AO1: Plato’s dualism
- Plato is a dualist, meaning the soul is distinct from the body.
- He believes the physical world is a poor copy of the real world of Forms.
- Our true self is the soul, which can understand these Forms through reason.
- His dualism is about levels of reality, with the soul being more real than the body.
- Plato explains the soul using the charioteer analogy.
- Reason is the charioteer controlling two horses.
- One represents spirit (courage), and the other appetite (desire).
- If reason controls them, the soul is ordered and moves towards truth.
- If not, the soul becomes disordered.
- So, virtue is achieved when the parts of the soul are in harmony.
AO2: Plato’s argument from recollection
- Plato argues we have knowledge of perfect things, like perfect circles or justice.
- But we never experience such perfection in the world.
- So, he says we must have learned them from a realm of forms before birth.
- This implies we have an immaterial soul that knew these forms.
- Learning is then recollection triggered by experience.
Counter
- Hume argues we can form ideas of perfection ourselves.
- We imagine imperfect things and remove the flaws.
- This creates the idea of a perfect circle or object.
- So, we do not need a realm of forms or a soul to explain this.
Evaluation
- Plato’s argument fails at two key points.
- Hume shows we can form perfect ideas through reasoning alone.
- So, they do not need to come from a previous life or realm of forms.
- Even if such ideas were innate, this would not prove the existence of a soul.
- There could be other explanations, such as evolution shaping our thinking.
- So Plato assumes too quickly that his explanation is the only possible one.
- The argument does not successfully prove the soul or forms exist.
AO1: Aristotle’s materialist view of the soul
- Aristotle rejects Plato’s idea that form exists separately from the world.
- He argues form is part of things themselves, known as hylomorphism.
- The soul is the form of a living body and gives it its abilities.
- Plants have souls for growth, animals also for movement, and humans also for reason.
- So, the soul explains what kind of living thing something is.
- He compares the soul to the imprint in wax made by a stamp.
- The wax is the body, and the imprint is the soul.
- The imprint is not separate, but gives the wax its shape.
- So, the soul cannot exist apart from the body, but gives it life and function.
AO2: Critique of formal causation by modern materialism
- Modern science rejects formal causation.
- For example, snow’s whiteness was once explained by its form.
- Now it is explained by its material structure and light.
- Science avoids concepts that are not needed for explanation.
- So, the mind is explained through brain processes, not a soul.
Counter
- Hylomorphists argue this is unjustified.
- Science has not explained consciousness or thought.
- So, we cannot rule out formal causation yet.
- It may still be needed to explain the mind.
Evaluation
- However, not having an explanation does not prove we need a new kind of cause.
- Science has often removed earlier ideas, like vital forces, once better explanations were found.
- The example of snow shows this clearly.
- Consciousness may seem mysterious, but that does not mean it needs formal causation.
- It could still be explained materially in the future.
- Since we have strong evidence for material causes, but none for formal causes, it is more reasonable to continue with a material approach.
AO1: Descartes’ substance dualism
- Descartes argues that the mind (or soul) and body are different.
- He is a substance dualist, meaning they are two distinct kinds of thing.
- Bodies are physical and take up space, while the mind is defined by thinking.
- As a rationalist, Descartes believes certain knowledge can be gained through reason.
- He argues we cannot doubt our own existence, because doubting is a form of thinking.
- So, “I think therefore I am” shows that we exist as thinking minds.
- However, the body can be doubted, since we could be dreaming or deceived.
- This suggests the mind is not the same as the body.
- Thinking is essential to us, but having a body is not.
- He then supports this with further arguments showing the mind and body are not identical.
AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument
- Descartes argues that physical things are divisible because they take up space and can be split into parts.
- By contrast, the mind has no parts and cannot be divided in this way.
- Thinking seems to be a single unified activity.
- He uses the principle that identical things must share the same properties.
- Since the body is divisible and the mind is not, they cannot be the same thing.
Counter
- Some argued the mind can be divided into thoughts, feelings and memories.
- Descartes replies these are not parts but modes of one consciousness.
- They all belong to a single unified subject.
- So, the mind itself remains indivisible.
Evaluation
- However, split-brain cases provide strong evidence against this.
- When the brain is divided, patients can display conflicting behaviours, as if there are two centres of consciousness.
- One hand may act against the other, suggesting divided awareness and control.
- This implies the mind may not be a single unified whole.
- If mental activity can be split in this way, then Descartes’ claim that the mind is indivisible is undermined.
- So, his key premise is weakened, and with it the conclusion that the mind must be non-physical.
AO1: Gilbert Ryle’s ‘category error’ critique of dualism
- Ryle argues that dualism makes a ‘category error’, by treating the mind as the wrong kind of thing.
- He uses the example of someone seeing university buildings and then asking to see the university itself.
- They wrongly think it is another object, rather than the organisation of those buildings.
- Ryle says Descartes makes the same mistake by treating the mind as a separate thing.
- This leads to the idea of a “ghost in the machine”.
- Ryle argues instead that mental language describes behaviour.
- For example, saying someone is angry means they are likely to act in certain ways.
- It does not refer to a separate inner thing.
- He compares this to brittleness.
- Brittleness is not a thing, but a tendency to break.
- In the same way, the mind is not a thing but a tendency to behave in certain ways.
- Ryle is still a materialist, but rejects the idea that the mind is either a non-physical thing or just the brain.
AO2: The category mistake
- A common response to Ryle is that the mind does seem like a real thing.
- Mill argues we know our own thoughts and feelings through introspection.
- We then assume others have similar inner experiences because they behave like us.
- So, we do use mental language like ‘anger’ or ‘pain’ to talk about real inner states.
- This means it’s not a category mistake to think the word ‘mind’ refers to a ‘thing’.
- So, it is then still valid to ask what kind of thing the mind is – physical or immaterial.
Counter
- Ryle rejects this and says we do not learn about the mind through introspection.
- Instead, we learn mental words like “pain” by seeing how they are used in behaviour.
- Children learn to apply these words publicly, not by identifying inner objects.
- So, talking about the mind as a thing is a mistake.
- It wrongly treats behaviour as caused by a hidden inner entity.
Evaluation
- However, Ryle goes too far.
- It is true that we learn mental language through behaviour and social use.
- But this does not mean there are no real inner experiences.
- We clearly feel pain, think, and remember, and these are not just behaviours.
- Mill is right that we have some awareness of our own mental life.
- Ryle has a point about the social influence on mental language.
- But we can combine both points in a way that still shows Ryle fails:
- We learn mental language publicly, but also at the same time learn to connect it to inner mental states.
- So, Ryle does not show that the mind is a category mistake.
AO1: Materialism
- Monism is the view that only one kind of reality exists.
- Materialism is the idea that everything is physical.
- Modern materialists reject the idea of a soul.
- They argue the mind is just the brain.
- Dawkins supports this view, saying there is no scientific evidence for a soul.
- Humans are physical beings shaped by evolution.
- Our thoughts and consciousness come from the brain.
- So, when the brain dies, the person no longer exists.
- Dawkins says the word “soul” can still be used metaphorically.
- For example, calling someone “soulless” describes their character.
- But it does not mean a literal soul exists.
AO2: Reductive materialism
- Reductive materialism says the mind is just the brain.
- Changes to the brain affect thoughts and feelings.
- Drugs, brain damage and ageing all change mental states.
- Brain scans also show links between brain activity and experience.
- So, the simplest explanation is that mental states are brain states.
Counter
- Chalmers argues this misses the “hard problem” of consciousness.
- Science can explain brain functions like memory and perception.
- But it cannot explain why these processes produce subjective experience.
- So, it may be too early to say the mind is just the brain.
Evaluation
- However, this objection is not decisive.
- If the mind really is the brain, we should expect it to be difficult to understand.
- So, the hard problem may just reflect limits in current science.
- Science has often explained things that once seemed mysterious.
- It is more reasonable to continue with physical explanations than introduce non-physical ones.
- Dualism is possible, but it adds extra assumptions without strong evidence.
- So, overall, the simpler and better-supported view is reductive materialism.