OCR
Philosophy

AO1: Natural & moral evil

Natural evil is suffering caused by the natural world.
It typically involves suffering that is intense, widespread, and seemingly purposeless.
Since God is believed to have designed the natural world, it is argued that God could have created it differently or intervened to prevent such suffering.
This raises the problem that God appears responsible for natural evil.
David Hume highlights how nature is structured in ways that generate suffering.
Animals endure hunger, disease, fear, and death, with pain acting as the main driver of survival, even though less severe mechanisms seem possible.
Living beings are physically fragile, and the environment exposes them to scarcity, disease, and natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods.
This suggests suffering is built into the natural order.
William Rowe illustrates this with a fawn trapped in a forest fire.
It suffers intensely for days before dying, with no apparent benefit or purpose.
This highlights how natural evil often involves prolonged, non-human suffering that serves no clear good.
Gregory S. Paul argues that suffering is embedded in the structure of life itself.
For most of human history, large numbers of children died before developing morally, due to disease, malnutrition, and natural hazards.
These deaths occur independently of human choice, making them clear examples of natural evil.
Moral evil, by contrast, is suffering caused by human actions, such as war and genocide.
It is argued that God could intervene to prevent extreme cases without removing free will entirely.
Some cases blur the distinction, such as natural disasters intensified by human-driven climate change.

AO1: the logical problem of evil

The logical problem of evil is a deductive argument, meaning if its premises are true its conclusion must be true.
It aims to show that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the God of classical theism (defined as omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient).
The classical logical problem of evil goes back to Epicurus, who pointed out that God is either unable or unwilling to prevent evil, in which case he either doesn’t exist or isn’t God.
Mackie puts it into a modern form of the inconsistent triad:
P1. An omnipotent God has the power to eliminate evil.
P2. An omnibenevolent God has the motivation to eliminate evil.
C1. Evil, omnipotence and omnibenevolence thus form an inconsistent triad such that God (as classically defined) and evil cannot possibly co-exist.
The argument is a priori in this form, since it doesn’t reference experience.
It is based purely on anl analysis of logical implications of the meaning of the concepts ‘omnipotent’, ‘omnibenevolent’ and ‘evil’.
It is logically impossible for something to exist if there is a being with the power and motivation to eliminate it.
So if evil exists, it is impossible that God exists.
Arguing for the impossible co-existence of two things is a bold claim. It requires that their co-existence be necessarily contradictory.
So that, there is no conceivable counter-example of some logically possible state of affairs or reason where a perfect God could allow evil.

AO1: the evidential problem of evil

The evidential problem of evil claims evil makes belief in God unjustified.
It is a posteriori, based on our experience of evil in the world.
It is inductive, using this experience to support the conclusion that there is no God.
E.g., Hume points to animal and human suffering caused by natural disasters, and the difficulty of survival due to our bodily and environmental limitations.
Hume accepts that it’s logically possible that a perfect God exists and has reasons for allowing evil consistent with their perfection.
What the evidential problem denies is that the evidence justifies believing that is actually the case.
Hume’s version draws on empiricism:
P1. We are only justified in believing what the evidence suggests.
P2. We only have evidence of imperfection (a mixture of good and evil).
C1. So, we are only justified in believing that imperfection exists.
C2. So, belief in a perfectly powerful and good being is not justified.
We cannot infer a perfect God from an imperfect world, so the evidence is insufficient to justify belief.
More modern versions like Rowe argue further that especially pointless evil counts against God.
E.g., a fawn dying slowly in a forest fire shows suffering with no apparent purpose.
P1. There appear to be cases of gratuitous evil
P2. If something appears gratuitous, it is reasonable to think it is
P3. Therefore, probably, there is gratuitous evil
C1. Therefore, God is unlikely
Rowe’s conclusion claims evil is evidence against God, rather than merely blocking the inference to God

AO1: Augustinian soul-deciding theodicy

Evil arises from human misuse of free will and is justly punished.
Augustine states that “evil is either sin or punishment for sin”.
Adam and Eve were created in original perfection, with desires fully ordered under reason.
This prelapsarian ‘concordia’ was destroyed by their disobedience in eating from the tree of knowledge.
Augustine believed all humans were ‘seminally present’ in Adam (homunculus theory), so when he sinned, all humanity was ‘vitiated’.
This corruption is original sin, giving humans a strong inclination to sin.
Concupiscence describes how bodily desires can overwhelm reason.
Humanity is therefore the ‘massa damnata’, and moral evil is our fault.
The Fall also explains natural evil.
Genesis describes punishment through suffering such as toil and pain in childbirth, and humans exist in a fallen world.
Augustine also held that fallen angels became demons who contribute to natural evil.
Augustine appeals to the principle of plenitude, the idea that a perfect creation contains a full range of beings in a hierarchy of value.
Such diversity makes the world more perfect overall, and what appears as evil in isolation may contribute to the harmony of the whole, like shadows in a painting.
Evil is ‘privatio boni’, a lack of good rather than a substance.
Like blindness, it has no positive existence.
Evil results from turning away from God’s goodness, not from any defect in God’s creation.

AO2: Augustine vs the scientific evidence

Evidence contradicts key premises of Augustine’s theodicy.
Science points to evolution rather than the fall.
Genetic diversity means it’s impossible for humanity to have come from just two people.
Even if Adam and Eve existed, the idea that sins could be passed on is a discredited theory called Lamarckism.

Counter

However, original sin is defended even without a literal fall.
Niebuhr argues that original sin is the one empirically verifiable christian doctrine. C K Chesterton agrees, arguing you can see it ‘in the street’.
Human immorality, e.g. Nazism, shows original sin.
Augustine illustrates this. In his teens, he roamed around with a gang stealing pears.
Not because he was hungry, but because our twisted nature actually enjoys sinning.

Evaluation

However, we can undermine this defence with Pinker’s sociological evidence that violence has declined in modern society.
Such improvement would be impossible if the sinful temptations of graceless humans were really irresistible.
Immorality is better explained by social conditioning, which Pelagius called being ‘educated in evil’.
Pelagius travelled from Ireland to Rome and noticed that people there were more sinful.
This illustrates how culture causes sinful behaviour.
Freud could explain Augustine’s ‘pear’ story as the enjoyment of rebelling against frustrating social norms that repress our instincts.
Any selfishness or violence in human nature is more simply and scientifically explained by evolutionary instincts.
Such traits helped survival in the state of nature, but are now maladaptive.
Still, the effectiveness of socialisation shows such traits cannot be described as original sin.

Even if we grant that moral improvement is due to better policing, not inner moral improvement, original sin is still undermined.
Since, It would mean humans are capable of regulating and restraining asocial impulses in response to external conditions.
This discredits Augustine’s claim that graceless humans are unable to avoid sin in any meaningful sense.

AO2: Original sin vs moral responsibility

Pelagius argued that Augustinian original sin conflicts with omnibenevolence and justice.
A loving just God would not hold us guilty for our ancestor’s actions.
Kant identified autonomous choice as a necessary condition of responsibility.
This influenced Hannah Arendt, who argued the holocaust illustrated the problem of attributing guilt collectively, concluding guilt is “strictly personal”.

Counter:

However, original guilt relies on a contested translation of Romans 5:12 as saying “in Adam all sinned”.
Theologians often retain a softened version of original sin without original guilt.
E.g., Barth reinterprets the fall as a description of humanity’s existential condition, not a literal event.
He argues the ‘responsibility’ critique assumes a Western individualist anthropology.
Yet scripture presents humans as communal and relational beings, to God and one’s neighbour.
It portrays humanity as a corporate body, not individualised moral atoms.
So, humanity participates in Adam’s story as it symbolises our shared condition of alienation from God.

Evaluation

However, even Barth’s charitable reconstruction cannot salvage original sin’s incoherent relation to suffering.
E.g., a child who dies from cancer.
Barth claims children are born into a world whose structure reflects this alienation.
But this does not explain God’s inaction; why God permits a world structured in such a way that innocent beings suffer before any free confirmation of sin.
Barth captures biblical anthropology, but that just raises doubts about whether scriptural collective responsibility reflects genuine revelation.
Scripture here more plausibly reflects ancient social conditions.
Collective responsibility in families and tribes functioned as deterrence or vengeance in pre-modern societies.
The shift toward individual responsibility reflects the development of stable social and legal institutions, not merely Western bias.

AO1: Soul-making theodicy (Irenaeus & Hick)

Soul-making theodicy claims God allows evil because it is necessary for moral development.
Irenaeus interprets Genesis as meaning humans are created morally immature in God’s image and must develop into his likeness.
The best kind of world God can create for this purpose is one containing challenges and suffering, since these are necessary for salvation.
John Hick develops this by rejecting original perfection and a literal Fall.
Humans were always imperfect, and salvation depends on developing moral goodness rather than recovering a lost state.
Hick draws on Aristotle, arguing virtue is formed through habituation in a context of real alternatives.
Some virtues logically require evil, such as compassion needing suffering and courage needing danger.
Virtue must also be freely chosen.
Therefore, even an omnipotent God could not create fully virtuous beings, since virtue must be developed through experience rather than implanted.
Authentic moral choice also requires epistemic distance: if God’s existence were certain, humans would act from fear or self-interest rather than genuinely choosing the good.
This requires a religiously ambiguous, law-governed world, where events follow consistent natural processes rather than constant divine intervention.
The apparent randomness and uneven distribution of suffering help preserve this ambiguity and maintain the epistemic distance necessary for genuine moral freedom.
Hick also argues that all will ultimately reach moral perfection, even if that requires a post-mortem continued development.
So even apparently purposeless suffering can be redeemed in the final state, providing an eschatological justification for evil.

AO2: Purposeless evil (soul making vs logical & evidential)

Evidence for soul-making is that struggle and suffering can cultivate virtues like compassion.
However, evidence also counts against it.
E.g., a child who dies of cancer is too young to learn anything.
Animal suffering is similar.
The holocaust was dysteleological, soul-breaking and disproportionate to soul-making requirements.
D Z Phillips concluded no one in their “right mind” could think the holocaust was justified because a few survivors were strengthened by it.

Counter

Hick objects that this criticism misunderstands his theodicy.
Without epistemic distance, we would obey God out of obedience, which fails to develop virtue.
If every case of evil was perfectly aligned with the soul-making needs of those who suffered, we would know God was controlling the process.
This would break epistemic distance and ruin soul-making.
So, to enable it, God must create a world where evil appears random.
Hick is not claiming each evil serves a purpose, but that living in such a world makes soul-making possible.
So God creates a world with random evil, giving us the opportunity to grow, though it is not all designed for our development.

Evaluation

This undermines Mackie’s premise that an all-loving God must eliminate evil.
It is logically possible that random evil is necessary for soul-making.
However, Hick is claiming the evidence against soul-making (of purposeless evil) is actually how evil would appear even if soul-making were true (since the epistemic distance requires purposeless evil).
That might be logically coherent, defeating the logical problem.
But by definition, the evidence cannot support it.
It means soul-making is unfalsifiable.
There would be no observable difference between a world where God allows random evil to exist for soul-making, and a world where there is random evil because there is no God.
So, Hick fails to solve the evidential problem of evil.

AO2: Dostoyevsky’s ‘Ivan’ vs soul-making

Dostoyevsky’s character ‘Ivan’ attacks the coherence of soul-making theodicy.
He argues the whole process is immoral.
Hick says we cannot develop compassion without suffering.
But if the suffering of an innocent child was the price of soul-making, Ivan argues this is indecent.
Building heaven on a foundation of children suffering is not what Hick’s supposed ‘God of love’ would accept.
So soul-making cannot reconcile God with evil.

Counter

However, a strength of soul-making is that God had no better option in creating us.
A fully developed soul is one which has chosen good over evil.
It is logically impossible for God to create us good, since free choice is necessary for genuine virtue.
So, the best a perfect God can do is create us undeveloped with free will and a world containing evil, hoping we choose good.

Evaluation

However, this only pushes the problem of evil to a different level.
Hick may be right that soul-making is the only way to bring humans to heaven.
But the question then becomes what justifies God in creating us at all.
We can extend Ivan’s critique to defeat Hick’s standard defense.
Hick does not claim every evil has its own benefit, but that epistemic distance requires a world of random evil.
This risks the suffering of innocents.
If that is necessary for our salvation, then it would be immoral to create us at all.
Ivan’s own moral virtue compels him to reject the whole system as immoral. It doesn’t seem right to accept salvation if the price is innocents suffering.
So, if the only logically possible way to bring humans to heaven once created was soul-making, a truly loving God would not have created humans at all.
Hick explains evil given creation, but not creation given evil.
So our own existence becomes a problem for God’s existence.

AO2: The problem of evil & the issue of free will

Omnipotence-preserving Theodicies function by arguing it’s not logically possible for God to remove evil without some violation or greater cost, e.g.:
To our deserved punishment (Augustine)
To our free will, since moral evil results from our misuse of free will, and natural evil results from the free will of Adam and Eve and the devil. A lack of free will would make our lives pointless (Plantinga & Augustine)
To our opportunities for soul-making as a result from freely choosing good over evil
They conclude a perfect God would allow evil as the technically better choice..

Counter:

Mackie responds that a world where free creatures always choose good is logically possible, so a perfect God would have created it.
Mackie assumes a compatibilist view of free will: we are free when our actions are determined by our character.
This is close to Augustine’s view.
Plantinga argues responding to Mackie requires the libertarian free will view, which is the ability to have done otherwise than what we did.
So, Plantinga can deny that Mackie’s possible world is feasible.
It’s logically possible we have libertarian free will.
In which case, even God cannot create a world where free creatures only choose good, since that would force and thus undermine their choice.

Evaluation:

However, Mackie counters that libertarian free will is actually incoherent and thus impossible.
Our choices must have a cause, which could be randomness, external causes or our character.
We only talk of ‘responsibility’ for our actions that come from our character.
Our character was itself determined by prior choices.
So, libertarian free will isn’t coherent or thus logically possible as Plantinga supposed.
Compatibilism explains how a world where free creatures only choose good is feasible.
If a perfect God existed, they would have created such a world.
So, a perfect God does not exist.

Question preparation

Key paragraphs:

The logical problem of evil (deductive – Mackie’s inconsistent triad).
The evidential problem of evil (Inductive – Hume & Rowe).
Augustine’s theodicy
Evaluation of Augustine vs the logical problem (it’s not fair to blame us for the actions of adam and eve)
Evaluation of Augustine vs the evidential problem (the scientific evidence – evolution – is against the fall & original sin).
Irenaeus/Hick’s theodicy
Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the logical problem (Why make us exist at all?)
Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the evidential problem (D Z Phillips – the holocaust is clearly dysteleological evil)
The issue of theodicies vs free will

Question types:

Questions could focus on:

A version of the problem of evil (logical or evidential)
Critically comparing the logical vs evidential
A theodicy (Hick or Augustine)
Critically comparing the theodicies
Judging whether a particular theodicy (Augustine/Hick) works against a particular version of the problem of evil (Logical/Evidential)
Whether theodicies manage to solve moral or natural evil better or in particular

For Questions focusing on Augustine/Hick vs Logical/evidential

Do the version of the problem of evil mentioned in the Q
Do the theodicy mentioned in the Q
Evaluate with the relevant criticism
Bring in the other theodicy – introduce it as a potentially better solution than the one mentioned in the Q.
E.g. if the question is on Augustine – you could then bring in Hick – Hick thinks his theodicy is better/more convincing than Augustine’s – certainly it seems more optimistic – it’s arguing evil serves a good purpose – it’s not just something we are cursed with and deserve – which isn’t logical/evidence-supported.
E.g. if the question is on Hick – you can then bring in Augustine – Augustine would say Hick is overly-optimistic in trying to find a good purpose for evil, which Augustine would say ignores the clear biblical evidence for original sin and the story of the fall – which presents evil as our deserved curse and punishment.

“Natural evil has no purpose” – Discuss [40]
Focused question – on natural evil and ideas about its purpose or lack thereof

The evidential problem of evil (Hume & Rowe) – moderate AO1
Augustine’s theodicy – moderate AO1 – highlight what he says about natural evil
Evaluation of Augustine vs the evidential problem (scientific critique of the fall)

Irenaeus/Hick’s theodicy – moderate AO1 – highlight what they say about natural evil
Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the evidential problem (purposeless/disproportionate evil)

“Augustine’s theodicy explains evil in the world” [40]
Focused question – on Augustine’s theodicy.

Augustine’s theodicy (full AO1)
The logical problem of evil (Mackie) (minor AO1)
Evaluation of Augustine vs the logical problem (the moral responsibility issue)
The evidential problem of evil (Hume & Rowe) (minor AO1)
Evaluation of Augustine vs the evidential problem (scientific critique of the fall)
Irenaeus/Hick’s theodicy (minor AO1 – used as critical comparison to Augustine – evaluate as either more successful or equally unconvincing)

Does Augustine solve the logical problem of evil? [40]
Split focused question – on Augustine’s theodicy and the logical problem.

Augustine’s theodicy (moderate AO1)
The logical problem of evil (Mackie) (moderate AO1)

Evaluation of Augustine vs the logical problem (the moral responsibility issue)
The issue of theodicies vs free will (Mackie’s incompatibilist view of free will) OR Hick’s theodicy as a potentially more successful theodicy – solving the problem of evil and showing where Augustine went wrong in his approach.

Is the logical or evidential problem of evil the greater challenge to belief? [40]
Split focused question – on logical & evidential.

The logical problem of evil (Mackie) moderate AO1
The evidential problem of evil (Hume & Rowe) moderate AO1
Augustine’s theodicy (minor AO1)
Evaluation of Augustine vs the evidential problem (scientific critique of the fall)
- Final linking sentence: So, the evidence is against Augustine’s theodicy, meaning he fails against the evidential problem. However his theodicy is still logically coherent. So he can solve the logical problem of evil.

Irenaeus/Hick’s theodicy

Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the evidential problem (purposeless/disproportionate evil)

- Final linking sentence: can’t solve the evidential – but can solve the logical

Conclusion: evidential problem of evil is the stronger challenge to belief – because it defeats both theodicies by showing the evidence is not on their side. However both theodicies are logically coherent and can thus solve Mackie’s inconsistent triad.

‘natural evil enables human beings to reach divine likeness’ – Discuss [40]
Focused question – on Irenaeus/Hick.

Irenaeus/Hick’s theodicy (full AO1 – esp their focus on natural evil)
The logical problem of evil (Mackie) (minor AO1)
Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the logical problem (Dostoevsky)

The evidential problem of evil (Hume & Rowe) (minor AO1)
Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the evidential problem (purposeless/disproportionate evil)

Can monotheism be defended in the face of evil? [40]
General question.

The logical problem of evil (Mackie) (minor AO1)
The evidential problem of evil (Hume & Rowe) (minor AO1)
Augustine’s theodicy (moderate AO1)
Evaluation of Augustine vs the logical problem (the moral responsibility issue – say Aug fails)
Irenaeus/Hick’s theodicy
Evaluation of Irenaeus/Hick vs the evidential problem (purposeless/disproportionate evil – defeats logical problem but not evidential)

Conclusion: monotheism can be defended as logically consistent with evil, but the evidence of evil makes belief in God unjustified. The evidential problem cannot be solved.

Does Augustine or Hick present the better defence against evil? [40]
Split focused question – on Augustine & Hick’s theodicies

Augustine’s theodicy (moderate AO1)
Hick’s theodicy (moderate AO1)
The logical problem (minor AO1)
Augustine vs the logical problem (problem of moral responsibility)
The evidential problem (minor AO1)
Hick vs the evidential problem (- some evidence for soul-making, whereas the evidence is against Augustine. However there’s the issue for Hick of purposeless/disproportionate evil. Hick’s epistemic distance defence then defeats the logical problem but not evidential).

Conclusion: Hick stronger as only he defeats the logical problem, defending the coherence of God’s co-existence with evil. However the evidential theodicy defeats both theodicies, as neither can show that the evidence supports their theodicy. So neither can defend traditional religious belief as justified.