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Philosophy ↗︎
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AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument

Anselm’s ontological argument is a priori, meaning not based on experience.
It is deductive, meaning if its premises are true, its conclusion must be true.
He thinks that if we think carefully about the definition of God, we’ll see that God must exist:
P1. God is defined as the greatest conceivable being.
P2. It is greater to exist in reality than the mind alone.
P3. God exists in the mind.
C1. Therefore, God exists in reality.
Essentially, if God did not exist, God would be less great.
But God is the greatest being.
So, God must exist.
In Proslogion chapter 3 Anselm introduces the ideas of necessary and contingent.
A necessary being is one which must exist, because it does not depend on anything else for its existence.
A contingent being is one which could either exist or not, because it does depend on something else to exist.
Anselm then argues that the greatest being must be a necessary being.
A necessary being is one which must
This is because a contingent being can not exist.
This makes it less great than a necessary being, which cannot not exist.
So, the greatest being would be a necessary being, and therefore it must exist.

AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection

Gaunilo thinks he can prove that the ontological argument is absurd by applying it to another case, the greatest imaginable island.
Anselm said it’s greater to exist than not to, and concluded that the greatest being (God) had to exist.
But Gaunilo argues that this means the greatest island also has to exist, for the same reason.

Counter

However, Anselm argues that God and an island are different.
God is a necessary being, whereas everything else, including islands, is contingent.
No matter how great an island is, it will still be contingent, because it will still depend on water, a planet, a sun, etc.

Evaluation

This defence shows Gaunilo fails, because a priori reasoning can only prove the existence of a necessary being.
This is because a priori reasoning tells us about the definition of a concept.
E.g., it tells us that an island depends on water or a sea, to exist.
For the island to exist, it requires that the water it depends on exists.
But a priori reasoning just tells us an island depends on water, not whether that water exists.
So we cannot know a priori whether a contingent thing exists.
By contrast, a priori reasoning can tell us that a necessary being contains its own reason for existence, and that it does not depend on anything else.
This explains why a priori reasoning can prove God’s existence, but not anything contingent like an island.

AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding

Gaunilo criticises Anselm’s idea that God is ‘in the mind/understanding’.
Most theologians have always agreed, that God is beyond our understanding.
Gaunilo argues that Anselm therefore is wrong to say God is in our mind/understanding.

Counter

However, Anselm didn’t mean that we fully understand God, he just meant that God can be thought about.
Anselm makes an analogy:
Just because we can’t look directly at the sun, doesn’t mean we can’t see by sunlight.
Similarly, just because we can’t fully understand what God is, doesn’t mean that we can’t understand that God is the greatest conceivable being.

Evaluation

This response shows that Gaunilo’s critique misunderstood Anselm’s argument.
We can understand the description ‘greatest conceivable being’ without fully understanding God.
We can understand the meaning of ‘greatness’, that some things are greater than others, and the idea of something greater than everything else.
This is all we need to understand for the ontological argument to work.
It’s greater for this idea of the greatest being to actually exist, therefore it exists.
So we don’t need to actually know what the greatest being fully is, to deduce that it must exist.

AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate

The ontological argument claims that if you think God doesn’t exist, you just don’t understand what God is.
This assumes that existence is part of what God is, meaning ‘existence’ is a predicate, a describing word.
Kant argues existence cannot be a predicate.
If I say the cat is black, the word ‘black’ clearly describes a characteristic of the cat, so it is a predicate.
But if I say the cat exists, the word ‘exists’ doesn’t describe a characteristic of the cat.
It tells us that there really is a cat with those characteristics.
So there’s a difference between what a thing is, and whether it exists.

Counter

Malcolm responded that Kant was only correct about contingent things, but not necessary things like God.
Kant’s reasoning makes sense when applied to cats, or Kant’s example of coins.
But those are contingent beings.
When we call something necessary, we do describe a characteristic of it, because we are saying it is impossibly non-existent.
So ‘necessary existence’ is a predicate.

Evaluation

So, Kant fails because he ends up making the same mistake as Gaunilo.
Both try to test the logic of the ontological argument with contingent things.
But this is not a fair test, since the argument was designed to only work to prove a necessary being.

AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Kant’s 1st critique argues that something seeming necessary in our mind, doesn’t prove it is necessary in reality.
He takes Descartes’ illustration of a triangle to illustrate this.
A triangle is the idea of a shape which necessarily has three sides.
This proves that if the triangle exists, it necessarily has three sides.
Similarly, God is the idea of a being which necessarily exists.
But similarly again, this only proves that if God exists, God exists in a special, necessary way, so that God has always existed and can never stop existing.

Counter

Malcolm responds that Kant’s 1st critique makes no sense because it admits God is a necessary being, but denies that God must exist.
But a necessary being is one which must exist.
He reasons that the greatest being cannot be contingent, and therefore must be necessary.

Evaluation

However, Malcolm has assumed that there is only one type of necessity.
He’s trying to prove that it’s contradictory to deny God’s existence, which requires that God is logically necessary.
But his evidence is just that God is a non-contingent being.
Hick points out that a non-contingent being could be ontologically necessary, meaning a being which has always existed and always will exist.
But the idea of an eternal being like this, could just be an idea.
There’s nothing contradictory in saying that an eternal being doesn’t exist.
All the ontological argument can tell us is that if such a being exists, then it would exist necessarily and eternally.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Question types:

Question can focus on any of the following:

Anselm (a priori argument based on reason)
Gaunilo
Kant

Can God’s existence be proven a priori? [40]

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence

Questions focused on Gaunilo:

Short explanation of Anselm’s argument (AO1 is focused on Gaunilo)
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
AO2: Gaunilo’s critique that God is beyond our understanding
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- Kant can work so long as the relevance to Gaunilo is brought out:
- Kant develops Gaunilo’s underlying idea, that there’s a difference between necessity in the mind and necessity in reality. Gaunilo’s island failed because it tested the ontological argument’s logic through application to a contingent thing, but here Kant makes a better application of Gaunilo’s insight to a case of necessity (a triangle having three sides) to critique Anselm.

Questions focused on Kant’s criticisms

This is a hard one but it can be fine to start with a bit of Anselm vs Gaunilo – so long as they are introduced and framed in relation to Kant:
Anselm is what Kant is going to crificise – and Gaunilo’s critique contains the key premise Kant develops (the distinction between necessity in the mind and necessity in reality), though Gaunilo chooses a poor example (of a contingent thing – the island) which Kant himself mistakenly followed in his 2nd critique (with contingent coins) but developed more successfully in his 1st critique (with the necessity of a triangle having 3 sides).
So:
Anselm’s argument (framed as what Kant attacks), then Gaunilo’s island (noting the key premise Kant later develops, but then explaining why it fails due to going in the wrong direction with the island which is contingent.
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
- Ends up making the same mistake as Gaunilo – applying to a contingent thing.
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- Finally applies Gaunilo’s idea successfully to a case of necessity.

Can existence be treated as a predicate? [40]

Introduction:
A predicate is a word that describes a subject. The question of whether existence could be a predicate is central to the ontological argument for God’s existence. Anselm is accused of having faulty reasoning regarding existence being a predicate.
Gaunilo’s idea that Kant developed was that there’s a difference between necessity in the mind, and necessity in reality.
Kant developed that by:
- In his 2nd critique, arguing that existence cannot be a predicate of a thing that necessitates its existence in reality.
- In his 1st critique, arguing that even if necessary existence somehow were a predicate, that would not imply actual existence.

So:
Anselm vs Gaunilo (minor detail for both) – framed for their relevance to Kant.
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- Intro sentence: Here, Kant argues that even if necessary existence could be treated as a predicate, that does not have the implications Anselm thought it did. I.e., it cannot show that God actually does exist.

Example of conclusion: Necessary existence is indeed a predicate, as Malcolm argued – however it being a predicate doesn’t have the logical significance Anselm & Malcolm thought it did – because it cannot establish God’s actual existence.

Are Gaunilo’s criticisms of the ontological argument the most effective? [40]

AO1: Anselm’s ontological argument (minor – it’s not the focus)
AO2: Gaunilo’s ‘lost island’ objection
- This fails
AO2: Kant’s 2nd critique: existence is not a predicate
- This looks more promising than Gaunilo, but Malcolm shows it fails
AO2: Kant’s 1st critique: necessity doesn’t imply existence
- This is the most successful critique, and shows Gaunilo had the right insight but it needed developing through proper application to necessity by Kant and then Hick’s modern distinctions between types of necessity.

LOA: Kant & Hick have the most effective criticism

OR: if you want to make it easier for yourself, do both of Gaunilo’s AO2 sections, and then Kant’s existence is not a predicate section – and argue all the critiques fail, so that Gaunilo is not the most effective because none are effective.

Weirdly worded questions:

Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]
Or: Whether God’s existence best justified a posteriori / a priori [40]

This question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
You must do the ontological argument, and then at least one of teleo or cosmo – or both.
You will then have judged whether:
They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain).
One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).

I’d choose these:

AO1: Anselm (short), AO2: Kant (either of Kant’s critiques will do)
- Kant is more of an upgraded critique than Gaunilo to be frank so an essay which leaves our Gaunilo feels more comprehensive than one which leaves out Kant.
AO2: Design arguments after Darwin
- This is a nice one for this purpose because it covers a variety of design arguments and how they interact with the evolution issue, and then more contemporary issues.
AO1: Aquinas’ 3rd way (short), AO2: The fallacy of composition
- Fallacy of composition targets all versions of the cosmological argument and touches on infinite regress issues and the universe needing no cause – so it’s the best for capturing the overall issues.
Or: AO2: The Im/possibility of a necessary being
- This critique of a necessary being works very well because it attempts to attack both cosmological and ontological – but Copleston replies that it only undermines the ontological argument, not the cosmological, making the cosmological seem stronger. However in the end I evaluate that Hume succeeds, showing all varieties of argument to equally fail (though you could evaluate differently if desired).

This question would be answered best if you could highlight how the criticisms of each especially target their a priori or a posteriori nature.
E.g., Kant shows the difficulty of proving existence through definition – which attacks a priori demonstrations of existence.
E.g., most criticisms of the design and cosmological arguments exploit its inductive a posteriori nature – by showing the evidence they point to could be explained by alternative conclusions (evolution, or the universe having no cause, or some scientific cause like necessary matter).