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Philosophy ↗︎
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AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument

Anselm’s ontological argument involves a purely a priori analysis of the concept of God.
It is intended to be deductive, so the conclusion follows from the premises with necessity.
Anselm illustrates this with a painter who has an idea in their mind before painting it in reality.
This distinguishes between existing in the mind and existing in reality.
He then points to Psalm 14:1 “the fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God’.”
Even atheists who deny God still have an idea of God in their mind.
In Proslogion 2, Anselm argues:
P1. God is the greatest conceivable being (by definition).
P2. It is greater to exist in reality than in the mind alone.
P3. God exists in the mind.
C1. Therefore, God exists in reality.
God cannot exist in the mind alone.
That would be incoherent, since we could then conceive of something greater: God existing in reality.
Anselm develops this reasoning in Proslogion 3:
P1. A necessary being, whose non-existence is impossible, is greater than a contingent being, whose non-existence is possible.
C1. Therefore, God necessarily exists.
Malcolm interprets ‘greater’ in terms of limitation, especially dependence on other things for existence.
God must be unlimited, without the contingencies that make non-existence possible.
So, a being greater than which none can be conceived is one whose non-existence is impossible.
Anselm’s key move is that if such a being is logically possible, then it must exist.

AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection

Gaunilo’s reductio ad absurdum argues that Anselm’s logic leads to absurd results.
If we apply the same reasoning to the greatest possible island, then following P2, it must exist.
This would apply to the greatest version of anything.
Reality would be absurdly ‘overloaded’ with the greatest conceivable versions of all things.
So, Gaunilo claims Anselm’s conclusion does not follow from the premises.
He is therefore denying the deductive validity of the ontological argument.

Counter

However, Anselm replies that the argument is only intended to work in the case of God.
Descartes develops this by arguing that God’s essence includes necessary existence, unlike contingent things.
An island is contingent by definition, as land enclosed by water, so it depends on water for its existence.
Like all empirical things, it can fail to exist.
So, no matter how great or perfect an island is, it remains contingent.
The argument therefore does not transfer to such cases.

Evaluation

This reply defeats Gaunilo because a priori reasoning can only establish the existence of a necessary being.
A priori arguments analyse definitions rather than appeal to experience.
Contingent beings have existence conditions separate from their definition, since they depend on external factors.
So their existence cannot be known a priori.
For example, I can know a priori that a perfect island requires water, but not whether that water exists.
So I cannot know a priori whether any contingent thing exists.
By contrast, a necessary being has no external conditions beyond its definition.
So, if the concept is coherent, existence follows.
There is therefore a relevant difference between God and contingent things which blocks Gaunilo’s analogy.
The objection fails because it tests the argument in a domain where its logic does not apply.

AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding

Gaunilo objects to P3, the claim that God exists in our understanding.
He appeals to the classical idea that God is beyond human understanding.
If this is true, then Anselm cannot claim that God is present in the mind in a way that supports the argument.
So, he cannot move from God being conceived to God existing in reality.
The argument seems to assume a level of conceptual access to God that Gaunilo denies we have.

Counter

Anselm replies with an analogy: we cannot look directly at the sun, yet we can still see by its light.
Likewise, we may not understand what God is, but we can grasp that whatever God is, God is the greatest conceivable being.
We can recognise that in a hierarchy like greatness, there must be a highest point or intrinsic maximum.
That is all the argument requires.
Once we accept that it is greater to exist, the conclusion follows.

Evaluation

This objection fails because it misinterprets what Anselm means by God being “in the mind”.
Anselm uses in intellectu to mean “can be conceived”, not fully understood.
So, Gaunilo attacks a stronger claim than Anselm actually makes, committing a straw man.
The argument does not require full knowledge of God’s nature, only grasp of a formal concept of maximal greatness.
There is a clear distinction between knowing what God is and knowing that God is the greatest possible being.
Anselm only relies on the latter.
Furthermore, Gaunilo’s objection does not affect Anselm’s second form, which avoids this premise.
So even if the criticism worked, it would not undermine the strongest version of the argument.

AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate

The ontological argument claims that denying God’s existence is incoherent, since God is defined as a maximally great being.
Kant argues this misunderstands existence by treating it as a predicate, a property of a thing.
He uses the example of 100 coins: there is no conceptual difference between 100 coins in reality and 100 coins in the mind.
If existence were a predicate, real coins would have an extra quality and be conceptually different.
But they are not.
So, existence is not a predicate.
This challenges the idea that existence makes something greater.

Counter:

However, Descartes does not rely on treating existence as a predicate, but on intuition.
We grasp that God is inseparable from existence, like a triangle is inseparable from three sides.
So Kant’s criticism misses Descartes’ argument.
Malcolm also defends Anselm.
Kant is right about contingent existence, since contingent things depend on something else.
But a necessary being contains the reason for its existence within itself.
So, necessary existence can be a defining quality in a way contingent existence is not.

Evaluation:

So, both Anselm and Descartes’ approaches succeed against Kant’s criticism.
Kant makes the same mistake as Gaunilo, thinking an argument for a necessary being could be undermined by showing it fails when applied to contingent things like coins.

AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Gaunilo criticised the move from necessity in thought to necessity in reality.
The Island (and Kant’s 100 coins) tries to show this mistake when applied to contingent things.
Kant better develops this point in his first critique, by applying it point to necessity itself.
A triangle necessarily has three sides.
But this only shows that if a triangle exists, then it must have three sides.
Likewise, God is defined as necessarily existing.
Yet this only shows that if God exists, then God exists necessarily.
So, necessary existence can be part of the concept of God without proving that God actually exists.
If God exists, denying God’s necessity is contradictory.
But if God does not exist, then neither does God’s necessity.

Counter:

Malcolm responds that Kant’s criticism is incoherent because a necessary being must exist.
If God is a necessary being, then God must exist.

Evaluation

Hick uses modern distinctions between types of necessity to challenge Malcolm.
Anselm and Malcolm argue that a maximally great or unlimited being cannot be contingent.
They then treat this as logical necessity.
Hick objects that this only shows God would be non-dependent and self-explaining (aseity).
This is ‘ontological necessity’, not logical necessity.
It describes how God would exist, not that God must exist.
So, God’s existence could still be a metaphysical ‘sheer fact’.
The ontological argument therefore cannot show that God’s non-existence is contradictory.
It only shows that if God exists, then God exists in a unique, non-contingent way.
So, Kant’s development of Gaunilo’s point is correct: necessity in a concept does not prove actual existence.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Question types:

Question can focus on any of the following:

Anselm (a priori argument based on reason)
Gaunilo
Kant

Can God’s existence be proven a priori? [40]

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Questions focused on Gaunilo:

Short explanation of Anselm’s argument (AO1 is focused on Gaunilo)
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- Kant can work so long as the relevance to Gaunilo is brought out:
- Kant develops Gaunilo’s underlying idea, that there’s a difference between necessity in the mind and necessity in reality. Gaunilo’s island failed because it tested the ontological argument’s logic through application to a contingent thing, but here Kant makes a better application of Gaunilo’s insight to a case of necessity (a triangle having three sides) to critique Anselm.

Questions focused on Kant’s criticisms

This is a hard one but it can be fine to start with a bit of Anselm vs Gaunilo – so long as they are introduced and framed in relation to Kant:
Anselm is what Kant is going to crificise – and Gaunilo’s critique contains the key premise Kant develops (the distinction between necessity in the mind and necessity in reality), though Gaunilo chooses a poor example (of a contingent thing – the island) which Kant himself mistakenly followed in his 2nd critique (with contingent coins) but developed more successfully in his 1st critique (with the necessity of a triangle having 3 sides).
So:
Anselm’s argument (framed as what Kant attacks), then Gaunilo’s island (noting the key premise Kant later develops, but then explaining why it fails due to going in the wrong direction with the island which is contingent.
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
- Ends up making the same mistake as Gaunilo – applying to a contingent thing.
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- Finally applies Gaunilo’s idea successfully to a case of necessity.

Can existence be treated as a predicate? [40]

Introduction:
A predicate is a word that describes a subject. The question of whether existence could be a predicate is central to the ontological argument for God’s existence. Anselm is accused of having faulty reasoning regarding existence being a predicate.
Gaunilo’s idea that Kant developed was that there’s a difference between necessity in the mind, and necessity in reality.
Kant developed that by:
- In his 2nd critique, arguing that existence cannot be a predicate of a thing that necessitates its existence in reality.
- In his 1st critique, arguing that even if necessary existence somehow were a predicate, that would not imply actual existence.

So:
Anselm vs Gaunilo (minor detail for both) – framed for their relevance to Kant.
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- Intro sentence: Here, Kant argues that even if necessary existence could be treated as a predicate, that does not have the implications Anselm thought it did. I.e., it cannot show that God actually does exist.

Example of conclusion: Necessary existence is indeed a predicate, as Malcolm argued – however it being a predicate doesn’t have the logical significance Anselm & Malcolm thought it did – because it cannot establish God’s actual existence.

Are Gaunilo’s criticisms of the ontological argument the most effective? [40]

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument (minor – it’s not the focus)
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
- This fails
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
- This looks more promising than Gaunilo, but Malcolm shows it fails
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- This is the most successful critique, and shows Gaunilo had the right insight but it needed developing through proper application to necessity by Kant and then Hick’s modern distinctions between types of necessity.

LOA: Kant & Hick have the most effective criticism

OR: if you want to make it easier for yourself, do both of Gaunilo’s AO2 sections, and then Kant’s existence is not a predicate section – and argue all the critiques fail, so that Gaunilo is not the most effective because none are effective.

Weirdly worded questions:

Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]
Or: Whether God’s existence best justified a posteriori / a priori [40]

This question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
You must do the ontological argument, and then at least one of teleo or cosmo – or both.
You will then have judged whether:
They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain).
One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).

I’d choose these:

AO1: Anselm (short), AO2: Kant (either of Kant’s critiques will do)
- Kant is more of an upgraded critique than Gaunilo to be frank so an essay which leaves our Gaunilo feels more comprehensive than one which leaves out Kant.
AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
- This is a nice one for this purpose because it covers a variety of design arguments and how they interact with the evolution issue, and then more contemporary issues.
AO1: Aquinas’ 3rd way (short), AO2: The fallacy of composition
- Fallacy of composition targets all versions of the cosmological argument and touches on infinite regress issues and the universe needing no cause – so it’s the best for capturing the overall issues.
Or: AO2: The Im/possibility of a necessary being
- This critique of a necessary being works very well because it attempts to attack both cosmological and ontological – but Copleston replies that it only undermines the ontological argument, not the cosmological, making the cosmological seem stronger. However in the end I evaluate that Hume succeeds, showing all varieties of argument to equally fail (though you could evaluate differently if desired).

This question would be answered best if you could highlight how the criticisms of each especially target their a priori or a posteriori nature.
E.g., Kant shows the difficulty of proving existence through definition – which attacks a priori demonstrations of existence.
E.g., most criticisms of the design and cosmological arguments exploit its inductive a posteriori nature – by showing the evidence they point to could be explained by alternative conclusions (evolution, or the universe having no cause, or some scientific cause like necessary matter).