation
- However, the multiverse hypothesis is taken seriously by physicists.
- It’s not incoherent, so Swinburne can’t dismiss scientific explanation as impossible.
- Regarding its lack of evidence, we can follow Hume’s method and deploy it as an abductive counter-example which breaks the inference to God.
- This treats the multiverse as a competing hypothesis to God.
- Both are equal in explanatory power regarding the world.
- This is not a stalemate, since it shows design is not the only reasonable explanation of our universe.
- So, the teleological argument loses its persuasive force.
- It cannot give us a reason to believe that a God is the explanation of the way the universe is.
AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design
- Paley and Aquinas appealed to the complexity and purpose of organisms.
- However, evolution by natural selection can also explain that.
- There is variation in species. Members that are better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and pass on the genes which code for that adaptation.
- Over time, this causes a greater prevalence of those traits in the species as it becomes increasingly adapted to its environment.
- This makes animals appear designed for survival. Really, those traits evolved over millions of years due to natural selection causing increasing adaptation.
- This includes traits like instincts guiding animal behaviour, which explains Aquinas’ claim that they have a telos.
- Dawkins wrote ‘the blind watchmaker’ referencing Paley. Taking Paley’s example of the eye, Dawkins explains how it could have evolved part by part over hundreds of millions of years.
- So yes there is a watchmaker, but it is ‘blind’, meaning merely the blind mechanical force of natural selection.
- Dawkins concludes complexity and purpose in organisms can be explained through simpler, more scientific means. This suggests belief in a designer is unnecessary.
AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil
- Darwin noted how vicious natural selection is, concluding “I cannot see evidence of design”.
- He illustrates with digger wasps which lay eggs inside caterpillars that are eaten from the inside when they hatch.
- He concludes it’s not credible to think a perfect God designed this world.
- Hume’s evidential problem of evil makes this point more philosophically.
- Excessive and dysteleological suffering could have been avoided if nature were designed differently.
- So, natural evil is evidence against a perfect creator and designer.
- This is a stronger critique than Hume’s ‘committee of God’s’ objection.
- It claims the world could not have been designed by the Christian God, not merely that it could have been another God.
Counter
- Religious philosophers attempt to respond with theodicies.
- These generally claim it is logically impossible for God to remove evil without also removing some greater good necessarily connected to evil.
- E.g., our deserved punishment for Augustine, free will for Plantinga or soul-making for Hick.
Evaluation
- However, natural evil kills innocent children and animals.
- Free will or punishment cannot excuse such cases.
- Hick would insist random evil is how a perfect God would design the world, to maintain the epistemic distance which enables soul-making.
- However, by definition there can’t be evidence for that claim; it is unfalsifiable.
- So all theodicies are vulnerable to Hume’s evidential argument.
- God may be consistent with the evidence, but can’t be inferred from the evidence.
- Design arguments are intended by natural theologians (Aquinas, Paley etc) to support faith in the Christian God, through providing evidence for a generic designer.
- Hume’s critique undermines this aim.
- It shows the only rational inference from observation of an imperfect world, would be to an imperfect designer.
- When we make a full accounting of all the evidence, including evil, we see that inference from imperfection to perfection is empirically invalid.
AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
- Tennant broadened the design argument to the overall structure, regularity and intelligibility of the universe.
- Swinburne developed this, arguing Aquinas’ focus on temporal order was ‘wiser’ than Paley’s focus on spatial order..
- Evolution can explain spatial order (e.g., the eye), but not the laws of nature.
- Physical constants like the charge of the electron must be extremely precise for our universe to be life-permitting..
- A tiny degree different and there would be chaos.
- So, fine-tuning by a God is more reasonable than chance.
Counter
- However, anthropic fine tuning relies on the assumption that the constants of nature are contingent.
- The assumption is that while laws of logic are necessary, there’s no contradiction in a universe with different laws.
- This overlooks that the laws of nature could be a metaphysical necessity.
- There could be a deeper reason why our constants just are what reality must be.
- Physicists seek a Grand Unified Theory of Everything, which could show that our physical laws arise from mathematical necessity.
- So, just because we can mathematically conceive of different laws, doesn’t mean different laws are metaphysically possible.
Evaluation
- Evolution demonstrates a broader critique of the bad design of design arguments, which modern ideas of necessary laws and multiverses merely extends.
- Design arguments point to current scientific ignorance and claim God must explain it.
- Despite their best efforts to avoid being a God-of-the-gaps style argument, they do fall into that fallacy.
- Advances in biology undermined Paley’s argument.
- But crucially, Paley’s argument was never justified to begin with.
- A lack of scientific explanation doesn’t justify inferring God.
- So, lacking explanation for the intelligibility or laws of nature doesn’t justify inferring God.
- It’s not justified to believe God explains X, just because we can’t think how else X could be explained.
Question preparation
Key paragraphs:
- Aquinas’ 5th way
- Paleys’ design argument
- Hume’s critique: of analogy
- Hume’s critique: of the committee of Gods
- Hume & Darwin’s critique: of the evil in the world suggesting it couldn’t have been designed by a perfect God like the Christian God.
- Evolution
- Swinburne’s design argument – modern development of Aquinas’ 5th way – focused on the laws of physics being designed (can’t be explained by evolution).
Question types:
Questions focused on Hume’s critiques
E.g. “How convincing are Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument” [40]
- Hume’s critique: of analogy
- Hume’s critique: of the committee of Gods
- Hume & Darwin’s critique: of the evil in the world suggesting it wasn’t designed by a perfect God
Questions focused on evolution
E.g. “Does evolution counter the design argument? [40]
- Minor AO1 for Paley/Aquinas
- Evolution (full AO1).
- Swinburne’s design argument (the laws of physics are designed – and they didn’t evolve – unlike Paley’s example of the eye)
- Hume & Darwin’s critique: of the evil in the world suggesting it wasn’t designed by a perfect God
Critically compare Aquinas’ 5th way with Paley’s design argument [40]
- Aquinas’ 5th way – moderate AO1
- Paley – moderate AO1
- Evolution (counters Paley more)
- Swinburne (defends Aquinas as better than Paley)
- Hume & Darwin on evil (says both fail equally)
“Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument are the most serious that it faces” – Discuss. [40]
- This question requires you to judge whether Hume or evolution poses the greater challenge to the design argument. Saying Hume fails and evolution succeeds would be easiest.
- Aquinas’ 5th way – minor
- Paley – minor
- Debate over analogy
- Hume’s ‘committee of God’s’ critique
- Evolution
Weirdly worded questions:
Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]
They could word this question more sneakily like this:
Is God’s existence best justified a posteriori?
Is God’s existence best justified a priori?
- This type of question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
- This question combines ontological (a priori) with one or more of the a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
- Do one paragraph on each of the three arguments: ontological, teleological & cosmological.
- You will then have judged whether:
- They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain).
- One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
- They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).
E.g.:
- Anselm vs Kant
- Paley vs Evolution
- Aquinas’ 3rd way vs the fallacy of composition (Hume & Russell)
You should try and sprinkle in some comparative statements even if treating the arguments separately. Or ideally – when discussing the criticisms of the theories – especially highlighting how they are problems for the a priori or a posteriori nature of the arguments they are criticising.
Does the teleological argument contain logical fallacies? [40]
- Just a weird way of asking whether the argument has any logical errors/mistakes in it – whether the criticisms of it succeed.
- Probably simplest to treat this as a question about Hume’s critiques (though you’d need moderate AO1 for Paley/Aquinas). The evolution critique isn’t saying there is a logical fallacy in the argument – just that science goes against it. But you could argue evolution shows a logical fallacy – the fallacy of assuming that because science can’t (currently) explain something, that therefore God must be the explanation.