The Teleological argument: OCR A grade notes

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Philosophy ↗︎
Question preparation ↓

AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way

  • Aquinas’ 5th Way is an a posteriori argument based on observation.
  • Natural beings do not behave chaotically but almost always act in a goal-directed way towards their good end.
  • We see this in flowers turning towards the sun, birds flying south in winter, and the motion of planets.
  • This regularity suggests behaviour is not due to chance.
  • However, these beings are not sufficiently intelligent to direct themselves.
  • They cannot understand or choose their goals.
  • So there must be some intelligent being which directs them towards their ends.
  • Aquinas illustrates this with the example of an archer and an arrow.
  • An arrow moves towards a target, but only because it is directed by an archer.
  • The arrow itself has no awareness of its purpose.
  • So when we observe goal-directed behaviour, we infer an intelligent director.
  • Similarly, natural objects must be directed by an intelligent mind.
  • God directs them through natural laws, which govern their behaviour.
  • Each being has a nature which inclines it towards its telos.
  • So Aquinas concludes that the order of nature points to an intelligent designer, “that thing we call God”.

AO1: Paley’s design qua purpose (watch)

  • William Paley asks us to imagine walking on a heath and seeing a rock.
  • The rock seems like it could have existed forever, since nothing about it suggests otherwise.
  • However, Paley claims we would think differently if we found a watch, because it has complexity enabling purpose.
  • Its purpose depends on the intricate structure of its parts and their precise arrangement in relation to each other.
  • Complexity alone is not enough to indicate design, since it can arise by chance.
  • For example, sand on a beach forms complex patterns but does not suggest design.
  • However, a sandcastle is different.
  • Its complex arrangement serves a purpose and is highly unlikely to occur by chance.
  • So it is more reasonable to infer that it was designed.
  • Paley concludes that we can infer design when something has purpose enabled by complexity.
  • This same property is found in nature.
  • The human eye, wings of birds, and fins of fish are composed of complex parts arranged to perform functions such as seeing, flying, and swimming.
  • So nature also shows complexity directed towards purpose.
  • So there must be a powerful, intelligent mind responsible for the world.
  • The argument is inductive and a posteriori, as it reasons from observation to a conclusion about God’s existence.

AO2: The validity of analogy 

  • Swinburne defends analogical reasoning as scientifically valid.
  • If we observe X and know it is similar to Y, whose cause we understand, it is rational to infer a similar cause.
  • Design arguments apply this to nature.
  • Objects in nature resemble artefacts or directed objects like watches or arrows.
  • So their cause is likely analogous, an intelligent mind.
  • This makes analogy a legitimate way of reasoning from known to unknown causes.

Counter

  • However, Hume argues that similar effects can have very different causes.
  • For example, dry ice and fire both produce smoke but arise from different causes.
  • So similarity does not justify inferring similar causes.
  • He also claims the analogy between artefacts and the universe is weak.
  • Artefacts are precise and mechanical, while the universe appears more organic and irregular.
  • So the comparison between watches and natural objects lacks sufficient similarity.

Evaluation

  • Hume’s critique fails against stronger interpretations of design arguments.
  • Many modern readings of Paley do not rely on analogy but on inference to the best explanation.
  • The watch is better seen as an illustration of how complexity and purpose typically arise from minds.
  • The argument instead focuses on the improbability of such features arising by chance.
  • This removes dependence on the strength of analogy.
  • The same applies to Aquinas’ 5th way, where the arrow illustrates goal-directedness rather than forming a strict comparison.
  • So Hume targets a weaker version of the argument.
  • Once reformulated probabilistically, design arguments avoid his criticism.

AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation 

  • Hume argues that even if the design argument succeeds, it cannot prove the Christian God in particular.
  • Alternative explanations remain equally possible, such as multiple gods, a limited designer, or a god who later died.
  • There is no basis for preferring the Christian God over these options.
  • So the argument could be inductively cogent, yet still limited in scope.

Counter

  • Swinburne responds using Ockham’s razor, arguing that one God is a simpler explanation than many.
  • More importantly, Aquinas, Paley and Swinburne do not aim to prove the Christian God.
  • Their arguments belong to natural theology, using inductive a posteriori reasoning to support belief.
  • Evidence for a generic designer still increases the plausibility of a specific God.

Evaluation

  • Hume’s critique overreaches because it targets a stronger claim than design arguments intend to make.
  • Sophisticated defenders are careful to limit their conclusion to a generic designer.
  • Aquinas explicitly ends his argument by referring to “that thing we call God,” showing awareness of this limitation.
  • The argument is not meant to establish the full nature of God, but to provide a rational foundation for belief.
  • Faith then identifies this designer as the Christian God.
  • This division of labour between reason and faith is central to natural theology.
  • So Hume’s objection commits a straw man by assuming the argument aims to prove more than it does.
  • The limitation in scope is not a weakness, but an intended feature of the argument.

AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse

  • David Hume’s epicurean hypothesis suggests that if the universe were eternal, random atomic combinations would eventually produce order by chance.
  • Given infinite time, even highly ordered structures would occur.
  • Hume does not claim this is true, only that it is possible.
  • This breaks the claim that order must come from God.
  • A modern example which makes the same point would be the multiverse, where many universes exist, making ordered ones unsurprising and explicible by chance.

Counter

  • However, Swinburne argues the multiverse is highly speculative and lacks direct evidence.
  • It may also be unfalsifiable, so it cannot function as a proper scientific explanation.
  • Swinburne concludes that science can describe laws but cannot explain why those laws exist at all.

Evaluation

  • Nonetheless, the multiverse remains a serious challenge to design arguments.
  • Even if it is speculative, it is not incoherent and is taken seriously in physics.
  • More importantly, Hume’s point does not depend on it being true, only possible.
  • If another explanation of order is available, the inference to God is no longer necessary.
  • This weakens the force of design arguments, which aim to show that God is the best explanation of the universe.
  • If the multiverse can explain order and fine-tuning just as well, then God is no longer especially supported by the evidence.
  • We have no reason to prefer the God hypothesis.
  • So the design argument loses its persuasive power.

AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design

  • William Paley and Thomas Aquinas appeal to the complexity and purpose of organisms as evidence of design.
  • However, Darwinian evolution by natural selection provides an alternative explanation.
  • There is variation within species, and individuals better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and reproduce.
  • They pass on genes coding for advantageous traits, which become more common over time.
  • This leads to increasing adaptation across generations.
  • As a result, organisms appear designed for survival.
  • In reality, these traits developed gradually through natural selection rather than intentional design.
  • Features such as instincts and goal-directed behaviour can be explained this way.
  • So what Aquinas described as a telos can instead be understood as the outcome of evolutionary processes.
  • Richard Dawkins develops this critique in The Blind Watchmaker.
  • Referring to Paley’s example of the eye, he argues that complex organs can evolve step by step over long periods.
  • Each stage offers a small advantage, allowing gradual development of complexity.
  • Dawkins concludes that there is a “watchmaker”, but it is blind, meaning natural selection rather than a conscious designer.
  • So complexity and purpose can be explained through natural processes, making belief in a designer unnecessary.

AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil

  • Charles Darwin argued that the cruelty of natural selection undermines belief in design.
  • He pointed to cases like parasitic wasps, whose larvae consume hosts alive, as evidence against a benevolent designer.
  • David Hume develops this into the evidential problem of evil.
  • If the world were designed by a perfect God, unnecessary suffering could have been avoided.
  • So natural evil counts as evidence against a perfect creator.

Counter:

  • Religious philosophers attempt to respond with theodicies.
  • These generally claim it is logically impossible for God to remove evil without also removing some greater good necessarily connected to evil. 
  • E.g., our deserved punishment for Augustine, free will for Plantinga or soul-making for Hick.

Evaluation:

  • These responses fail to address the evidential force of natural evil.
  • Suffering inflicted on innocent children and animals cannot plausibly be justified by free will or punishment.
  • Hick’s soul-making defence claims that random suffering is necessary to preserve epistemic distance, but this is unfalsifiable and lacks empirical support.
  • So while God’s existence may be logically consistent with evil, it cannot be inferred from the evidence.
  • This directly undermines the aim of design arguments.
  • Natural theologians like Thomas Aquinas and William Paley appeal to observation to support faith in a perfect God.
  • But once all the evidence is considered, including suffering, the world appears imperfect.
  • So the most reasonable inference is not to a perfect designer, but to an imperfect or limited cause.

AO2: Design arguments after Darwin

  • F. R. Tennant and Swinburne develop design arguments beyond biology to the structure and intelligibility of the universe.
  • Swinburne argues Aquinas’ focus on temporal order is stronger than Paley’s spatial order.
  • Evolution may explain organisms, but not why laws of nature exist.
  • The precise constants required for life suggest fine-tuning by a designer.

Counter

  • This assumes the laws of nature could have been different.
  • However, they may be metaphysically necessary rather than contingent.
  • Physicists search for a unified theory that explains why the constants must be as they are.
  • Just because we can imagine different laws does not mean they are really possible.
  • So fine-tuning may not require explanation by God.

Evaluation

  • The broader problem is that design arguments rely on gaps in scientific explanation.
  • Even in their refined form, they risk becoming a God-of-the-gaps argument.
  • Evolution showed that Paley’s appeal to complexity was misplaced, but more importantly, it revealed a deeper issue.
  • Lack of explanation does not justify inferring God.
  • This same mistake appears in fine-tuning arguments.
  • Just because we cannot currently explain the laws of nature does not mean God is the best explanation.
  • Future science may provide deeper explanations, such as necessary laws or unified theories.
  • So the argument rests on temporary ignorance rather than strong evidence.
  • This makes modern design arguments no more convincing than earlier versions.

Question preparation

Key paragraphs:

AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way
AO1: Paley’s design qua purpose (watch)
AO2: The validity of analogy
AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design
AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil
AO2: Design arguments after Darwin

Question types:

Questions could focus on, or ask for a critical comparison of, any the following:

  • Aquinas’ 5th way
  • Paley’s design argument
  • Hume’s critiques of the design argument
  • Evolution

Can Aquinas’ 5th way be defended against the issue of ‘chance’? [40]

  • AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way (Full amount)
  • AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
    • Evolution argues for ‘chance’, though Swinburne argues Aquinas gets around it – but, there could be necessary laws which would make our existence chance (or perhaps predetermined!).
  • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
    • This argues the world could have come about by chance
  • AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil
    • Evil makes the world appear like it was either the result of chance, or the result of an evil God, or a God who just didn’t care and happened to make us by chance, or created a world that could have made us by chance without caring about nor intending that.

Evaluate whether Hume’s critiques undermine Paley’s design argument [40]

  • Split focused AO1: between Paley’s design argument and Hume’s critiques
  • AO1: Paley’s design qua purpose (moderate amount)
  • Then, any 3 of these 4 will work:
  • AO2: The validity of analogy
  • AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
  • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
  • AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil

“How convincing are Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument” [40]

  • Minor explanation of Paley and/or Aquinas
  • Then, there are 4 critiques from Hume to choose from, I’d do these ones:
  • AO2: The validity of analogy (Hume’s critique)
  • AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
  • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis (Hume’s critique) & the multiverse  (modern extension of Hume’s style of critique)
  • Line of argument / Conclusion: Hume’s analogy and multiple God’s critiques fail, but his epicurean hypothesis succeeds with developments from modern science – so he undermines the design argument.
  • Or you could add his problem of evil critique instead, which you could argue succeeds.

“Does evolution undermine the possibility of arguing for God based on design? [40]

  • Very short AO1 for Paley and Aquinas’ 5th way
  • AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design
  • AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil
  • AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
    • Fine-tuning / anthropic design arguments may get around evolution, but they don’t get around the possibility of ‘necessary laws.
    • The key thing to set up here is: this extends the evolution ‘style’ of critique, by showing scientific explanations block the inference to God. 
    • So Tennant and Swinburne repeat the same mistake as Paley, which evolution already highlighted: assuming that if science can’t explain something, then God does. 
  • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
    • I’d probably leave out the epicurean hypothesis part and focus on the multiverse.
    • The key thing here is that Swinburne attempts to argue a scientific explanation of the laws of physics is impossible. 
    • This could show that modern scientific critiques of design arguments cannot simply extend the evolution style of critique.
    • However, the multiverse is ‘possible’, and therefore Swinburne seems to fail.
    • So design arguments can be accused of a god of the gaps fallacy.
    • Paley assumed organisms couldn’t be explained by science so require God. 
    • Swinburne assumes the same about the laws of physics.
    • So evolution does highlight the flaw in design arguments: the assumption that science being unable to explain something justifies thinking God is the explanation.

Critically compare Aquinas’ 5th way with Paley’s design argument [40]

  • AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way (half amount)
  • AO1: Paley’s design qua purpose (half amount)
  • Then you could do any of the following:
  • AO2: The validity of analogy
    • Ends up saying Paley seems stronger as his argument isn’t based on analogy. Though maybe Aquinas’ doesn’t have to be either?
  • AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
    • They both get around this critique – following Aquinas’ natural theology approach.
  • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
    • This critique destroys all design arguments – showing aquinas and paley both fail equally.
  • AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil
    • This also counters both arguments equally
  • AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
    • Evolution is more of an issue for Paley, since Aquinas focuses on order at the level of natural laws rather than biological organisms – what Swinburne develops into calling ‘temporal order’. But in the end, even Aquinas’ version also fails against modern scientific hypotheses about multiverses and necessary laws.

“Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument are the most serious that it faces” – Discuss. [40]

  • Saying Hume fails and evolution succeeds as a critique would be easiest:
  • Minor explanation of Paley and/or Aquinas
  • AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
  • AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design (moderate amount)
  • AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
  • Then you could do either:
  • AO2: The validity of analogy
    • To show Hume fails even more
  • Or more interesting would be:
  • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
    • This argument from Hume works in style, but needs extending by modern scientific critiques like the multiverse. 

Weirdly worded questions:

Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]
Or: Whether God’s existence best justified a posteriori / a priori [40]

  • This question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
  • You must do the ontological argument, and then at least one of teleo or cosmo – or both. 
  • You will then have judged whether: 
  • They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain). 
  • One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
  • They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).

I’d choose these:

  • AO1: Anselm (short), AO2: Kant (either of Kant’s critiques will do)
    • Kant is more of an upgraded critique than Gaunilo to be frank so an essay which leaves our Gaunilo feels more comprehensive than one which leaves out Kant.
  • AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
    • This is a nice one for this purpose because it covers a variety of design arguments and how they interact with the evolution issue, and then more contemporary issues.
  • AO1: Aquinas’ 3rd way (short), AO2: The fallacy of composition
    • Fallacy of composition targets all versions of the cosmological argument and touches on infinite regress issues and the universe needing no cause – so it’s the best for capturing the overall issues.
  • Or: AO2: The Im/possibility of a necessary being
    • This critique of a necessary being works very well because it attempts to attack both cosmological and ontological – but Copleston replies that it only undermines the ontological argument, not the cosmological, making the cosmological seem stronger. However in the end I evaluate that Hume succeeds, showing all varieties of argument to equally fail (though you could evaluate differently if desired).
  • This question would be answered best if you could highlight how the criticisms of each especially target their a priori or a posteriori nature. 
  • E.g., Kant shows the difficulty of proving existence through definition – which attacks a priori demonstrations of existence.
  • E.g., most criticisms of the design and cosmological arguments exploit its inductive a posteriori nature – by showing the evidence they point to could be explained by alternative conclusions (evolution, or the universe having no cause, or some scientific cause like necessary matter).

Does the teleological argument contain logical fallacies? [40]

  • A very broad definition of a logical fallacy is a mistake in reasoning. 
  • The more standard definition of a fallacy is a particular type of mistake, which are then called formal or informal fallacies.
  • Without getting into that though, it would be simplest to treat this as a question about whether the criticisms highlight flaws in the reasoning of the argument. Not just providing evidence against it. E.g., evolution provides evidence against the design argument – but the fallacy it highlights is the assumption that complexity and purpose implies design, or that science being unable to explain something is a reason to think God designed it (God of the gaps fallacy). 
  • For Hume:
    • AO2: The validity of analogy
      • It’s a fallacy to think human creations are analogous to natural objects.
    • AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation
      • It’s a fallacy to infer the existence of the Christian God in particular
    • AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse
      •  It’s fallacious to assume that complexity and purpose couldn’t come about by chance.