20th century religious language B summary notes

OCR
Philosophy

AO1: Verificationism

  • Verificationism is the method of the logical positivists.
  • Comte’s Positivism claims only empirical knowledge is valid, and ‘logical’ refers to analysing language.
  • The verification principle says a statement is meaningful if it can be verified through experience.
  • Analytic statements, like maths and logic, are also meaningful.
  • If a statement is neither analytic nor verifiable, it lacks cognitive meaning.

  • Early verificationists supported ‘hard’ verification, where statements must be proven conclusively.
  • Ayer rejects this as too strict, since science cannot achieve certainty.
  • He proposes ‘weak’ verification, where statements are meaningful if they can probably be shown true or false.

  • Weak verification risks allowing too much meaning, so Ayer introduces direct and indirect verification.
  • Direct verification is immediate observation, like “I see a key”.
  • Indirect verification involves claims that could be tested in principle, like “this key is made of iron”.

  • A statement is meaningful if it can be verified in practice or in principle.
  • For example, claims about the dark side of the moon were once unverifiable in practice but still meaningful.
  • Religious language, referring to a metaphysical God, cannot be verified and is therefore meaningless.

AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification

  • Hick argues religious language can be verified in principle.
  • He says that after death we would find out whether God and an afterlife exist.
  • So even if we cannot test this now, it could still be verified later.

Counter

  • However, this assumes an afterlife exists where verification could happen.
  • Ayer’s example of the dark side of the moon worked because we already knew it existed.
  • We also knew it could be reached.
  • But we do not know that an afterlife exists at all.
  • So there is no clear way to verify religious claims even in principle.

Evaluation

  • Hick’s argument is unconvincing.
  • If death leads to nothing, there would be no chance to verify anything.
  • So religious claims would remain unverifiable.
  • Simply imagining a situation where verification happens is not enough.
  • We need reason to think such a situation actually exists.
  • Without this, Hick’s idea becomes speculation rather than real verification.
  • Ayer’s point is that meaningful statements must be linked to possible observation.
  • Hick fails to show this link.
  • So religious language still does not meet the verification principle.

AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test

  • The verification principle says a statement is meaningful only if it is analytic or can be tested by experience.
  • But this creates a problem.
  • The principle itself is not analytic or testable.
  • So, it seems to be meaningless by its own rule.

Counter

  • Ayer accepts this and says the principle is not a factual statement.
  • Instead, it is a tool used to decide what counts as meaningful.
  • So it does not need to pass its own test.

Evaluation

  • However, this weakens Ayer’s argument.
  • If the principle is just a tool, then it cannot prove that religious or metaphysical language is meaningless in general.
  • It only shows they are meaningless within his chosen method.
  • Other approaches, like rationalism, can reject this method and still treat such language as meaningful.
  • So Ayer no longer proves his view is correct, but only assumes it.
  • This means the verification principle fails to justify its strong claim and loses its force.

AO1: Falsificationism

  • Popper argued that verificationism is not a correct account of empiricism.
  • Science works by testing theories to see if they can be falsified, not by trying to prove them true.
  • Einstein’s theory predicted Mercury’s orbit, and if this had been wrong, the theory would have been falsified.
  • By contrast, Freud and Marx interpret all evidence as support, making their theories unfalsifiable.

  • Flew applies this to religious language.
  • He agrees it is cognitive, as it tries to make claims about the world.
  • However, these claims are unfalsifiable and so fail to say anything about reality.
  • Unlike Ayer, he does not call them meaningless, but says they fail to make real assertions.

  • Flew argues that to assert something is to rule out the opposite.
  • So a meaningful claim must be able to be false.
  • If nothing could count against it, then it does not really assert anything.
  • Religious believers cannot say what would prove God false, so their claims fail.

  • He explains this with the parable of the gardener.
  • A believer claims a gardener exists, but keeps changing the idea when tests fail.
  • The gardener becomes invisible and undetectable.
  • This leads to a “death of a thousand qualifications”, where the claim says nothing.
  • There is no difference between a world where the gardener exists and one where it does not.

  • So religious language fails to describe reality because it makes no testable difference.

AO1: Mitchell

  • Mitchell argues religious language is cognitively meaningful and can be falsified.
  • Some believers may have blind faith, but most base their belief on evidence, such as personal experience.
  • This belief can be challenged by counter-evidence like evil.
  • The amount of evidence needed to overturn faith will vary between individuals.
  • Flew’s mistake is thinking believers must know in advance what would falsify their belief.
  • Instead, falsifiable just means a belief could be overturned by some possible evidence.

  • Mitchell also rejects Hare’s idea that believers ignore all counter-evidence.
  • He argues they do recognise challenges, but do not think they are strong enough to disprove their belief.
  • So belief in God can still be rational.

  • His parable describes a soldier who trusts a stranger claiming to be their leader after a powerful meeting.
  • Even when the stranger appears to support the enemy, the soldier keeps faith, perhaps thinking they are a double agent.
  • Mitchell says there must be some point where belief becomes unreasonable, even if this is not known in advance.
  • This shows religious belief can be based on evidence while still being open to falsification.

AO2: Mitchell vs Flew

  • Flew argues religious belief is unfalsifiable.
  • He says evil contradicts the idea of an all-good and all-powerful God.
  • So even a small amount of evil should disprove belief in God.
  • Since believers continue to believe, Flew says their belief is unfalsifiable.

Counter

  • However, this depends on the logical problem of evil being correct.
  • Plantinga argues God cannot remove evil without removing free will.
  • Many philosophers accept this, so evil does not logically disprove God.
  • Instead, evil becomes a matter of evidence, not strict contradiction.

Evaluation

  • Mitchell gives a better account of religious belief, because it is validated by the observable reality of religious psychology.
  • He says belief can be weakened or lost depending on how much evil a person experiences.
  • People sometimes lose faith after events like the death of a loved one.
  • They may not know in advance what would change their belief, but it can still be challenged by experience.
  • Others keep their faith but use explanations like free will or soul-making.
  • However, these become less convincing as suffering increases.
  • This shows belief responds to evidence.
  • So Mitchell is right that religious belief can be falsifiable and meaningful.

AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’

  • Ayer and Flew say religious language is a failed attempt to describe reality because it cannot be verified or falsified.
  • Hare argues this is mistaken because religious language is not trying to describe reality in the first place.
  • So it cannot be a failed attempt.
  • He says religious language expresses a ‘blik’, which is a way of seeing the world based on attitudes and emotions.
  • This shapes how people think, behave and speak.
  • So religious language can still be meaningful, even if it is not about facts.
  • Hare illustrates this with a paranoid student who believes their professors are trying to kill them.
  • Even when shown evidence they are kind, the student thinks they are pretending.
  • This belief is not based on evidence, but on an underlying attitude.
  • Hare argues religious belief works in a similar way.
  • When someone says “God exists”, they may be expressing a worldview rather than stating a fact.
  • He is influenced by Hume’s idea that reason follows emotion.
  • So religious beliefs may be expressions of underlying feelings rather than rational claims about reality.

AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist

  • Flew argues Hare is too reductionist.
  • He says religious believers are making real claims about God, not just expressing attitudes.
  • For example, Aquinas’ arguments try to prove God exists using reasoning and evidence.
  • This shows religious language can be cognitive.

Counter

  • However, Hare argues our thinking is strongly influenced by emotions.
  • Psychology shows we often justify beliefs we already hold.
  • So religious beliefs may come from attitudes rather than objective reasoning.

Evaluation

  • Hare’s point has some truth, since emotions do influence how we think.
  • However, it goes too far to say reason is only a tool for our feelings.
  • People can reflect on their beliefs and sometimes change them through reasoning.
  • Philosophical arguments about God clearly aim to show something is true, not just express attitudes.
  • Even if emotions play a role, they do not fully control belief.
  • There is a mix of reason and feeling in religion.
  • So Hare’s view is too extreme and reduces religious language too much.

AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games

  • Wittgenstein argues religious language can be meaningful even if it is not cognitive.
  • He thinks Ayer and Flew misunderstood it as a failed attempt to describe reality because it cannot be verified or falsified.

  • He originally agreed that language ‘pictured’ reality, but later developed his theory of language games.
  • He argues that meaning is use.
  • Statements get their meaning from how they function in social contexts, not from referring to reality.
  • So the meaning of a statement is what it does in a particular context.

  • Social life involves different types of interaction, each with its own rules.
  • Wittgenstein calls these ‘language games’.
  • We speak differently depending on context, such as with friends, family or in a job interview.
  • So meaning depends on how language is used in each situation.

  • A language game is a rule-governed activity, usually learned unconsciously.
  • Religion is its own language game.
  • So religious language is meaningful within that context for those who understand its rules.
  • Those not part of that context may struggle to find it meaningful.
  • Science is a different language game, so religious language may seem meaningless within science.
  • Language games shape what counts as meaningful for us.

AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism

  • Wittgensteinian fideism says religion is a separate language game from science.
  • Religious belief is based on faith, not reason or evidence.
  • This can explain why religion and science do not always conflict.

Counter

  • However, natural theology shows they are not completely separate.
  • Aquinas argues we can use reason and evidence to support belief in God.
  • His arguments, and modern ones like fine-tuning, use the natural world as evidence.
  • So religion can connect with science.

Evaluation

  • Fideism goes too far in separating religion from reason.
  • Religious arguments clearly try to show that God exists, which is a factual claim.
  • Even if these arguments are wrong, they still aim at truth.
  • Also, when believers say God created the world, they mean the same world science studies.
  • Aquinas’ idea of analogy explains how religious language can refer to this shared reality.
  • So religion is not a completely separate language game.
  • Natural theology gives a more convincing account of religious language than fideism.

AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism

  • Wittgenstein explains religion as a social “form of life.”
  • The meaning of religious language comes from how it is used in shared practices like prayer, worship and reading scripture.
  • This helps explain religion as something communal rather than just based on individual feelings.

Counter

  • However, this can make religion seem purely human and constructed.
  • Believers usually think they are relating to a real, transcendent God, not just taking part in social practices.
  • Religious experience is often understood as contact with something beyond human life.
  • So Wittgenstein’s view risks removing this “vertical” dimension of religion.

Evaluation

  • Wittgenstein’s theory explains the social side of religion well, but it seems incomplete.
  • Many religions share similar features, such as moral teachings and experiences of transcendence.
  • This suggests religion is not just a local social construction.
  • Different explanations exist, such as belief in God, Hick’s idea of a shared ultimate reality, or natural explanations from psychology.
  • But they all agree religion connects to something beyond society itself.
  • Wittgenstein cannot fully explain this wider pattern.
  • So his theory captures part of religious language, but reduces it too much overall.