OCR ↗︎
Philosophy ↗︎
Question preparation ↓

AO1: Plato’s dualism

Plato is a dualist, meaning the soul is distinct from the body.
He believes the physical world is a poor copy of the real world of Forms.
Our true self is the soul, which can understand these Forms through reason.
His dualism is about levels of reality, with the soul being more real than the body.
Plato explains the soul using the charioteer analogy.
Reason is the charioteer controlling two horses.
One represents spirit (courage), and the other appetite (desire).
If reason controls them, the soul is ordered and moves towards truth.
If not, the soul becomes disordered.
So, virtue is achieved when the parts of the soul are in harmony.

AO2: Plato’s argument from recollection

Plato argues we have knowledge of perfect things, like perfect circles or justice.
But we never experience such perfection in the world.
So, he says we must have learned them from a realm of forms before birth.
This implies we have an immaterial soul that knew these forms.
Learning is then recollection triggered by experience.

Counter

Hume argues we can form ideas of perfection ourselves.
We imagine imperfect things and remove the flaws.
This creates the idea of a perfect circle or object.
So, we do not need a realm of forms or a soul to explain this.

Evaluation

Plato’s argument fails at two key points.
Hume shows we can form perfect ideas through reasoning alone.
So, they do not need to come from a previous life or realm of forms.
Even if such ideas were innate, this would not prove the existence of a soul.
There could be other explanations, such as evolution shaping our thinking.
So Plato assumes too quickly that his explanation is the only possible one.
The argument does not successfully prove the soul or forms exist.

AO1: Aristotle’s materialist view of the soul

Aristotle rejects Plato’s idea that form exists separately from the world.
He argues form is part of things themselves, known as hylomorphism.
The soul is the form of a living body and gives it its abilities.
Plants have souls for growth, animals also for movement, and humans also for reason.
So, the soul explains what kind of living thing something is.
He compares the soul to the imprint in wax made by a stamp.
The wax is the body, and the imprint is the soul.
The imprint is not separate, but gives the wax its shape.
So, the soul cannot exist apart from the body, but gives it life and function.

AO2: Critique of formal causation by modern materialism

Modern science rejects formal causation.
For example, snow’s whiteness was once explained by its form.
Now it is explained by its material structure and light.
Science avoids concepts that are not needed for explanation.
So, the mind is explained through brain processes, not a soul.

Counter

Hylomorphists argue this is unjustified.
Science has not explained consciousness or thought.
So, we cannot rule out formal causation yet.
It may still be needed to explain the mind.

Evaluation

However, not having an explanation does not prove we need a new kind of cause.
Science has often removed earlier ideas, like vital forces, once better explanations were found.
The example of snow shows this clearly.
Consciousness may seem mysterious, but that does not mean it needs formal causation.
It could still be explained materially in the future.
Since we have strong evidence for material causes, but none for formal causes, it is more reasonable to continue with a material approach.

AO1: Descartes’ substance dualism

Descartes argues that the mind (or soul) and body are different.
He is a substance dualist, meaning they are two distinct kinds of thing.
Bodies are physical and take up space, while the mind is defined by thinking.
As a rationalist, Descartes believes certain knowledge can be gained through reason.
He argues we cannot doubt our own existence, because doubting is a form of thinking.
So, “I think therefore I am” shows that we exist as thinking minds.
However, the body can be doubted, since we could be dreaming or deceived.
This suggests the mind is not the same as the body.
Thinking is essential to us, but having a body is not.
He then supports this with further arguments showing the mind and body are not identical.

AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument

Descartes argues that physical things are divisible because they take up space and can be split into parts.
By contrast, the mind has no parts and cannot be divided in this way.
Thinking seems to be a single unified activity.
He uses the principle that identical things must share the same properties.
Since the body is divisible and the mind is not, they cannot be the same thing.

Counter

Some argued the mind can be divided into thoughts, feelings and memories.
Descartes replies these are not parts but modes of one consciousness.
They all belong to a single unified subject.
So, the mind itself remains indivisible.

Evaluation

However, split-brain cases provide strong evidence against this.
When the brain is divided, patients can display conflicting behaviours, as if there are two centres of consciousness.
One hand may act against the other, suggesting divided awareness and control.
This implies the mind may not be a single unified whole.
If mental activity can be split in this way, then Descartes’ claim that the mind is indivisible is undermined.
So, his key premise is weakened, and with it the conclusion that the mind must be non-physical.

AO1: Gilbert Ryle’s ‘category error’ critique of dualism

Ryle argues that dualism makes a ‘category error’, by treating the mind as the wrong kind of thing.
He uses the example of someone seeing university buildings and then asking to see the university itself.
They wrongly think it is another object, rather than the organisation of those buildings.
Ryle says Descartes makes the same mistake by treating the mind as a separate thing.
This leads to the idea of a “ghost in the machine”.
Ryle argues instead that mental language describes behaviour.
For example, saying someone is angry means they are likely to act in certain ways.
It does not refer to a separate inner thing.
He compares this to brittleness.
Brittleness is not a thing, but a tendency to break.
In the same way, the mind is not a thing but a tendency to behave in certain ways.
Ryle is still a materialist, but rejects the idea that the mind is either a non-physical thing or just the brain.

AO2: The category mistake

A common response to Ryle is that the mind does seem like a real thing.
Mill argues we know our own thoughts and feelings through introspection.
We then assume others have similar inner experiences because they behave like us.
So, we do use mental language like ‘anger’ or ‘pain’ to talk about real inner states.
This means it’s not a category mistake to think the word ‘mind’ refers to a ‘thing’.
So, it is then still valid to ask what kind of thing the mind is – physical or immaterial.

Counter

Ryle rejects this and says we do not learn about the mind through introspection.
Instead, we learn mental words like “pain” by seeing how they are used in behaviour.
Children learn to apply these words publicly, not by identifying inner objects.
So, talking about the mind as a thing is a mistake.
It wrongly treats behaviour as caused by a hidden inner entity.

Evaluation

However, Ryle goes too far.
It is true that we learn mental language through behaviour and social use.
But this does not mean there are no real inner experiences.
We clearly feel pain, think, and remember, and these are not just behaviours.
Mill is right that we have some awareness of our own mental life.
Ryle has a point about the social influence on mental language.
But we can combine both points in a way that still shows Ryle fails:
We learn mental language publicly, but also at the same time learn to connect it to inner mental states.
So, Ryle does not show that the mind is a category mistake.

AO1: Materialism

Monism is the view that only one kind of reality exists.
Materialism is the idea that everything is physical.
Modern materialists reject the idea of a soul.
They argue the mind is just the brain.
Dawkins supports this view, saying there is no scientific evidence for a soul.
Humans are physical beings shaped by evolution.
Our thoughts and consciousness come from the brain.
So, when the brain dies, the person no longer exists.
Dawkins says the word “soul” can still be used metaphorically.
For example, calling someone “soulless” describes their character.
But it does not mean a literal soul exists.

AO2: Reductive materialism

Reductive materialism says the mind is just the brain.
Changes to the brain affect thoughts and feelings.
Drugs, brain damage and ageing all change mental states.
Brain scans also show links between brain activity and experience.
So, the simplest explanation is that mental states are brain states.

Counter

Chalmers argues this misses the “hard problem” of consciousness.
Science can explain brain functions like memory and perception.
But it cannot explain why these processes produce subjective experience.
So, it may be too early to say the mind is just the brain.

Evaluation

However, this objection is not decisive.
If the mind really is the brain, we should expect it to be difficult to understand.
So, the hard problem may just reflect limits in current science.
Science has often explained things that once seemed mysterious.
It is more reasonable to continue with physical explanations than introduce non-physical ones.
Dualism is possible, but it adds extra assumptions without strong evidence.
So, overall, the simpler and better-supported view is reductive materialism.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: Plato’s dualism
AO2: Plato’s argument from recollection
AO1: Aristotle’s materialist view of the soul
AO2: Critique of formal causation by modern materialism
AO1: Descartes’ substance dualism
AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument
AO1: Gilbert Ryle’s ‘category error’ critique of dualism
AO2: The category mistake
AO1: Materialism
AO2: Reductive materialism

Question types:

Questions can focus on or critically comparing, any of the following:

Plato (the soul as the essential and immaterial part of a human, temporarily united with the body
Aristotle (the soul as the form of the body; the way the body behaves and lives; something which cannot be separated from the body)
Descartes (mind and body are distinct material and spiritual substances)
Metaphorical view of the soul (Dawkins)
Category error/mistake (Ryle)

For such focused questions:

AO1 on the thing in the question.
AO2 on the thing in the question (each has at least one).
Then, you can bring in other views – but bare minimum AO1 for them, and their relevance to the view focused on by the question must be introduced and sustained throughout the paragraph.

For critical comparison questions:

You could do one paragraph on each and then a third paragraph on another person who would either say yes or no to both, or back up one over the other.
Fine to conclude both views fail equally, or that one is slightly more convincing but both still fail.

Evaluate Plato’s view of the soul [40]

AO1: Plato’s dualism
AO2: Plato’s argument from recollection
And then could do any two of the following:
- AO2: Reductive materialism
  - Dawkins & Smart would say Plato is wrong, Chalmers attempts a defense of property dualism, but ultimately fails.
- AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument
  - Would say Plato’s dualist metaphysics needs developing into a more modern ‘substance’ variety, though modern science shows they both ultimately fail.
- AO2: Critique of formal causation by modern materialism
  - Aristotle would say Plato was wrong, though modern science would say they both ultimately fail.

“The should is best understood metaphorically” – Discuss [40]

AO1: Materialism
- (must include the Dawkins part).
AO2: Reductive materialism
And then could do anything else really:
Plato, Aristotle and Descartes all believe in various types of a literal soul, and are all countered by modern science – which fits well to defend and link back to Dawkins’ view.
Even Ryle could work, since he would not quite agree with either side of the ‘metaphorical vs literal’ question, but would say language about the mind refers to behavioural dispositions – not a literal non-physical soul entity, nor a material form, nor a material entity.

‘Discussion of the mind-body distinction is a category error’ – Discuss [40]

AO1: Gilbert Ryle’s ‘category error’ critique of dualism
AO2: The category mistake
AO2: Reductive materialism
- Ryle aims to attack reductive materialism like that of Dawkins & Smart as well as dualism. It’s a category error to refer to the mind as a thing, which includes a non-physical thing, but also a physical thing like the brain.
- Dawkins’ approach to the mind-body distinction is better than Ryle’s in making the case for materialism & criticising dualism – because Dawkins relies more on science and doesn’t lead to counter-intuitive claims that the mind isn’t a thing.
AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument
- Intro sentence: Descartes argued his theory was not based on a category error, but on sound rationalist argumentation.
- Outro sentence: Modern science (split brain patients) shows that Descartes is wrong, adding further weight to the conclusion that it is science that undermines Descartes, not Ryle’s philosophical linguistic analysis about category errors.

Questions about consciousness or the mind

Definition of ‘mind’: the whole inner psychological self, including its conscious and unconscious aspects.
Definition of ‘consciousness’: our sense of awareness; a thing is conscious if there is ‘something it is like’ to be that thing (Nagel’s phrasing).

Descartes thinks the soul and the conscious mind are the same thing.
For Plato, the mind is the soul, and consciousness is one part of it (the charioteer).
For Aristotle, the conscious mind arises from the activity of the soul’s integrated powers, especially perception, imagination and intellect. Soul is much broader than mind, because soul covers many aspects of the organism (nutrition, motion, as well as reason/intellect).

Weirdly worded questions:

Could consciousness/mind/soul could be fully explained by physical interactions [40]

Physical interactions refers to brain processes – e.g. electrical impulses in the brain.
This question is basically asking whether the mind is just the brain.
Reductive materialism (Smart & Dawkins): yes.
Dualists (Plato & Descartes): no.
Aristotle: no – because the soul gives us reason – and it isn’t simply reducible to the material/efficient causes in the brain as it’s the formal cause of the body.

“The soul is the way the body behaves and lives” – Discuss [40]

This Q is about aristotle so treat it as just “evaluate Aristotle on the soul”, though with a bit of focus on whether the soul is as he says or as others describe – or whether it exists at all!
AO1: Aristotle’s materialist view of the soul
AO2: Critique of formal causation by modern materialism
Aside from this, you could bring in any of the others, as they all disagree with Aristotle:
AO2: Plato’s argument from recollection
- Plato rejects Aristotle’s location of form as immanently realised in beings, instead arguing recollection proves our soul is separable from the body and comes from a transcendent realm of forms.
AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument
- Descartes’ argument is for a separate soul which would reject Aristotle’s account of it
AO2: Reductive materialism
- the materialist critique of the existence of any kind of soul.
Ryle could work but would be complicated!

Analyse the metaphysics of consciousness. [40]

Metaphysics is the philosophical field/study of the nature of existence/reality).
This question is just asking you to debate the nature of consciousness – e.g. is consciousness physical (materialism) or non-physical (dualism)

Assess the philosophical language of soul, mind and body in Plato and Aristotle’s work. [40]

This question is just asking you to critically compare Plato & Aristotle on the soul.
Using Ryle against Plato would be great because he focuses on critiquing the philosophical language of dualism (and technically materialism too).

Assess materialist critiques of dualism [40]
Assess dualist arguments against materialism [40]

AO1: Materialism
AO2: Plato’s argument from recollection (dualist argument) and its counter from Hume (materialist critique).
AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument
AO2: Reductive materialism (Smart’s materialist critique) and Chalmers’ as a counter (dualist argument)

Is the soul a spiritual substance? [40]

Descartes: yes – Descartes is the substance dualist.
Plato: no – Plato is a dualist – but not a substance dualist – Plato doesn’t say the mind and body are separate substances, but different degrees of reality.
Dawkins – no (it doesn’t exist)
Aristotle – no (it’s the form of the body)
Ryle – no (it’s a category error to think of the soul/mind as a thing of any type, including a spiritual substance).