The Ontological argument: OCR A grade notes

OCR
Philosophy

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument

Anselm’s ontological argument involves a purely a priori analysis of the concept of God.
It is intended to be deductive, so the conclusion follows from the premises with necessity.
Anselm illustrates this with a painter who has an idea in their mind before painting it in reality.
This distinguishes between existing in the mind and existing in reality.
He then points to Psalm 14:1 “the fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God’.”
Even atheists who deny God still have an idea of God in their mind.
In Proslogion 2, Anselm argues:
P1. God is the greatest conceivable being (by definition).
P2. It is greater to exist in reality than in the mind alone.
P3. God exists in the mind.
C1. Therefore, God exists in reality.
God cannot exist in the mind alone.
That would be incoherent, since we could then conceive of something greater: God existing in reality.
Anselm develops this reasoning in Proslogion 3:
P1. A necessary being, whose non-existence is impossible, is greater than a contingent being, whose non-existence is possible.
C1. Therefore, God necessarily exists.
Malcolm interprets ‘greater’ in terms of limitation, especially dependence on other things for existence.
God must be unlimited, without the contingencies that make non-existence possible.
So, a being greater than which none can be conceived is one whose non-existence is impossible.
Anselm’s key move is that if such a being is logically possible, then it must exist.

AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection

Gaunilo’s reductio ad absurdum argues that Anselm’s logic leads to absurd results.
If we apply the same reasoning to the greatest possible island, then following P2, it must exist.
This would apply to the greatest version of anything.
Reality would be absurdly ‘overloaded’ with the greatest conceivable versions of all things.
So, Gaunilo claims Anselm’s conclusion does not follow from the premises.
He is therefore denying the deductive validity of the ontological argument.

Counter

However, Anselm replies that the argument is only intended to work in the case of God.
Descartes develops this by arguing that God’s essence includes necessary existence, unlike contingent things.
An island is contingent by definition, as land enclosed by water, so it depends on water for its existence.
Like all empirical things, it can fail to exist.
So, no matter how great or perfect an island is, it remains contingent.
The argument therefore does not transfer to such cases.

Evaluation

This reply defeats Gaunilo because a priori reasoning can only establish the existence of a necessary being.
A priori arguments analyse definitions rather than appeal to experience.
Contingent beings have existence conditions separate from their definition, since they depend on external factors.
So their existence cannot be known a priori.
For example, I can know a priori that a perfect island requires water, but not whether that water exists.
So I cannot know a priori whether any contingent thing exists.
By contrast, a necessary being has no external conditions beyond its definition.
So, if the concept is coherent, existence follows.
There is therefore a relevant difference between God and contingent things which blocks Gaunilo’s analogy.
The objection fails because it tests the argument in a domain where its logic does not apply.

AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding

Gaunilo objects to P3, the claim that God exists in our understanding.
He appeals to the classical idea that God is beyond human understanding.
If this is true, then Anselm cannot claim that God is present in the mind in a way that supports the argument.
So, he cannot move from God being conceived to God existing in reality.
The argument seems to assume a level of conceptual access to God that Gaunilo denies we have.

Counter

Anselm replies with an analogy: we cannot look directly at the sun, yet we can still see by its light.
Likewise, we may not understand what God is, but we can grasp that whatever God is, God is the greatest conceivable being.
We can recognise that in a hierarchy like greatness, there must be a highest point or intrinsic maximum.
That is all the argument requires.
Once we accept that it is greater to exist, the conclusion follows.

Evaluation

This objection fails because it misinterprets what Anselm means by God being “in the mind”.
Anselm uses in intellectu to mean “can be conceived”, not fully understood.
So, Gaunilo attacks a stronger claim than Anselm actually makes, committing a straw man.
The argument does not require full knowledge of God’s nature, only grasp of a formal concept of maximal greatness.
There is a clear distinction between knowing what God is and knowing that God is the greatest possible being.
Anselm only relies on the latter.
Furthermore, Gaunilo’s objection does not affect Anselm’s second form, which avoids this premise.
So even if the criticism worked, it would not undermine the strongest version of the argument.

AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate

The ontological argument claims that denying God’s existence is incoherent, since God is defined as a maximally great being.
Kant argues this misunderstands existence by treating it as a predicate, a property of a thing.
He uses the example of 100 coins: there is no conceptual difference between 100 coins in reality and 100 coins in the mind.
If existence were a predicate, real coins would have an extra quality and be conceptually different.
But they are not.
So, existence is not a predicate.
This challenges the idea that existence makes something greater.

Counter:

However, Descartes does not rely on treating existence as a predicate, but on intuition.
We grasp that God is inseparable from existence, like a triangle is inseparable from three sides.
So Kant’s criticism misses Descartes’ argument.
Malcolm also defends Anselm.
Kant is right about contingent existence, since contingent things depend on something else.
But a necessary being contains the reason for its existence within itself.
So, necessary existence can be a defining quality in a way contingent existence is not.

Evaluation:

So, both Anselm and Descartes’ approaches succeed against Kant’s criticism.
Kant makes the same mistake as Gaunilo, thinking an argument for a necessary being could be undermined by showing it fails when applied to contingent things like coins.

AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Gaunilo criticised the move from necessity in thought to necessity in reality.
The Island (and Kant’s 100 coins) tries to show this mistake when applied to contingent things.
Kant better develops this point in his first critique, by applying it point to necessity itself.
A triangle necessarily has three sides.
But this only shows that if a triangle exists, then it must have three sides.
Likewise, God is defined as necessarily existing.
Yet this only shows that if God exists, then God exists necessarily.
So, necessary existence can be part of the concept of God without proving that God actually exists.
If God exists, denying God’s necessity is contradictory.
But if God does not exist, then neither does God’s necessity.

Counter:

Malcolm responds that Kant’s criticism is incoherent because a necessary being must exist.
If God is a necessary being, then God must exist.

Evaluation

Hick uses modern distinctions between types of necessity to challenge Malcolm.
Anselm and Malcolm argue that a maximally great or unlimited being cannot be contingent.
They then treat this as logical necessity.
Hick objects that this only shows God would be non-dependent and self-explaining (aseity).
This is ‘ontological necessity’, not logical necessity.
It describes how God would exist, not that God must exist.
So, God’s existence could still be a metaphysical ‘sheer fact’.
The ontological argument therefore cannot show that God’s non-existence is contradictory.
It only shows that if God exists, then God exists in a unique, non-contingent way.
So, Kant’s development of Gaunilo’s point is correct: necessity in a concept does not prove actual existence.