OCR ↗︎
Philosophy ↗︎
Question preparation ↓

AO1: Verificationism

• Verificationism is the method of the logical positivists.
• Comte’s Positivism claims only empirical knowledge is valid, and ‘logical’ refers to analysing language.
• The verification principle says a statement is meaningful if it can be verified through experience.
• Analytic statements, like maths and logic, are also meaningful.
• If a statement is neither analytic nor verifiable, it lacks cognitive meaning. 
• Early verificationists supported ‘hard’ verification, where statements must be proven conclusively.
• Ayer rejects this as too strict, since science cannot achieve certainty.
• He proposes ‘weak’ verification, where statements are meaningful if they can probably be shown true or false. 
• Weak verification risks allowing too much meaning, so Ayer introduces direct and indirect verification.
• Direct verification is immediate observation, like “I see a key”.
• Indirect verification involves claims that could be tested in principle, like “this key is made of iron”. 
• A statement is meaningful if it can be verified in practice or in principle.
• For example, claims about the dark side of the moon were once unverifiable in practice but still meaningful.
• Religious language, referring to a metaphysical God, cannot be verified and is therefore meaningless.

AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification

• Hick argues religious language can be verified in principle.
• He says that after death we would find out whether God and an afterlife exist.
• So even if we cannot test this now, it could still be verified later.

Counter

• However, this assumes an afterlife exists where verification could happen.
• Ayer’s example of the dark side of the moon worked because we already knew it existed.
• We also knew it could be reached.
• But we do not know that an afterlife exists at all.
• So there is no clear way to verify religious claims even in principle.

Evaluation

• Hick’s argument is unconvincing.
• If death leads to nothing, there would be no chance to verify anything.
• So religious claims would remain unverifiable.
• Simply imagining a situation where verification happens is not enough.
• We need reason to think such a situation actually exists.
• Without this, Hick’s idea becomes speculation rather than real verification.
• Ayer’s point is that meaningful statements must be linked to possible observation.
• Hick fails to show this link.
• So religious language still does not meet the verification principle.

AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test

• The verification principle says a statement is meaningful only if it is analytic or can be tested by experience.
• But this creates a problem.
• The principle itself is not analytic or testable.
• So, it seems to be meaningless by its own rule.

Counter

• Ayer accepts this and says the principle is not a factual statement.
• Instead, it is a tool used to decide what counts as meaningful.
• So it does not need to pass its own test.

Evaluation

• However, this weakens Ayer’s argument.
• If the principle is just a tool, then it cannot prove that religious or metaphysical language is meaningless in general.
• It only shows they are meaningless within his chosen method.
• Other approaches, like rationalism, can reject this method and still treat such language as meaningful.
• So Ayer no longer proves his view is correct, but only assumes it.
• This means the verification principle fails to justify its strong claim and loses its force.

AO1: Falsificationism

• Popper argued that verificationism is not a correct account of empiricism.
• Science works by testing theories to see if they can be falsified, not by trying to prove them true.
• Einstein’s theory predicted Mercury’s orbit, and if this had been wrong, the theory would have been falsified.
• By contrast, Freud and Marx interpret all evidence as support, making their theories unfalsifiable. 
• Flew applies this to religious language.
• He agrees it is cognitive, as it tries to make claims about the world.
• However, these claims are unfalsifiable and so fail to say anything about reality.
• Unlike Ayer, he does not call them meaningless, but says they fail to make real assertions. 
• Flew argues that to assert something is to rule out the opposite.
• So a meaningful claim must be able to be false.
• If nothing could count against it, then it does not really assert anything.
• Religious believers cannot say what would prove God false, so their claims fail. 
• He explains this with the parable of the gardener.
• A believer claims a gardener exists, but keeps changing the idea when tests fail.
• The gardener becomes invisible and undetectable.
• This leads to a “death of a thousand qualifications”, where the claim says nothing.
• There is no difference between a world where the gardener exists and one where it does not. 
• So religious language fails to describe reality because it makes no testable difference.

AO1: Mitchell

• Mitchell argues religious language is cognitively meaningful and can be falsified.
• Some believers may have blind faith, but most base their belief on evidence, such as personal experience.
• This belief can be challenged by counter-evidence like evil.
• The amount of evidence needed to overturn faith will vary between individuals.
• Flew’s mistake is thinking believers must know in advance what would falsify their belief.
• Instead, falsifiable just means a belief could be overturned by some possible evidence. 
• Mitchell also rejects Hare’s idea that believers ignore all counter-evidence.
• He argues they do recognise challenges, but do not think they are strong enough to disprove their belief.
• So belief in God can still be rational. 
• His parable describes a soldier who trusts a stranger claiming to be their leader after a powerful meeting.
• Even when the stranger appears to support the enemy, the soldier keeps faith, perhaps thinking they are a double agent.
• Mitchell says there must be some point where belief becomes unreasonable, even if this is not known in advance.
• This shows religious belief can be based on evidence while still being open to falsification.

AO2: Mitchell vs Flew

• Flew argues religious belief is unfalsifiable.
• He says evil contradicts the idea of an all-good and all-powerful God.
• So even a small amount of evil should disprove belief in God.
• Since believers continue to believe, Flew says their belief is unfalsifiable.

Counter

• However, this depends on the logical problem of evil being correct.
• Plantinga argues God cannot remove evil without removing free will.
• Many philosophers accept this, so evil does not logically disprove God.
• Instead, evil becomes a matter of evidence, not strict contradiction.

Evaluation

• Mitchell gives a better account of religious belief, because it is validated by the observable reality of religious psychology.
• He says belief can be weakened or lost depending on how much evil a person experiences.
• People sometimes lose faith after events like the death of a loved one.
• They may not know in advance what would change their belief, but it can still be challenged by experience.
• Others keep their faith but use explanations like free will or soul-making.
• However, these become less convincing as suffering increases.
• This shows belief responds to evidence.
• So Mitchell is right that religious belief can be falsifiable and meaningful.

AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’

• Ayer and Flew say religious language is a failed attempt to describe reality because it cannot be verified or falsified.
• Hare argues this is mistaken because religious language is not trying to describe reality in the first place.
• So it cannot be a failed attempt.
• He says religious language expresses a ‘blik’, which is a way of seeing the world based on attitudes and emotions.
• This shapes how people think, behave and speak.
• So religious language can still be meaningful, even if it is not about facts.
• Hare illustrates this with a paranoid student who believes their professors are trying to kill them.
• Even when shown evidence they are kind, the student thinks they are pretending.
• This belief is not based on evidence, but on an underlying attitude.
• Hare argues religious belief works in a similar way.
• When someone says “God exists”, they may be expressing a worldview rather than stating a fact.
• He is influenced by Hume’s idea that reason follows emotion.
• So religious beliefs may be expressions of underlying feelings rather than rational claims about reality.

AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist

• Flew argues Hare is too reductionist.
• He says religious believers are making real claims about God, not just expressing attitudes.
• For example, Aquinas’ arguments try to prove God exists using reasoning and evidence.
• This shows religious language can be cognitive.

Counter

• However, Hare argues our thinking is strongly influenced by emotions.
• Psychology shows we often justify beliefs we already hold.
• So religious beliefs may come from attitudes rather than objective reasoning.

Evaluation

• Hare’s point has some truth, since emotions do influence how we think.
• However, it goes too far to say reason is only a tool for our feelings.
• People can reflect on their beliefs and sometimes change them through reasoning.
• Philosophical arguments about God clearly aim to show something is true, not just express attitudes.
• Even if emotions play a role, they do not fully control belief.
• There is a mix of reason and feeling in religion.
• So Hare’s view is too extreme and reduces religious language too much.

AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games

• Wittgenstein argues religious language can be meaningful even if it is not cognitive.
• He thinks Ayer and Flew misunderstood it as a failed attempt to describe reality because it cannot be verified or falsified. 
• He originally agreed that language ‘pictured’ reality, but later developed his theory of language games.
• He argues that meaning is use.
• Statements get their meaning from how they function in social contexts, not from referring to reality.
• So the meaning of a statement is what it does in a particular context. 
• Social life involves different types of interaction, each with its own rules.
• Wittgenstein calls these ‘language games’.
• We speak differently depending on context, such as with friends, family or in a job interview.
• So meaning depends on how language is used in each situation. 
• A language game is a rule-governed activity, usually learned unconsciously.
• Religion is its own language game.
• So religious language is meaningful within that context for those who understand its rules.
• Those not part of that context may struggle to find it meaningful.
• Science is a different language game, so religious language may seem meaningless within science.
• Language games shape what counts as meaningful for us.

AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism

• Wittgensteinian fideism says religion is a separate language game from science.
• Religious belief is based on faith, not reason or evidence.
• This can explain why religion and science do not always conflict.

Counter

• However, natural theology shows they are not completely separate.
• Aquinas argues we can use reason and evidence to support belief in God.
• His arguments, and modern ones like fine-tuning, use the natural world as evidence.
• So religion can connect with science.

Evaluation

• Fideism goes too far in separating religion from reason.
• Religious arguments clearly try to show that God exists, which is a factual claim.
• Even if these arguments are wrong, they still aim at truth.
• Also, when believers say God created the world, they mean the same world science studies.
• Aquinas’ idea of analogy explains how religious language can refer to this shared reality.
• So religion is not a completely separate language game.
• Natural theology gives a more convincing account of religious language than fideism.

AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism

• Wittgenstein explains religion as a social “form of life.”
• The meaning of religious language comes from how it is used in shared practices like prayer, worship and reading scripture.
• This helps explain religion as something communal rather than just based on individual feelings.

Counter

• However, this can make religion seem purely human and constructed.
• Believers usually think they are relating to a real, transcendent God, not just taking part in social practices.
• Religious experience is often understood as contact with something beyond human life.
• So Wittgenstein’s view risks removing this “vertical” dimension of religion.

Evaluation

• Wittgenstein’s theory explains the social side of religion well, but it seems incomplete.
• Many religions share similar features, such as moral teachings and experiences of transcendence.
• This suggests religion is not just a local social construction.
• Different explanations exist, such as belief in God, Hick’s idea of a shared ultimate reality, or natural explanations from psychology.
• But they all agree religion connects to something beyond society itself.
• Wittgenstein cannot fully explain this wider pattern.
• So his theory captures part of religious language, but reduces it too much overall.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: Verificationism
AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification
AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
AO1: Falsificationism
AO1: Mitchell
AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’
AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist
AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games
AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism
AO1: Aquinas’ theory of analogy (cataphatic)
AO2: Brummer’s critique of analogy

Verificationism/logical-positivism: RL = cognitive but meaningless (unverifiable).

Hick: RL = cognitive and meaningful (eschatological verifiable).

Falsificationism: RL = cognitive but unfalsifiable and thus fails to ‘assert’ anything about reality.

Mitchell: RL = falsifiable and thus cognitive and meaningful.

Hare: RL = non-cognitive expression of Blik but meaningful (affects people’s lives)

Wittgenstein: RL = non-cognitive but contextually meaningful expression of participation in a language game 

Aquinas: RL = cognitive and meaningful expression of belief about God by analogy.

Ayer and Flew’s stance is a little complicated regarding whether they think religious language is cognitive or not.

Flew definitely thinks religious language ‘attempts’ to be cognitive – he doesn’t think it’s simply non-cognitive expression of feelings, attitudes, Bliks, language game participation etc. But nor does he think it’s really ‘genuinely’ cognitive in the sense of having cognitive meaning. Because for him, language must be falsifiable to meet that condition. 

Ayer is more tricky still, but it’s fair to read him in a similar way. He doesn’t say RL is just an expression of non-cognitive emotion like he is very clear about for ethical language. 

A lot of text books disagree, and funnily enough different exam boards actually say different things about this. OCR’s spec doesn’t actually say either way. So there’s no ‘official’ answer they’re looking for. Ultimately, I don’t think you’d be penalised for thinking Ayer and Flew regard religious language as non-cognitive. But if you explain this more nuanced view it would be an interesting thing to add to demonstrate deeper understanding (though absolutely not necessary to gain full marks). 

So: 

Ayer regards religious language as cognitive but meaningless.
Flew regards religious language as cognitive but failing to assert anything about reality.

RL expresses beliefs – or at least, mental states which attempt to be genuine beliefs and genuinely represent reality. But they fail to do what they attempt – because for Ayer and Flew, for a belief to genuinely represents reality means that it must be verifiable or falsifiable.

Question types:

You could be asked to evaluate or critically compare any of the following:

• Verificationism (logical positivism)
• Falsificationism
• Mitchell
• Hare (Blik)
• Wittgenstein (language games, form of life)
• The falsification symposium (Flew, Mitchell & Hare’s debate – and their parables)

Remember (this is true for all such topics with OCR): if a question focuses on one of these – the AO1 is for that. You can bring in other theories, but keep their AO1 to a minimum, and focus it on the theory in question (i.e., explain how it would contest the theory in question: explain what it would say in answer to the question).

Also, when bringing in an alternate theory, you can’t really just say here’s another theory, I like it, the end – you should evaluate it, even if your evaluate ends up defending and agreeing with it. But there’s a risk/danger there of straying too much from the question, e.g., if you are using a criticism of the theory you are bringing in which doesn’t have much or anything to do with the theory in the actual question:

E.g., a question assessing verificationism – you could do a solid section on verificationism, then do falsificationism for the 2nd section, which can be easily linked as it clearly rejects verificationism. However if you then brought in Mitchell to criticise falsificationism, your essay might start wandering off course a bit. Mitchell’s critique of falsificationism isn’t obviously relevant to the evaluation of verificationism! Might be easier to do Hare’s critique, since he would counter falsificationism but it’s also easier to see and thus explain how he would reject verificationism too. Wittgenstein would also be easier in this respect.

Evaluate Mitchell’s contribution to the falsification symposium [40]

• AO1: Falsificationism (minimal AO1 – explaining Flew is the one Mitchell is attacking)
• AO1: Mitchell (Full AO1)
• AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
• AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist
  • Hare disagreed with Mitchell
• Then you could do one of the following:
• AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
  • Verificationism could be made relevant as an even more radical version of Flew’s approach. Mitchell may have shown RL falsifiable, but Ayer might say he’s not made it verifiable. 
• Either:
• AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism
• Or:
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • Wittgenstein would agree with Mitchell that RL is meaningful, but disagree about why and how – since Mitchel defends its cognitivist falsifiability, whereas Wittgenstein defends it as non-cognitive expression of participation in a form of life. 
  • Either evaluation section on Wittgenstein would work – both defend RL as cognitive, which then backs up Mitchell.
  • More specifically: Aquinas would argue RL has a grounding in reason and evidence (which is part of Mitchell’s case too: regarding the stranger staying up all night talking with the soldier = the evidence for God). And the other counter to Wittgenstein of the universal elements of religion, such as religious experience, showing religion is not a purely socially constructed form of life – would also provide evidence for Christianity which backs up Mitchell’s account of religion as based on evidence.
  • So RL = based on evidence, and thus subject to evidence changing, or to counter-evidence (like evil) – making it falsifiable and thus meaningful.

Does religious language merely express ‘Blik’? [40]

• AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’
• AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist
• AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
  • Both Mitchell and Flew reject Hare for the same reason that it’s too reductionist – suggesting RL is not just non-cognitive expression of Blik, but at least an ‘attempt’ at cognitive expression of belief about reality. The question then is whether it is successful in that, or whether it’s unsuccessful because it’s unfalsifiable – which Mitchell and Flew disagree about. For their rejection of Hare to make sense, one of them has to have a coherent account. 
  • Personally I’d side with Mitchell as having the best alternative to Hare.
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • Wittgenstein can be linked to Hare as a potential stronger form of non-cognitivism – which takes the social elements of the phenomenon of religion into account. 
  • Hare can seem overly individualistic in his reduction of religious psychology and meaning to personal attitude and worldview. But religion is a social thing. So Wittgenstein’s non-cognitivism seems stronger for accounting for religion as expression of an individual’s participation in a shared practice and form of life.
  • But, even Wittgenstein’s approach has its issues. I think especially this critical comparison of Wittgenstein with Aquinas is great for a Hare question – because Aquinas, and the whole natural theology tradition, is insisting religious language is cognitive – which counters Hare and also Wittgenstein, perhaps showing that no non-cognitive approach, no matter how sociologically developed, can account for the phenomenon.

Cognitive vs non-cognitive questions OR meaningful/meaningless questions

Cognitive language expresses beliefs which can be true or false.
Non-cognitive language expresses some non-belief which cannot be true or false.

Cog/non-cog is distinct from the question of meaningful/meaningles. These represent two separate questions. 

One is, the psychological question of what sort of mental state is expresed by religious language (cognitive belief or non-cognitive emotion/attitude). 

Then there is the philosophical question of what is the correct theory of meaning, and from that follows the answer of whether expression of cognitive and/or non-cognitive states counts as meaningful.

Whichever scholar/theory you defend as correct will give you your answer to a cog/non-cog or meaningful/less question.

Is religious language cognitive? [40]
Or:
Does religious language have a factual quality? [40]

You could really include anything here – since all the theories have a judgement on whether religious language is cognitive, or whether it’s instead non-cognitive.

This is focusing less on the question of meaningfulness – and more on the psychological question of what’s going on in religious people’s minds when they express religious utterances.

Is religious language meaningful? [40]

This question – or it’s opposite of whether religious language is meaningless – really has to include Ayer’s verificationism, since that’s the only theory which straight up said RL = meaningless. Flew doesn’t quite go that far, preferring not to make categorical claims about meaning in general (which got Ayer into trouble..) but instead arguing RL fails to assert anything about reality.

You could then really include anything else.

Aquinas vs Wittgenstein questions:

• These types of questions bring Aquinas in from the previous RL topic into this topic.
• AO1: Aquinas’ theory of analogy (cataphatic)
• AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
• AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism
  • This is an eval of Wittgenstein – but ultimately defends the cognitive meaning of RL through its universal elements of religious experience and the ethics found in its texts – which would back up Aquinas
  • (in fact, it fits very well with Aquinas’ belief, upheld in Vatican II inclusivism, that such universalities fit the ‘ray of truth’ that enlightens all mankind. So Aquinas’ anthropology of religion better fits the data of universalities compared to Wittgenstein’s sociologically reductive anthropology).
  • Then I’d do something to evaluate Aquinas further. Options could be:
• AO2: Barth vs Aquinas on natural theology
  • This runs the danger of being repetative – but Barth is offering a genuinely distinct critique of Aquinas from the revealed theology ‘fideist’ perspective than we considered earlier. And it ‘could’ back up Wittgenstein who is also ‘tentatively’ linked to Fideism (the support would be very indirect – but not nothing).
• AO2: Brummer’s critique of analogy
  • This is just a straight critique of Aquians – but it could be relevant here because it suggests Aquinas’ account of RL fails due to internal issues regarding the problem of God being beyond our understanding so how can we ever refer to God in language. 
  • Wittgenstein’s approach seems better because it avoids this issue, arguably intelligently just separating religion from literal cognitive meaning, and thus avoiding this paradox of referring to something beyond understanding.
  • Though of course you could then defend Aquinas, as my paragraph goes on to do.

Weirdly worded questions:

How convincing are non-cognitive approaches to religious texts? [40]

• This question is not as bad as it looks.. Though it’s probably best avoided. 
• It’s still about assessing the non-cognitive approach to religious language, whch is straightforward.. But specifically focusing on the religious language in religious texts – not the everyday spoken religious language we’re used to dealing with here in this topic.

• The Hick paragraph “AO2: Hick on Jesus as just a teacher of wisdom” would work well here.
• Hick thinks some religious language in the bible, like its exclusivist claims about Jesus’ divinity, resurrection, incarnation etc – must be taken in more of a non-cognitive way, as symbols for things like the importance of Jesus as a human with a special mission (though not God..), the rising of the early Church, and care of God for humanity.
• Hick is influenced here by Bultmann, who thinks religious texts express the existentialist-themed spiritual experience of the bible authors.
• He took a ‘demythologisation’ approach to religious texts, arguing we should replace these stories which sounds literal to modern ears with statements of the deeper ethical truths they intend to convey.
• Bultmann and Hick don’t think religious language expresses mere feelings, but existential commitments – moral and spiritual inclinations to ways of life in response to unavoidable existential questions.

• Of course, Bultmann and Hick are challenged for reducing ideas about Jesus, e.g., the incarnation and resurrection, to expressions of spiritual experience. Traditional Christians like Aquinas would argue that must be interpreted cognitively.

• Tillich (another existentialist) would also work here. 
• Technically Tillich sees his approach as beyond the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction – because he thinks symbols express participation in a higher spiritual reality, not merely emotions. 
• Ultimately – he does view the text of the bible as symbolic and not ‘factual’ in the normal cognitive way.
• But then: 
  • Critics of Tillich could argue it doesn’t actually connect us to anything higher and the symbols are just in our mind, which would make them purely non-cognitive. 
  • And critics like Alston say Tillich can’t make the right sense of the language of heaven/hell in the bible, which he thinks requires a cognitive reading.
• You can also answer this question with Hare, and/or treat it as a Wittgenstein (non-cognitive) vs Aquinas (cognitive) question.

• You have to assess whether it’s valid to view the words in the Bible as expressions of Blik or participation in a language game – OR are the cognitivist theories like Aquinas’ better. Aquinas would interpret language about God in the bible analogically.
• How convincing are non-cognitive theories of religious language, when applied to the religious language in the Bible – rather than everyday religious language.

• Tillich would also work here. Technically Tillich sees his approach as beyond the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction – because he thinks symbols express participation in a higher spiritual reality, not merely emotions. But, critics of him could argue it doesn’t actually connect us to anything higher and the symbols are just in our mind, which would make them purely non-cognitive. And people like Alston say it can’t make the right sense of the language of heaven/hell in the bible, which he thinks requires a cognitive reading.

Are any versions of the verification principle convincing? [40]

• Ayer goes through various versions of verification principle (first weak – then direct/indirect).
• In my main article notes there’s a debate section on whether the verification principle is overly restrictive. If you want really good marks that would be ideal for this question.

• And/or: just explain the weak version and direct/indirect version and then just treat the question like a verificationism question:
  
• AO1: Verificationism (full AO1 – focusing on the versions of the verification principle)
• AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
• AO1: Falsificationism (minimal AO1 – focusing on how it intended to improve on verificatoinism)
  
• Aside from that you could bring in anything else,- since the other theories all contest what Ayer says about religious langauge. But note the question isn’t really focused on RL. So you’d need to frame other theories as showing that Ayer’s version of the verification principle is unconvincing as shown through its inadequate application to RL.
• AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games
  • Wittgenstein would be the best I think – since he initially agreed with logical positivism (somewhat.. with his picture theory of meaning) but then changed his mind with language games.
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • But of course Wittgenstein gets into trouble separating religious from scientific/empirical meaning – especially regarding Aquinas’ a posteriori arguments which appear cognitive.
  • A link back to Ayer could be: it was cases like Aquinas’ 5 ways which Ayer opened the door to in his ‘weak’ verificationism, but which he then tried to close with his direct/indirect verification distinction.

How useful/valuable is Aquinas’ analogical approach in the philosophy of religion? [40]

• This question is asking whether Aquinas’ theory of analogy is still relevant to the modern debates, e.g., between Ayer, Flew, Hare & Wittgenstein.

• You could just treat this as an Aquinas vs Wittgenstein question. But you could easily bring in Ayer or Flew here, as they would reject analogical religious language.

• Note that: in this 2nd RL topic, many of those defending the meaningfulness of RL are defending it as non-cognitive (Hare & Wittgenstein) – suggesting philosophy of religion has significantly moved towards marginalising the notion of religious language as having any value as a cognitive expression – which is what Aquinas thinks it has.
• Though, Hare and Mitchell buck that trend.

• AO1: Aquinas’ theory of analogy (cataphatic) (full AO1)
• AO1: Verificationism (minor AO1)
• AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
  • Ayer fails – so he can’t make defeat the value/use of Aquians
• AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games (minor AO1 – just set up his rejection of Aquinas’ cognitivist presumptions) 
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • Defends Aquians’ value/usefulness against Wittgenstein
• AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
  • Flew would say Aquinas has no use/value because RL is unfalsifiable and thus fails to assert anything about reality.
  • Mitchell counters: it is falsifiable – based on evidence, sensitive to possible counter-evidence, and falsifiable by some potential evidence (albeit unknown in each individual case), i.e., some sufficient amount and/or type of evil.
  • Mitchell can be argued to back up Aquians’ natural theology project somewhat – of showing religious faith to be supported by evidence and reason. 
  • So this shows Aquinas is still relevant (especially if you evaluate Mitchell succeeds!).