OCR
Philosophy

This page contains A*/A grade level summary revision notes for the Teleological argument topic.

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AO1: Aquinas’ 5th way

A posteriori observation shows that Natural beings do not behave chaotically or randomly but almost always goal-directedly, towards their good end.
E.g., flowers move towards the sun. Birds fly south in winter. The motion of planets.
Natural beings are not sufficiently intelligent to direct their own behaviour.
So, there must be some intelligent being which designed natural beings with this orientation to their good end.
To illustrate, Aquinas points out that humans can give an inanimate object goal-directed behaviour through exerting force on it, like an archer does with an arrow.
If we see an arrow directed towards a target, we infer that there must be an archer who shot it.
Similarly, we can infer there must be an intelligent mind responsible for the goal-directed behaviour of non-intelligent natural beings.
This mind is directing objects in a much greater way than we can.
It uses natural laws (laws of nature/physics).
All beings have a nature which inclines their behaviour towards their goal (telos).
E.g. bird nature is to fly south in winter.
Objects are directed towards their good end through the design and creation of natural laws.
So, a designer of natural laws exists: “That thing, we call God.”

AO1: Paley’s design qua purpose (watch)

Imagine walking on a heath and seeing a rock. The rock seems like it could have existed forever. Nothing about it suggests otherwise.
However Paley claims we would think differently if we found a watch, because it has complexity enabling purpose.
Its purpose depends on the exact individually intricate structure of its parts and their precise arrangement in relation to each other.
Complexity by itself is not enough, since it can occur by chance. E.g. if we come across sand on a beach, it forms a complex pattern but does not indicate design.
However if we came across a sand castle, that complex arrangement of the sand serves a purpose. It’s so unlikely to occur by chance that it’s more reasonable to infer design.
So we can infer design when a thing has the property of purpose enabled by complexity.
This property we observe in the watch, we also observe in nature.
E.g. the human eye, wings of a bird and fins of a fish are made of individually complex parts precisely arranged to enable the purpose of sight.
So, nature must have a designer.
Nature is much grander and greater than any human design, so the designer of the nature must be greater and more powerful than any human designer.
Furthermore, a designer is a mind which is distinct from what is designed.
So, a mind which designed the world and is distinct from it exists.
This argument is typically interpreted as inductive and a posteriori, because its premises involve observations of the world which are used as evidence for the conclusion that God exists.

AO2: The validity of analogy

Swinburne supports design arguments, arguing analogical argumentation is scientifically valid.
If a scientist doesn’t know the cause of X, but they know X is similar to Y, which they do know the cause of. It is rational for the scientist to hypothesise that the cause of X is similar, analogous to, the cause of Y.
Paley and Aquinas seem to be arguing that things in nature are like things humans create (watch) or direct (arrow). So, the cause of those natural things is analogous, i.e., an intelligent mind.

Counter:

Hume objects that things which are like each other can have very different causes.
E.g. Dry ice and fire are not alike as causes, but their effect (smoke) is alike.
So, even if things in nature are like a watch or an arrow, that doesn’t prove the causes are alike (i.e., an intelligent mind).
Hume further argues it doesn’t even provide probabilistic evidence, as Swinburne claims.
The analogy between artefacts and natural beings is weak, because there are significant differences. Artefacts are mechanical, i.e., quite mathematically precisely constructed. Whereas Hume says the universe is more like an organic thing, more messy, less precise, less seemingly designed.
So the analogy between watches and eyes, or between arrows and the behaviour of birds/flowers is weak.

Evaluation:

However, Hume’s critique of analogy doesn’t work against versions of the design argument which are based on probability rather than analogy.
Paley’s argument is often interpreted that way today.
He’s just saying that the universe is designed because it has complexity and purpose. Not because it’s like a watch. That’s just an illustration of how complexity and purpose comes from a designer.
The argument is that it is astronomically improbable for complexity and purpose to arise by chance.
We could also apply this to Aquinas too. The arrow is just an illustration of how goal-directedness comes from a designer.
So, Hume’s critique of analogy fails.

AO2: Hume’s critique: God not the only explanation

Hume argues that even if the design argument worked, it would not prove the Christian God in particular.
Just as possible is a committee of Gods (polytheism), a junior God, or even a God who then died.
There is no basis for preferring the Christian God as an explanation of the design in the universe, compared to those other options.
So, even if the design argument is logically sound, it is limited.

Counter:

Swinburne counters Hume, using Ockham’s razor that one God is simpler than multiple.
However the main problem for Hume is that Aquinas, Paley and Swinburne aren’t trying to prove the Christian God in particular. They know the design argument can’t do that and is limited to proving some generic designer.
They all broadly follow the approach laid out by Aquinas’ Natural theology.
This involves inductive a posteriori argument aimed at supporting faith.
Belief in a particular God is still made more reasonable by an argument that only shows there is some kind of God.

Evaluation

So, sophisticated proponents of design arguments are appropriately careful about the scope of their conclusion.
Hume overreached with this critique and attacked claims they never made.
As Aquinas says in the end of all his 5 ways, ‘that thing we call God’.
This indicates awareness that the argument doesn’t prove exactly what that designer is, but that’s where the proper role of faith comes in, that the designer he’s found evidence for is the Christian God.
That support for faith through evidence of some higher power is the sole purpose of the argument.
Hume’s critique falsely assumes it aimed for more.

AO2: The epicurean hypothesis & the multiverse

Hume’s epicurean hypothesis is that the universe is made of atoms and has existed infinitely.
In infinite time, every possibility becomes certain to occur at some point.
So, an orderly world would be certain to assemble by chance movements of atoms.
Hume uses this as an abductive counter-example. He’s not claiming it is true, just that it is possible.
This breaks the necessity of inferring from order to God.
The problem for Hume is, current evidence for the big bang suggests the universe isn’t eternal.
However, Hume’s approach can be applied to the multiverse.
Rather than infinite time, this involves infinite space (universes).

Some versions claim all metaphysically possible permutations of beings (spatial order) and physical laws (temporal order) exist in some universe.
This attacks all current and possible versions of the design argument.
Whatever they point to (Paley’s organisms, Aquinas’ natural laws or Tennant/Swinburne’s fine-tuning) can all be explained by the hypothesis that every possible state or thing exists somewhere in the multiverse.

Counter

Defenders of fine-tuning argue that the multiverse relies on very speculative physics, has no evidence for it, and seems potentially unfalsifiable.
Swinburne argues a scientific explanation is impossible, since science can only discover which laws exist, not explain why there are such laws.

Evaluation

However, the multiverse hypothesis is taken seriously by physicists.
It’s not incoherent, so Swinburne can’t dismiss scientific explanation as impossible.
Regarding its lack of evidence, we can follow Hume’s method and deploy it as an abductive counter-example which breaks the inference to God.
This treats the multiverse as a competing hypothesis to God.
Both are equal in explanatory power regarding the world.
This stalemate then actually means the design argument fails.
It shows design is not the only reasonable explanation of our universe.
So, the teleological argument loses its persuasive force. It cannot give us a reason to believe that a God is the explanation of the way the universe is.

AO1: Darwinian evolution vs design

Paley and Aquinas appealed to the complexity and purpose of organisms.
However, evolution by natural selection can also explain that.
There is variation in species. Members that are better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and pass on the genes which code for that adaptation.
Over time, this causes a greater prevalence of those traits in the species as it becomes increasingly adapted to its environment.
This makes animals appear designed for survival. Really, those traits evolved over millions of years due to natural selection causing increasing adaptation.
This includes traits like instincts guiding animal behaviour, which explains Aquinas’ claim that they have a telos.
Dawkins wrote ‘the blind watchmaker’ referencing Paley. Taking Paley’s example of the eye, Dawkins explains how it could have evolved part by part over hundreds of millions of years.
So yes there is a watchmaker, but it is ‘blind’, meaning merely the blind mechanical force of natural selection.
Dawkins concludes complexity and purpose in organisms can be explained through simpler, more scientific means. This suggests belief in a designer is unnecessary.

AO2: Hume & Darwin on Design vs the problem of evil

Darwin noted how vicious natural selection is, concluding “I cannot see evidence of design”. He illustrates with digger wasps which lay eggs inside caterpillars that are eaten from the inside when they hatch.
For Darwin it’s not credible to think a perfect God designed this world.
Hume’s evidential problem of evil makes a similar point. Excessive and dysteleological suffering could have been avoided if nature were designed differently.
So, natural evil is evidence against a perfect creator and designer.
This is a stronger critique than Hume’s ‘committee of God’s’ objection because it claims the world could not have been designed by the Christian God, not merely that it could have been another God.

Counter

Religious philosophers attempt to respond that God cannot remove evil without also removing some greater good necessarily connected to evil.
E.g., our deserved punishment for Augustine, free will for Plantinga or soul-making for Hick.

Evaluation

However, theodicies are unsuccessful because natural evil kills innocent children and animals. E.g., Rowe’s example of a fawn dying in a forest fire. Free will or punishment can’t excuse such cases.
Hick attempts to argue that apparently random evil is actually how a perfect God would design the world, to avoid breaking the epistemic distance and thus enable soul-making.
However, by definition there can’t be evidence for that claim.
God may be consistent with the evidence, but can’t be inferred from the evidence.
So, Hick’s theodicy doesn’t help the design argument.
Design arguments conveniently focus on features of the world that help us. A full accounting including natural evil suggests that if there is a designer, it’s not a perfect God.
Design argument fails in the aim natural theologians held for it, of supporting faith in the Christian God through inductive evidence.

AO2: Design arguments after Darwin

Tennant broadened the design argument to the overall structure, regularity and intelligibility of the universe.
Swinburne developed this, arguing Aquinas’ focus on temporal order was ‘wiser’ than Paley’s focus on spatial order..
Evolution can explain spatial order (e.g., the eye), but not the laws of nature.
Physical constants like the charge of the electron must be extremely precise for our universe to be life-permitting..
A tiny degree different and there would be chaos.
So, fine-tuning by a God is more reasonable than chance.

Counter

However, anthropic fine tuning relies on the assumption that the constants of nature are contingent.
The assumption is that while laws of logic are necessary, there’s no contradiction in a universe with different laws.
This overlooks that the laws of nature could be a metaphysical necessity.
There could be a deeper reason why our constants just are what reality must be.
Physicists seek a Grand Unified Theory of Everything, which could show that our physical laws arise from mathematical necessity.
So, just because we can mathematically conceive of different laws, doesn’t mean different laws are metaphysically possible.

Evaluation

Evolution demonstrates a broader critique of the bad design of design arguments, which modern ideas of necessary laws and multiverses merely extends.
Design arguments point to current scientific ignorance and claim God must explain it.
Despite their best efforts to avoid being a God-of-the-gaps style argument, they do fall into that fallacy.
Advances in biology undermined Paley’s argument.
But crucially, Paley’s argument was never justified to begin with.
A lack of scientific explanation doesn’t justify inferring God.
So, lacking explanation for the intelligibility or laws of nature doesn’t justify inferring God.
It’s not justified to believe God explains X, just because we can’t think how else X could be explained.

Question preparation

Key paragraphs:

Aquinas’ 5th way
Paleys’ design argument
Hume’s critique: of analogy
Hume’s critique: of the committee of Gods
Hume & Darwin’s critique: of the evil in the world suggesting it couldn’t have been designed by a perfect God like the Christian God.
Evolution
Swinburne’s design argument – modern development of Aquinas’ 5th way – focused on the laws of physics being designed (can’t be explained by evolution).

Question types:

Questions focused on Hume’s critiques

E.g. “How convincing are Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument” [40]

Hume’s critique: of analogy
Hume’s critique: of the committee of Gods
Hume & Darwin’s critique: of the evil in the world suggesting it wasn’t designed by a perfect God

Questions focused on evolution

E.g. “Does evolution counter the design argument? [40]

Minor AO1 for Paley/Aquinas
Evolution (full AO1).
Swinburne’s design argument (the laws of physics are designed – and they didn’t evolve – unlike Paley’s example of the eye)
Hume & Darwin’s critique: of the evil in the world suggesting it wasn’t designed by a perfect God

Critically compare Aquinas’ 5th way with Paley’s design argument [40]

Aquinas’ 5th way – moderate AO1
Paley – moderate AO1
Evolution (counters Paley more)
Swinburne (defends Aquinas as better than Paley)
Hume & Darwin on evil (says both fail equally)

“Hume’s criticisms of the teleological argument are the most serious that it faces” – Discuss. [40]

This question requires you to judge whether Hume or evolution poses the greater challenge to the design argument. Saying Hume fails and evolution succeeds would be easiest.
Aquinas’ 5th way – minor
Paley – minor
Debate over analogy
Hume’s ‘committee of God’s’ critique
Evolution

Weirdly worded questions:

Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]

They could word this question more sneakily like this:

Is God’s existence best justified a posteriori?
Is God’s existence best justified a priori?

This type of question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
This question combines ontological (a priori) with one or more of the a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
Do one paragraph on each of the three arguments: ontological, teleological & cosmological.
You will then have judged whether:
They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain).
One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).

E.g.:

Anselm vs Kant
Paley vs Evolution
Aquinas’ 3rd way vs the fallacy of composition (Hume & Russell)

You should try and sprinkle in some comparative statements even if treating the arguments separately. Or ideally – when discussing the criticisms of the theories – especially highlighting how they are problems for the a priori or a posteriori nature of the arguments they are criticising.

Does the teleological argument contain logical fallacies? [40]

Just a weird way of asking whether the argument has any logical errors/mistakes in it – whether the criticisms of it succeed.

Probably simplest to treat this as a question about Hume’s critiques (though you’d need moderate AO1 for Paley/Aquinas). The evolution critique isn’t saying there is a logical fallacy in the argument – just that science goes against it. But you could argue evolution shows a logical fallacy – the fallacy of assuming that because science can’t (currently) explain something, that therefore God must be the explanation.