OCR ↗︎
Philosophy ↗︎
Question preparation ↓

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument

• Anselm’s ontological argument involves a purely a priori analysis of the concept of God
• It’s deductive, so that the conclusion follows from the premises with necessity.

• In Proslogion 2, Anselm argues:
• There is a distinction between existing in the mind, and existing in reality, illustrated by the way a painter has an idea in their mind before painting it in reality
• He then justifies his first premise by pointing to Psalm 14:1 “the fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God’”, to show atheists must have a definition in their mind of the God they are rejecting.

• P1. God is defined as the greatest conceivable being.
• P2. It is greater to exist in reality than the mind alone
• P3. God exists in the mind
• C1. Therefore, God exists in reality

• If God is defined as the greatest conceivable being, then it’s incoherent to think we can imagine anything greater.
• It is therefore incoherent to thinking of God as only in the mind means we could think of something greater, God existing in reality.
• To argue that God does not exist, is to say that God is not God.

• In Proslogion chapter 3 Anselm argues:
• P1. A necessary being whose nonexistence is impossible is greater than a contingent being whose nonexistence is possible.
• C1. Therefore, God (as the greatest conceivable being), necessarily exists.

• Malcolm interprets Anselm’s term ‘greatest’ as referring to God being unlimited, without any of the contingencies of ordinary beings that make their non-existence possible.
• So, a being greater than which none may be conceived is one whose nonexistence is impossible.
• In his later replies to critics, Anselm puts it that if such a being is logically possible, then it must exist.

AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection

• Gaunilo’s ‘reductio ad absurdum’ critique argues absurdity results from applying Anselm’s reasoning to another case, like the greatest conceivable island.
• Following P2, if it’s greater to exist, then that island must exist.
• This would work for the greatest conceivable version of anything, absurdly implying reality would be ‘overloaded’ with greatest versions of every possible thing.
• Gaunilo is denying deductive validity, because he’s denying that the conclusion of God’s existence follows from the premises.

Counter

• However, Anselm replies that his argument applies uniquely to God, whose non-existence he argues is inconceivable
• Descartes develops this by arguing that God’s essence includes necessary existence, whereas contingent beings like islands do not.
• An island is contingent by definition (land enclosed by water), so its existence depends on things which might not exist, e.g., water, a planet, etc.
• Therefore, no matter how great a contingent thing like an island is, it will still be contingent and possibly non-existent.

Evaluation

• This reply defeats Gaunilo because a priori reasoning can only demonstrate the existence of a necessary being.
• A priori reasoning involves analysing the definition of concepts.
• When we apply this analysis to contingent beings, we can discover their existence conditions, but not whether those conditions are fulfilled.
• E.g., It tells us the island depends on water to exist, but not whether that water exists, nor therefore the island itself.
• By contrast, a priori analysis of a necessary being tells us that they contain their own reason for existence.
• Their existence conditions do not involve anything external to them.
• Therefore, there is nothing regarding the fulfilment of those conditions which is not already captured in their definition.

• This explains why an a priori demonstration of existence can work exclusively for God, but not for contingent things like islands.

AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding

• Gaunilo objects to P3, the claim that God is in our mind/understanding. 
• He invokes the classical notion that God is beyond our understanding.
• In that case, Anselm can’t go on to conclude that God being the greatest being requires that he is not just in our understanding, but also in reality.

Counter

• However, in P3, Anselm uses ‘in intellectu’, meaning ‘can be conceived or thought about’, not ‘fully understood’.
• Anselm didn’t mean God is in the mind in the sense of us having full knowledge of God’s substantive nature.
• Anselm makes an analogy:
• Just because we cannot look directly at the sun, doesn’t mean we can’t see by sunlight.
• Similarly, just because we can’t understand what God is, doesn’t mean we can’t understand that whatever God is, God is the greatest conceivable being.

Evaluation

• This response shows that Gaunilo misunderstood P3 and demanded more understanding than Anselm’s premise requires.
• Some concepts involve a hierarchy which must have a highest point, which Plantinga called its ‘intrinsic maximum’.
• E.g., knowledge has an intrinsic maximum because knowing every truth would be unsurpassable.
• ‘Greatness’ has an intrinsic maximum, as a being with all the omni-qualities is unsurpassable.
• We can understand what knowing everything means without knowing everything ourselves.
• Such a being is beyond our understanding, but we can still understand that it is the pinnacle of the greatness hierarchy.
• We don’t need to understand what a maximally great being substantively is in order to follow the ontological argument’s reasoning about it, that if it’s greater to exist, then it must exist.
• So, Anselm’s defence works because Gaunilo overlooks the distinction between knowing God to be the greatest being, and knowing what it is to be the greatest being.
• His argument only needs the former, not the latter.

AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate

• The ontological argument claims that denying God’s existence incoherently denies what God is (a maximally great/perfect being).
• Kant argues this misunderstands what existence is by treating it as a real predicate, which describes a thing’s characteristics.
• He illustrates: there’s no conceptual difference between 100 coins in reality versus only in the mind.
• If existence were a predicate, it would describe a characteristic of the real coins which the mental coins do not have.
• But 100 coins is just 100 coins whether they exist or not, predicated by 100, round, shiny, etc.
• Anselm’s premise that existing is greater or more perfect therefore assumes that existence bears on what a thing is.
• Kant has distinguished what a thing is from whether it exists.

Counter

• However, Descartes’ version of the ontological argument doesn’t rely on attributing existence to God as a predicate.
• He criticised Anselm’s scholastic method of argumentation.
• In cartesian epistemology, rational intuition can apprehend that God is inseparable from existence, just as a triangle is inseparable from three sides. 

Evaluation

• Furthermore, Malcolm argues Kant fails to undermine Anselm’s 2nd version.
• Coins are contingent things which can exist or not, having the same conceptual description in either case.
• This proves that existence ‘as such’ is not a real predicate, but doesn’t show that necessary existence isn’t a real predicate.
• An unlimited being has no dependencies, and therefore cannot fail to exist.
• Necessary existence is therefore a real predicate, because it characterizes a being as containing its reason for existence within itself and as impossibly non-existent.
• Unlike with coins, we cannot hold God’s nature constant while comparing his existence with his non-existence.
• Ultimately, Kant makes the same mistake as Gaunilo, extending a conclusion drawn from contingent things, like islands or coins, to an argument about a necessary being.

AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

• Gaunilo rejected inference from understanding God to God’s existence.
• Malcolm argues Gaunilo misapplied this insight to a contingent Island (as did Kant’s 100 coins).
• Kant’s first critique develops this insight, arguing Anselm conflated necessity in mental judgement with necessity in reality.
• Here, Kant properly applies this to necessity:
• A triangle necessarily has three sides, meaning if a triangle exists, then it necessarily has three sides.
• Similarly, mentally defining God as predicated with necessary existence only shows that if God exists, then God exists necessarily.
• This also answers Descartes’s claim God can be known intuitively through grasping of necessity in mental judgement.

Counter:

• Malcolm accuses Kant of incoherently accepting God’s necessary existence as an a priori truth while also allowing that God’s non-existence is possible.
• If God necessarily exists, God cannot possibly fail to exist.
• Anselm & Malcolm claim a maximally great being cannot have any dependencies.
• It therefore cannot contingently exist nor contingently not exist.
• They infer that God either necessarily doesn’t exist (is impossible) or necessarily exists.
• So if the idea of God makes sense (isn’t impossible), God must exist.

Evaluation

• However, there are alternatives Malcolm has not eliminated.
• Hick argues a non-contingent being could be ontologically necessary, meaning non-dependent, eternal, and self-existent (aseity).
• If it exists, it cannot cease to exist and is ontologically necessary.
• If it does not exist, it cannot come into existence, and is ontologically impossible.
• God could either exist or not exist, without contradicting the definition of an ontologically necessary being.
• A priori reasoning can specify how such a being would exist if it did, but not whether it actually does exist.
• Whether God exists is therefore a ‘sheer fact’ (Hick).
• So, Malcolm’s description of God as a non-contingent being at most establishes ontological necessity or impossibility.
• He is left without justification for his move to God being either logically necessary or impossible.
• So, Hick’s distinction between types of necessity defends Gaunilo and Kant’s insight that necessity in mental judgement doesn’t entail actual existence.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Question types:

Question can focus on any of the following:

• Anselm (a priori argument based on reason)
• Gaunilo
• Kant

Can God’s existence be proven a priori? [40]

• AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument
• AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
• AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
• AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Questions focused on Gaunilo:

• Short explanation of Anselm’s argument (AO1 is focused on Gaunilo)
• AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
• AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding
• AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
  • Kant can work so long as the relevance to Gaunilo is brought out:
  • Kant develops Gaunilo’s underlying idea, that there’s a difference between necessity in the mind and necessity in reality. Gaunilo’s island failed because it tested the ontological argument’s logic through application to a contingent thing, but here Kant makes a better application of Gaunilo’s insight to a case of necessity (a triangle having three sides) to critique Anselm.

Questions focused on Kant’s criticisms

• This is a hard one but it can be fine to start with a bit of Anselm vs Gaunilo – so long as they are introduced and framed in relation to Kant: 
• Anselm is what Kant is going to crificise – and Gaunilo’s critique contains the key premise Kant develops (the distinction between necessity in the mind and necessity in reality), though Gaunilo chooses a poor example (of a contingent thing – the island) which Kant himself mistakenly followed in his 2nd critique (with contingent coins) but developed more successfully in his 1st critique (with the necessity of a triangle having 3 sides).
• So:
• Anselm’s argument (framed as what Kant attacks), then Gaunilo’s island (noting the key premise Kant later develops, but then explaining why it fails due to going in the wrong direction with the island which is contingent.
• AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
  • Ends up making the same mistake as Gaunilo – applying to a contingent thing.
• AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
  • Finally applies Gaunilo’s idea successfully to a case of necessity.

Can existence be treated as a predicate? [40]

• Introduction:
• A predicate is a word that describes a subject. The question of whether existence could be a predicate is central to the ontological argument for God’s existence. Anselm is accused of having faulty reasoning regarding existence being a predicate. 
• Gaunilo’s idea that Kant developed was that there’s a difference between necessity in the mind, and necessity in reality. 
• Kant developed that by:
  • In his 2nd critique, arguing that existence cannot be a predicate of a thing that necessitates its existence in reality. 
  • In his 1st critique, arguing that even if necessary existence somehow were a predicate, that would not imply actual existence.

• So:
• Anselm vs Gaunilo (minor detail for both) – framed for their relevance to Kant.
• AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
• AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
  • Intro sentence: Here, Kant argues that even if necessary existence could be treated as a predicate, that does not have the implications Anselm thought it did. I.e., it cannot show that God actually does exist.

• Example of conclusion: Necessary existence is indeed a predicate, as Malcolm argued – however it being a predicate doesn’t have the logical significance Anselm & Malcolm thought it did – because it cannot establish God’s actual existence.

Are Gaunilo’s criticisms of the ontological argument the most effective? [40]

• AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument (minor – it’s not the focus)
• AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
  • This fails 
• AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
  • This looks more promising than Gaunilo, but Malcolm shows it fails
• AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
  • This is the most successful critique, and shows Gaunilo had the right insight but it needed developing through proper application to necessity by Kant and then Hick’s modern distinctions between types of necessity.

LOA: Kant & Hick have the most effective criticism

OR: if you want to make it easier for yourself, do both of Gaunilo’s AO2 sections, and then Kant’s existence is not a predicate section – and argue all the critiques fail, so that Gaunilo is not the most effective because none are effective.

Weirdly worded questions:

Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]
Or: Whether God’s existence best justified a posteriori / a priori [40]

• This question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
• You must do the ontological argument, and then at least one of teleo or cosmo – or both.
• You will then have judged whether: 
• They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain). 
• One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
• They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).

I’d choose these:

• AO1: Anselm (short), AO2: Kant (either of Kant’s critiques will do)
  • Kant is more of an upgraded critique than Gaunilo to be frank so an essay which leaves our Gaunilo feels more comprehensive than one which leaves out Kant.
• AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
  • This is a nice one for this purpose because it covers a variety of design arguments and how they interact with the evolution issue, and then more contemporary issues.
• AO1: Aquinas’ 3rd way (short), AO2: The fallacy of composition
  • Fallacy of composition targets all versions of the cosmological argument and touches on infinite regress issues and the universe needing no cause – so it’s the best for capturing the overall issues.
• Or: AO2: The Im/possibility of a necessary being
  • This critique of a necessary being works very well because it attempts to attack both cosmological and ontological – but Copleston replies that it only undermines the ontological argument, not the cosmological, making the cosmological seem stronger. However in the end I evaluate that Hume succeeds, showing all varieties of argument to equally fail (though you could evaluate differently if desired).

• This question would be answered best if you could highlight how the criticisms of each especially target their a priori or a posteriori nature. 
• E.g., Kant shows the difficulty of proving existence through definition – which attacks a priori demonstrations of existence.
• E.g., most criticisms of the design and cosmological arguments exploit its inductive a posteriori nature – by showing the evidence they point to could be explained by alternative conclusions (evolution, or the universe having no cause, or some scientific cause like necessary matter).