OCR ↗︎
Philosophy ↗︎
Question preparation ↓

AO1: Verificationism

• Verificationism is the method of the logical positivists.
• Positivism comes from Comte’s view that only empirical knowledge is valid, while ‘logical’ reflects the analytic focus on clarifying language.
• The verification principle claims that for a statement to be factually significant (synthetic), it must be empirically verifiable.
• We must know how to verify it as true or false through experience.
• Ayer also allows analytic statements, such as maths and logic, as meaningful.
• If a proposition is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, it lacks ‘literal’ or cognitive significance. 
• Early verificationists held a ‘hard’ verification principle, where a statement is only meaningful if it can be conclusively verified.
• However, Ayer argues this is too strict, since universal scientific laws cannot be verified with certainty.
• He therefore introduces ‘weak’ verification, where a statement is meaningful if experience can show it is probably true or false. 
• However, weak verification risks allowing too much meaning, as many claims might appear indirectly supported by experience.
• Ayer therefore refines his principle into direct and indirect verification.
• Direct verification involves immediate observation, such as “I see a key”.
• Indirect verification involves statements connected to experience that can be tested in principle, such as “this key is made of iron”. 
• Ayer distinguishes between what is verifiable in practice and in principle.
• A statement is meaningful if we know there is some possible way to verify it, even if we cannot currently do so.
• For example, claims about the dark side of the moon were once unverifiable in practice but verifiable in principle.
• Religious language, referring to a metaphysical God, fails these tests and is therefore not meaningful.

AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification

• Hick argues verificationism does not undermine religious language.
• He accepts Ayer’s principle but claims religious statements are verifiable in principle.
• After death, we would discover whether God and an afterlife exist.
• Although this cannot be tested while alive, it could be verified eschatologically.
• So, religious language may still meet Ayer’s requirement of verifiability in principle.

Counter

• However, this assumes the afterlife exists as a place where verification could occur.
• Ayer’s example of the dark side of the moon worked because we already knew it existed.
• We also knew it could be reached and observed.
• In contrast, we do not know that an afterlife exists or that it provides conditions for verification.
• So Hick has not shown that religious claims are verifiable in principle.

Evaluation

• Hick’s argument ultimately fails.
• If death results in annihilation, there would be no moment of discovery or verification.
• So religious claims would remain unverifiable.
• Simply imagining possible verification is not enough.
• We must have reason to believe the conditions for verification actually exist.
• Without this, Hick’s proposal collapses into speculation.
• Ayer’s principle is designed to exclude exactly this kind of unfounded metaphysical claim.
• So Hick does not successfully defend religious language against verificationism.

AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test

• The verification principle states that a statement is meaningful only if it is analytic or empirically verifiable.
• However, this creates a problem.
• For the principle itself to be meaningful, it must meet its own test.
• It is not analytic, since it can be denied without contradiction.
• It is also not empirically verifiable.
• So, it appears to be meaningless by its own standard.

Counter

• Ayer accepts this problem and responds that the principle is not a factual statement.
• Instead, it is a methodological tool.
• It is a rule adopted to distinguish meaningful empirical statements from others.
• So, it does not need to be verified itself.

Evaluation

• However, this response weakens Ayer’s position.
• If the principle is only a tool, then it cannot be used to declare metaphysical or religious language meaningless in any absolute sense.
• It simply reflects a chosen method, not an objective truth about meaning.
• This means alternative approaches, such as rationalism, remain possible.
• Ayer’s original aim was to dismiss metaphysics entirely, but this defence reduces his claim to a preference for empiricism.
• So, the verification principle fails to justify its strong conclusions and loses much of its force.

AO1: Falsificationism

• Popper argued that verificationism is not a correct account of empiricism.
• Science does not work by looking for evidence that verifies a theory, but by making predictions which are falsifiable.
• He illustrates this with Einstein’s prediction about Mercury’s orbit.
• If observations had contradicted it, Einstein’s theory would have been falsified.
• By contrast, Popper criticises Freudian and Marxist theories for interpreting all evidence as confirmation, making them unfalsifiable. 
• Antony Flew applies falsificationism to religious language.
• Flew agrees religious language is cognitive, as it expresses beliefs attempting to assert something about the world.
• However, these beliefs are unfalsifiable and so fail to say anything about reality.
• Unlike Ayer, Flew does not claim religious language is meaningless in all senses, but that it fails to make genuine assertions. 
• Flew argues that asserting “X” is equivalent to denying “not X”.
• So all assertions must be capable of being false.
• If a statement cannot be imagined false, then it does not deny anything and so does not assert anything either.
• Religious believers cannot say what would prove their belief in God false.
• So religious language is a failed attempt to speak about reality. 
• Flew illustrates this through John Wisdom’s ‘parable of the gardener’.
• A believer claims a gardener exists, but as tests fail, they qualify the claim (invisible, intangible, etc.).
• This leads to a “death of a thousand qualifications”, where the claim becomes indistinguishable from there being no gardener.
• Thus, religious language fails to make a testable difference to reality and cannot meaningfully assert anything about it.

AO1: Mitchell

• Mitchell argues religious language is cognitively meaningful and falsifiable.
• Some theists have unfalsifiable ‘blind’ faith.
• However, he argues most theistic belief is based on evidence, such as personal experience, which can be outweighed by counter-evidence like evil.
• Encounter with God is personal, so the amount of evil needed to undermine faith will differ between individuals.
• Crucially, Flew’s mistake was to think falsification requires knowing in advance what would falsify a belief.
• But ‘falsifiable’ only means a belief could be overturned by some possible evidence. 
• Mitchell also disagrees with Hare, who compares believers to a paranoid student who ignores counter-evidence.
• Mitchell argues believers do acknowledge contrary evidence, such as evil, but judge it insufficient to overturn their belief.
• So theism can be a rational assessment of the balance of evidence. 
• Mitchell illustrates this with a parable.
• A resistance soldier in a civil war meets a stranger who claims to be their leader.
• After a powerful encounter, the soldier becomes convinced this is true.
• This belief is maintained despite counter-evidence, such as seeing the stranger fighting for the enemy.
• The soldier may interpret this as the leader being a double agent.
• Mitchell notes there must be some level of evidence where continuing belief would become ‘ridiculous’, even if it cannot be specified in advance.
• The parable shows that religious belief can be based on personal experience, while still allowing that some evidence could eventually falsify it.

AO2: Mitchell vs Flew

• Flew argues Mitchell fails to show theistic belief is falsifiable.
• He appeals to the logical problem of evil, claiming any evil is incompatible with an all-good, all-powerful God.
• If so, any amount of evil would falsify belief in God.
• The fact that believers continue to believe suggests their claims are unfalsifiable.

Counter

• However, this relies on the logical problem of evil being sound.
• Plantinga’s free will defence challenges this, arguing God cannot remove evil without removing free will.
• Most philosophers now accept this response and focus on the evidential problem instead.
• But this weaker version does not show that any evil disproves God.
• So Flew’s criticism loses its force.

Evaluation

• Mitchell gives a better account of religious belief, because it is validated by the observable reality of religious psychology.
• He argues belief is based on experience and can be undermined by sufficient evidence.
• This is supported by real cases where people lose faith after suffering.
• Crucially, individuals may not know in advance what would falsify their belief.
• This does not make belief unfalsifiable, only unpredictable.
• Those who retain belief often use theodicies, but these become less convincing as suffering increases.
• So belief remains sensitive to evidence.
• Mitchell therefore successfully shows religious belief can be falsifiable and cognitively meaningful.

AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’

• Ayer and Flew regard religious language as a failed attempt to describe reality because it is unverifiable (Ayer) or unfalsifiable (Flew).
• Hare argues they are wrong in assuming religious language is trying to describe reality at all.
• If it is not attempting that, it cannot be a failed attempt. 
• Hare claims religious language is a non-cognitive expression of a ‘blik’, involving attitudes, emotions and a worldview.
• Our blik shapes how we perceive the world, affecting our thoughts, behaviour and expressions.
• He argues this makes the expression of a blik non-cognitively meaningful. 
• He illustrates this with a paranoid student who believes their professors are trying to kill them.
• Even after meeting kind professors, the student thinks they are pretending.
• Similarly, religious belief can persist despite lack of, or contrary, evidence. 
• Ayer and Flew would say this shows an unfalsifiable belief.
• But Hare argues the student is expressing an underlying attitude of paranoia.
• When the student says “my professors are trying to kill me”, they are expressing their blik.
• Likewise, when religious people say “God exists” or “God be with you”, it may appear to be a belief, but is really expressing a non-cognitive attitude or worldview.
• Hare is influenced by Hume’s view that reason is a slave of the passions.
• What looks like rational belief about God is actually a rationalisation of underlying emotions.

AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist

• Flew argues Hare is too reductionist.
• Theists intend to express beliefs about reality, not just attitudes.
• Religious arguments like Aquinas’ cosmological argument present reasons for believing God exists.
• These involve observation and reasoning, not just expressions of feeling.
• Even if the argument is unsound, it still aims to make a factual claim.
• So, reducing religious language to attitudes ignores its cognitive aspect.

Counter

• However, Hare draws on Humean psychology.
• Human reasoning is often shaped by emotions and unconscious biases.
• Freud and later psychology support the idea that much of our thinking is influenced by hidden motives.
• Reason can act as a tool for justifying beliefs we already hold.
• So religious belief may reflect underlying attitudes rather than objective reasoning.

Evaluation

• Hume’s insight is partly correct, but overstated.
• While emotions influence reasoning, they do not fully determine it.
• Aristotle shows we can shape our desires through rational habits and virtue.
• Modern psychology also suggests reason can guide and influence emotions over time.
• So, it is wrong to reduce belief entirely to non-cognitive attitudes.
• Religious arguments clearly aim to establish truth, even if influenced by bias.
• There may be a range of religious language, from rational argument to blind faith.
• But Hare’s claim that all religious language is non-cognitive is too extreme.
• So, his account is overly reductionist.

AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games

• Wittgenstein argues religious language can be meaningful even if it is not cognitive.
• He thought Ayer and Flew misunderstood religious language as a failed attempt to describe reality due to being unverifiable or unfalsifiable. 
• Wittgenstein initially held a similar view to Ayer, that language ‘pictured’ reality.
• He later changed this with his theory of language games.
• Ayer and Flew think statements get their meaning by referring to reality through verification or falsification.
• Wittgenstein disagrees, arguing that meaning consists in how statements are used.
• Their meaning is acquired through their function in social contexts.
• The meaning of a statement is what it ‘does’ in a social context. 
• Social reality consists of different types of interaction.
• Each type is like a ‘game’ because it follows rules.
• The way we speak depends on context; for example, we speak differently with friends, family or in a job interview.
• So words get their meaning from the context in which they are used. 
• A language game is a rule-governed form of activity.
• We usually learn these rules unconsciously.
• Religion is its own language game, so religious language is meaningful within that context to those who understand its rules.
• Only those socialised into a language game find it fully meaningful. 
• Science is a different language game from religion, so religious language may seem meaningless within the scientific context.
• Those not socialised into the religious language game may struggle to find it meaningful.
• Language games are like environments we are trained into, shaping what counts as meaningful.
• But unlike Plato’s cave, they are not illusions to escape from, and there is no higher perspective outside them.

AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism

• A strength of Wittgensteinian fideism is that it explains the apparent independence of religion and science.
• Religion can be seen as a distinct “language game” with its own rules and purposes.
• This reflects a long fideist tradition in Christianity, such as Tertullian’s rejection of Greek philosophy.
• On this view, religious belief is grounded in faith, not reason or evidence.
• So conflicts between science and religion may be avoided by treating them as separate forms of life.

Counter

• However, this separation is rejected by natural theology.
• Aquinas argues that reason and observation can support belief in God.
• His cosmological arguments aim to prove God’s existence from features of the natural world.
• Modern versions, such as fine-tuning arguments, also use scientific evidence to support theism.
• This shows religion and science are not always separate, but can be connected.
• Religious claims often overlap with scientific claims about the same world.

Evaluation

• Wittgensteinian fideism therefore goes too far in separating religion from reason.
• Religious arguments clearly aim to make cognitive claims about reality.
• Even if such arguments fail, they still show that believers use evidence and reasoning.
• Ordinary religious belief also supports this.
• When believers say God created the world, they refer to the same world studied by science.
• Aquinas’ theory of analogy explains how this works: terms like “creator” apply to God in a different but related way.
• This allows religious language to refer meaningfully to reality without being identical to scientific language.
• So religion is not a completely separate language game.
• Aquinas’ natural theology provides a more convincing account of how religious language works.

AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism

• Wittgenstein’s approach to religious language is more convincing than other non-cognitive theories because it avoids reducing religion to purely individual feeling.
• He explains religion as a social “form of life,” where meaning comes from shared practices.
• Activities such as prayer, worship and scripture-reading are rule-governed, and their meaning depends on how they are used within a community.
• This captures the lived, communal nature of religion better than purely emotive theories.

Counter

• However, this view is criticised for leading to theological anti-realism.
• If meaning is entirely based on use within a community, religious language becomes disconnected from any objective reality.
• This removes religion’s “vertical dimension,” where believers see themselves as relating to a transcendent God.
• Religious practices are not experienced as mere human constructions, but as responses to something beyond the human world.
• Religious experience in particular is often taken as direct awareness of the divine.
• So Wittgenstein risks reducing religion too much.

Evaluation

• While Wittgenstein could be right that religion is socially constructed, this seems incomplete.
• Many features of religion appear across different cultures, such as mystical experiences, moral insights and ideas of transcendence.
• This suggests religion is not purely constructed.
• Different theories explain this in different ways: traditional theism sees it as evidence for God, Hick’s pluralism as responses to a shared ultimate reality, and naturalism as a product of human social or evolutionary psychology.
• Although these views are incompatible, they all agree that religion connects to something beyond mere social practice.
• Wittgenstein’s account cannot easily explain this universality.
• So, while his theory captures the social dimension of religion, it fails to account for its apparent link to objective reality, making it incomplete.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: Verificationism
AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification
AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
AO1: Falsificationism
AO1: Mitchell
AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’
AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist
AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games
AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism
AO1: Aquinas’ theory of analogy (cataphatic)
AO2: Brummer’s critique of analogy

Verificationism/logical-positivism: RL = cognitive but meaningless (unverifiable).

Hick: RL = cognitive and meaningful (eschatological verifiable).

Falsificationism: RL = cognitive but unfalsifiable and thus fails to ‘assert’ anything about reality.

Mitchell: RL = falsifiable and thus cognitive and meaningful.

Hare: RL = non-cognitive expression of Blik but meaningful (affects people’s lives)

Wittgenstein: RL = non-cognitive but contextually meaningful expression of participation in a language game 

Aquinas: RL = cognitive and meaningful expression of belief about God by analogy.

Ayer and Flew’s stance is a little complicated regarding whether they think religious language is cognitive or not.

Flew definitely thinks religious language ‘attempts’ to be cognitive – he doesn’t think it’s simply non-cognitive expression of feelings, attitudes, Bliks, language game participation etc. But nor does he think it’s really ‘genuinely’ cognitive in the sense of having cognitive meaning. Because for him, language must be falsifiable to meet that condition. 

Ayer is more tricky still, but it’s fair to read him in a similar way. He doesn’t say RL is just an expression of non-cognitive emotion like he is very clear about for ethical language. 

A lot of text books disagree, and funnily enough different exam boards actually say different things about this. OCR’s spec doesn’t actually say either way. So there’s no ‘official’ answer they’re looking for. Ultimately, I don’t think you’d be penalised for thinking Ayer and Flew regard religious language as non-cognitive. But if you explain this more nuanced view it would be an interesting thing to add to demonstrate deeper understanding (though absolutely not necessary to gain full marks). 

So: 

Ayer regards religious language as cognitive but meaningless.
Flew regards religious language as cognitive but failing to assert anything about reality.

RL expresses beliefs – or at least, mental states which attempt to be genuine beliefs and genuinely represent reality. But they fail to do what they attempt – because for Ayer and Flew, for a belief to genuinely represents reality means that it must be verifiable or falsifiable.

Question types:

You could be asked to evaluate or critically compare any of the following:

• Verificationism (logical positivism)
• Falsificationism
• Mitchell
• Hare (Blik)
• Wittgenstein (language games, form of life)
• The falsification symposium (Flew, Mitchell & Hare’s debate – and their parables)

Remember (this is true for all such topics with OCR): if a question focuses on one of these – the AO1 is for that. You can bring in other theories, but keep their AO1 to a minimum, and focus it on the theory in question (i.e., explain how it would contest the theory in question: explain what it would say in answer to the question).

Also, when bringing in an alternate theory, you can’t really just say here’s another theory, I like it, the end – you should evaluate it, even if your evaluate ends up defending and agreeing with it. But there’s a risk/danger there of straying too much from the question, e.g., if you are using a criticism of the theory you are bringing in which doesn’t have much or anything to do with the theory in the actual question:

E.g., a question assessing verificationism – you could do a solid section on verificationism, then do falsificationism for the 2nd section, which can be easily linked as it clearly rejects verificationism. However if you then brought in Mitchell to criticise falsificationism, your essay might start wandering off course a bit. Mitchell’s critique of falsificationism isn’t obviously relevant to the evaluation of verificationism! Might be easier to do Hare’s critique, since he would counter falsificationism but it’s also easier to see and thus explain how he would reject verificationism too. Wittgenstein would also be easier in this respect.

Evaluate Mitchell’s contribution to the falsification symposium [40]

• AO1: Falsificationism (minimal AO1 – explaining Flew is the one Mitchell is attacking)
• AO1: Mitchell (Full AO1)
• AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
• AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist
  • Hare disagreed with Mitchell
• Then you could do one of the following:
• AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
  • Verificationism could be made relevant as an even more radical version of Flew’s approach. Mitchell may have shown RL falsifiable, but Ayer might say he’s not made it verifiable. 
• Either:
• AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism
• Or:
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • Wittgenstein would agree with Mitchell that RL is meaningful, but disagree about why and how – since Mitchel defends its cognitivist falsifiability, whereas Wittgenstein defends it as non-cognitive expression of participation in a form of life. 
  • Either evaluation section on Wittgenstein would work – both defend RL as cognitive, which then backs up Mitchell.
  • More specifically: Aquinas would argue RL has a grounding in reason and evidence (which is part of Mitchell’s case too: regarding the stranger staying up all night talking with the soldier = the evidence for God). And the other counter to Wittgenstein of the universal elements of religion, such as religious experience, showing religion is not a purely socially constructed form of life – would also provide evidence for Christianity which backs up Mitchell’s account of religion as based on evidence.
  • So RL = based on evidence, and thus subject to evidence changing, or to counter-evidence (like evil) – making it falsifiable and thus meaningful.

Does religious language merely express ‘Blik’? [40]

• AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’
• AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist
• AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
  • Both Mitchell and Flew reject Hare for the same reason that it’s too reductionist – suggesting RL is not just non-cognitive expression of Blik, but at least an ‘attempt’ at cognitive expression of belief about reality. The question then is whether it is successful in that, or whether it’s unsuccessful because it’s unfalsifiable – which Mitchell and Flew disagree about. For their rejection of Hare to make sense, one of them has to have a coherent account. 
  • Personally I’d side with Mitchell as having the best alternative to Hare.
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • Wittgenstein can be linked to Hare as a potential stronger form of non-cognitivism – which takes the social elements of the phenomenon of religion into account. 
  • Hare can seem overly individualistic in his reduction of religious psychology and meaning to personal attitude and worldview. But religion is a social thing. So Wittgenstein’s non-cognitivism seems stronger for accounting for religion as expression of an individual’s participation in a shared practice and form of life.
  • But, even Wittgenstein’s approach has its issues. I think especially this critical comparison of Wittgenstein with Aquinas is great for a Hare question – because Aquinas, and the whole natural theology tradition, is insisting religious language is cognitive – which counters Hare and also Wittgenstein, perhaps showing that no non-cognitive approach, no matter how sociologically developed, can account for the phenomenon.

Cognitive vs non-cognitive questions OR meaningful/meaningless questions

Cognitive language expresses beliefs which can be true or false.
Non-cognitive language expresses some non-belief which cannot be true or false.

Cog/non-cog is distinct from the question of meaningful/meaningles. These represent two separate questions. 

One is, the psychological question of what sort of mental state is expresed by religious language (cognitive belief or non-cognitive emotion/attitude). 

Then there is the philosophical question of what is the correct theory of meaning, and from that follows the answer of whether expression of cognitive and/or non-cognitive states counts as meaningful.

Whichever scholar/theory you defend as correct will give you your answer to a cog/non-cog or meaningful/less question.

Is religious language cognitive? [40]
Or:
Does religious language have a factual quality? [40]

You could really include anything here – since all the theories have a judgement on whether religious language is cognitive, or whether it’s instead non-cognitive.

This is focusing less on the question of meaningfulness – and more on the psychological question of what’s going on in religious people’s minds when they express religious utterances.

Is religious language meaningful? [40]

This question – or it’s opposite of whether religious language is meaningless – really has to include Ayer’s verificationism, since that’s the only theory which straight up said RL = meaningless. Flew doesn’t quite go that far, preferring not to make categorical claims about meaning in general (which got Ayer into trouble..) but instead arguing RL fails to assert anything about reality.

You could then really include anything else.

Aquinas vs Wittgenstein questions:

• These types of questions bring Aquinas in from the previous RL topic into this topic.
• AO1: Aquinas’ theory of analogy (cataphatic)
• AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
• AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism
  • This is an eval of Wittgenstein – but ultimately defends the cognitive meaning of RL through its universal elements of religious experience and the ethics found in its texts – which would back up Aquinas
  • (in fact, it fits very well with Aquinas’ belief, upheld in Vatican II inclusivism, that such universalities fit the ‘ray of truth’ that enlightens all mankind. So Aquinas’ anthropology of religion better fits the data of universalities compared to Wittgenstein’s sociologically reductive anthropology).
  • Then I’d do something to evaluate Aquinas further. Options could be:
• AO2: Barth vs Aquinas on natural theology
  • This runs the danger of being repetative – but Barth is offering a genuinely distinct critique of Aquinas from the revealed theology ‘fideist’ perspective than we considered earlier. And it ‘could’ back up Wittgenstein who is also ‘tentatively’ linked to Fideism (the support would be very indirect – but not nothing).
• AO2: Brummer’s critique of analogy
  • This is just a straight critique of Aquians – but it could be relevant here because it suggests Aquinas’ account of RL fails due to internal issues regarding the problem of God being beyond our understanding so how can we ever refer to God in language. 
  • Wittgenstein’s approach seems better because it avoids this issue, arguably intelligently just separating religion from literal cognitive meaning, and thus avoiding this paradox of referring to something beyond understanding.
  • Though of course you could then defend Aquinas, as my paragraph goes on to do.

Weirdly worded questions:

How convincing are non-cognitive approaches to religious texts? [40]

• This question is not as bad as it looks.. Though it’s probably best avoided. 
• It’s still about assessing the non-cognitive approach to religious language, whch is straightforward.. But specifically focusing on the religious language in religious texts – not the everyday spoken religious language we’re used to dealing with here in this topic.

• The Hick paragraph “AO2: Hick on Jesus as just a teacher of wisdom” would work well here.
• Hick thinks some religious language in the bible, like its exclusivist claims about Jesus’ divinity, resurrection, incarnation etc – must be taken in more of a non-cognitive way, as symbols for things like the importance of Jesus as a human with a special mission (though not God..), the rising of the early Church, and care of God for humanity.
• Hick is influenced here by Bultmann, who thinks religious texts express the existentialist-themed spiritual experience of the bible authors.
• He took a ‘demythologisation’ approach to religious texts, arguing we should replace these stories which sounds literal to modern ears with statements of the deeper ethical truths they intend to convey.
• Bultmann and Hick don’t think religious language expresses mere feelings, but existential commitments – moral and spiritual inclinations to ways of life in response to unavoidable existential questions.

• Of course, Bultmann and Hick are challenged for reducing ideas about Jesus, e.g., the incarnation and resurrection, to expressions of spiritual experience. Traditional Christians like Aquinas would argue that must be interpreted cognitively.

• Tillich (another existentialist) would also work here. 
• Technically Tillich sees his approach as beyond the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction – because he thinks symbols express participation in a higher spiritual reality, not merely emotions. 
• Ultimately – he does view the text of the bible as symbolic and not ‘factual’ in the normal cognitive way.
• But then: 
  • Critics of Tillich could argue it doesn’t actually connect us to anything higher and the symbols are just in our mind, which would make them purely non-cognitive. 
  • And critics like Alston say Tillich can’t make the right sense of the language of heaven/hell in the bible, which he thinks requires a cognitive reading.
• You can also answer this question with Hare, and/or treat it as a Wittgenstein (non-cognitive) vs Aquinas (cognitive) question.

• You have to assess whether it’s valid to view the words in the Bible as expressions of Blik or participation in a language game – OR are the cognitivist theories like Aquinas’ better. Aquinas would interpret language about God in the bible analogically.
• How convincing are non-cognitive theories of religious language, when applied to the religious language in the Bible – rather than everyday religious language.

• Tillich would also work here. Technically Tillich sees his approach as beyond the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction – because he thinks symbols express participation in a higher spiritual reality, not merely emotions. But, critics of him could argue it doesn’t actually connect us to anything higher and the symbols are just in our mind, which would make them purely non-cognitive. And people like Alston say it can’t make the right sense of the language of heaven/hell in the bible, which he thinks requires a cognitive reading.

Are any versions of the verification principle convincing? [40]

• Ayer goes through various versions of verification principle (first weak – then direct/indirect).
• In my main article notes there’s a debate section on whether the verification principle is overly restrictive. If you want really good marks that would be ideal for this question.

• And/or: just explain the weak version and direct/indirect version and then just treat the question like a verificationism question:
  
• AO1: Verificationism (full AO1 – focusing on the versions of the verification principle)
• AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
• AO1: Falsificationism (minimal AO1 – focusing on how it intended to improve on verificatoinism)
  
• Aside from that you could bring in anything else,- since the other theories all contest what Ayer says about religious langauge. But note the question isn’t really focused on RL. So you’d need to frame other theories as showing that Ayer’s version of the verification principle is unconvincing as shown through its inadequate application to RL.
• AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games
  • Wittgenstein would be the best I think – since he initially agreed with logical positivism (somewhat.. with his picture theory of meaning) but then changed his mind with language games.
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • But of course Wittgenstein gets into trouble separating religious from scientific/empirical meaning – especially regarding Aquinas’ a posteriori arguments which appear cognitive.
  • A link back to Ayer could be: it was cases like Aquinas’ 5 ways which Ayer opened the door to in his ‘weak’ verificationism, but which he then tried to close with his direct/indirect verification distinction.

How useful/valuable is Aquinas’ analogical approach in the philosophy of religion? [40]

• This question is asking whether Aquinas’ theory of analogy is still relevant to the modern debates, e.g., between Ayer, Flew, Hare & Wittgenstein.

• You could just treat this as an Aquinas vs Wittgenstein question. But you could easily bring in Ayer or Flew here, as they would reject analogical religious language.

• Note that: in this 2nd RL topic, many of those defending the meaningfulness of RL are defending it as non-cognitive (Hare & Wittgenstein) – suggesting philosophy of religion has significantly moved towards marginalising the notion of religious language as having any value as a cognitive expression – which is what Aquinas thinks it has.
• Though, Hare and Mitchell buck that trend.

• AO1: Aquinas’ theory of analogy (cataphatic) (full AO1)
• AO1: Verificationism (minor AO1)
• AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test
  • Ayer fails – so he can’t make defeat the value/use of Aquians
• AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games (minor AO1 – just set up his rejection of Aquinas’ cognitivist presumptions) 
• AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism
  • Defends Aquians’ value/usefulness against Wittgenstein
• AO2: Mitchell vs Flew
  • Flew would say Aquinas has no use/value because RL is unfalsifiable and thus fails to assert anything about reality.
  • Mitchell counters: it is falsifiable – based on evidence, sensitive to possible counter-evidence, and falsifiable by some potential evidence (albeit unknown in each individual case), i.e., some sufficient amount and/or type of evil.
  • Mitchell can be argued to back up Aquians’ natural theology project somewhat – of showing religious faith to be supported by evidence and reason. 
  • So this shows Aquinas is still relevant (especially if you evaluate Mitchell succeeds!).