OCR ↗︎
Philosophy ↗︎
Question preparation ↓

AO1: God as timeless (eternal)

• God as timeless is the view that God is atemporal, existing outside of time.
• Philosophers like Anselm argue this follows from God being the greatest conceivable being.
• If God existed within time, time would limit or confine him.
• A perfect being would be unchanging, but temporal beings change.
• Timelessness can also follow from God creating time.
• If God created time, God cannot himself be inside it.
• An eternal God would not experience time moment by moment like humans do.
• Instead, God apprehends all of time at once, in the ‘eternal present’.
• So, every event is present to God, even if those events happen at different times for us.

AO1: God as within time (everlasting)

• Everlasting is the view that God is a temporal being, existing within time.
• Unlike other temporal beings, God is sempiternal.
• This means God has no beginning or end, but exists at every moment in time.
• God is therefore necessary in existence, but not timeless.
• Swinburne argues this better explains God’s interaction with the world.
• If God exists in time, it is easier to understand how God can respond to prayers, perform miracles, and know what is happening ‘now’.

AO1: God as omnipotent

• Voluntarism is the view that things depend on God’s will rather than any separate order.
• Descartes applies this even to logic and mathematics.
• He therefore understands omnipotence as the power to do everything, including the logically impossible.
• For example, God could have made it false that 4+4=8.
• These truths still seem necessary to human reason, because we cannot imagine them being otherwise.
• So, logical truths either depend on God’s will, or are grounded in God beyond human understanding.

   

• Aquinas gives the mainstream view.
• Omnipotence is the power to bring about any logically possible state of affairs.
• God cannot create something which both exists and does not exist.
• Aquinas argues this is not a real limit on God’s power.
• Logically impossible “things”, like four-sided triangles, are not genuine possibilities at all.

   

• The self-limitation view agrees that God can only do the logically possible.
• It adds that God chooses not to act in ways that would damage his plan for humanity.
• For example, God does not destroy human free will or the physical order of the universe.
• Unlike Aquinas, self-limitation theorists like Swinburne and Vardy see this restraint as a temporal decision.
• This is because they typically regard God as sempiturna.
• So, God’s non-exercise of power is a free decision within time, not a necessity from eternity.

AO2: The in/coherence of Voluntarism about omnipotence

• Descartes’ argument is that God created everything, including logic.
• Nothing can exist independently of God.
• Logical impossibility limits humans and the universe, but not God.
• Just because we cannot imagine logical impossibilities, that does not prove they are impossible for God.

Counter

• Descartes is criticised for treating logic as if it were a created thing.
• Logical laws are not like physical laws or created beings.
• They are necessary truths.
• If they could be changed, they would not be necessary.
• So, saying God can make contradictions possible destroys the meaning of “possible” and “impossible”.

Evaluation

• Descartes starts with a strong idea: nothing should be independent of God.
• If logic exists apart from God, then God is not truly the source of everything.
• However, Aquinas gives the better answer.
• Logical truths depend on God because they are part of God’s eternal intellect.
• This means logic is not outside God, but it is also not something God freely creates or changes.
• God cannot make contradictions true, but that is not a weakness.
• It is because God cannot change his own perfect nature.
• This is much stronger than Descartes’ view, because it keeps God as the source of logic without turning necessary truths into changeable or meaningless claims.

AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism

• Classical theists reject divine self-limitation.
• They follow Aristotle: perfection means pure actuality, with no unrealised potential.
• This means God cannot change.
• Since time measures change, God must be outside time.
• So God’s restraint cannot be a temporal decision of self-limitation.
• It must eternally express God’s perfect nature and wisdom.

Counter

• However, this risks making God too static and detached for loving relationship.
• Swinburne argues that perfect love requires responsiveness.
• A God who cannot be affected by creation seems unable to genuinely interact with humans.
• The incarnation also suggests self-giving love involves suffering.
• So God self-limits sempiternally, choosing not to overpower freedom or natural laws.

Evaluation

• However, classical theism gives the stronger answer.
• God does not need to change in order for relationship to be real.
• Humans change in relation to God through prayer, repentance, sin, and grace.
• God responds eternally, not temporally.
• Prayer does not change God’s will, but secures what God eternally willed to give through prayer.
• Repentance and obedience also receive real effects, such as grace and forgiveness.
• Sin disorders our relation to God through defective free will.
• So omnibenevolence does not require temporal self-limitation.
• God can preserve freedom and order through eternal wisdom.

AO2: The paradox of the stone

• Mackie’s omnipotence paradox asks whether God can create a stone so heavy that God cannot lift it.
• If God can create it, then God cannot lift it.
• If God cannot create it, then God cannot create it.
• Either way, there seems to be something God cannot do.
• So, omnipotence seems incoherent.

Counter

• However, this only challenges a crude definition of omnipotence.
• Descartes can say God can do the logically impossible, so God can create and lift the stone.
• Aquinas and Mavrodes argue the stone is contradictory.
• A stone too heavy for an omnipotent being is like a square circle, not a real task.

Evaluation

• Mavrodes’ defence is sometimes criticised for assuming Aquinas’ definition of omnipotence.
• However, this criticism is weak.
• Mavrodes does not need to prove Aquinas’ view completely.
• He only needs to show that Mackie has not created a real paradox for it.
• The stone is only a problem if omnipotence means doing literally anything, including contradictions.
• But sophisticated accounts do not define omnipotence that way.
• Descartes accepts contradictions, while Aquinas and self-limitation views reject them as not genuine tasks.
• So the stone paradox does not refute omnipotence.
• It only refutes a simplistic version of it.

AO1: God as omniscient

• Omniscience means all-knowing.
• Philosophically, knowledge requires truth.
• So, God is omniscient if God knows every true proposition.
• Omniscience also means God cannot be mistaken.
• God therefore knows all true propositions infallibly.
• Aquinas argues that God has direct awareness of everything.
• This is similar to how we directly know our own perceptions.
• He calls this God’s ‘knowledge of vision’.
• However, this is only an analogy, because God’s knowledge is beyond human understanding.
• God’s knowledge is immediate, not based on reasoning or inference like human knowledge.

AO1: Boethius

• Boethius identifies an apparent conflict between divine omniscience and human free will.
• If God knows everything, God must know future human actions.
• Since God cannot be wrong, we cannot do anything other than what God knows we will do.
• This seems to destroy free will.
• It also creates a problem for divine justice, because it seems unfair for God to punish sin if humans are not free.
• Boethius’ solution is based on divine eternity.
• God is outside time and does not experience events moment by moment as we do.
• Instead, God sees all of time at once in one eternal present, as if from a ‘lofty peak’.
• So God does not “foresee” our future choices before they happen.
• He eternally sees them as present.
• This means God knows our free choices without forcing them.
• This also explains divine action.
• God does not enter time to make new decisions.
• What seems to us like a new divine action, such as answering prayer or performing a miracle, is really the temporal effect of God’s eternal will.
• God acts eternally, while we experience the results within time.

AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge

• The appeal to divine eternity is criticised as paradoxical.
• Even if God’s eternal knowledge does not force our actions, it still seems to make them necessary.
• If God knows I choose X, I cannot choose Y.
• So future choices known by God seem unable to be otherwise, and therefore not free.

Counter

• Boethius argues this misunderstands necessity.
• Some things are necessary because of free choice.
• For example, if I see someone walking, it is necessary that they are walking while they walk.
• However, they could have chosen not to walk.
• Anselm adds: actions are necessary because they happen; they don’t happen because they are necessary.

Evaluation

• Boethius’ defence is stronger.
• The criticism says God’s knowledge makes our choices set in stone, but it does not explain what sets them in stone.
• Boethius and Anselm answer that the necessity comes from the action itself, not from God forcing it.
• If someone freely chooses X, then once they choose X, it is necessarily true that they choose X.
• God eternally knows that choice, but his knowledge is not the cause of it.
• The cause is still the agent’s free will.
• So divine eternity can preserve omniscience without destroying freedom.

AO1: Anselm’s four dimensionalism

• Anselm develops Boethius’ view of divine eternity to explain how an eternal God can know and act upon temporal events.
• Boethius’ image of God viewing all time from outside can suggest God is distant from time.
• Anselm avoids this while still denying that God is inside time.
• A temporal God would be confined by succession and therefore limited.
• So Anselm argues that God is not in time; rather, all of time is in God.
• This can be understood through four-dimensionalism.
• This is the view that objects and events extend through time as well as space.
• Anselm treats divine eternity as a higher reality than time.
• All moments of time are contained within the one eternal present of God.
• This means God does not merely observe time from a distance.
• God is eternally present with every temporal event because all of time exists within divine eternity.
• So God knows future actions by being eternally present with them, not by prediction.
• God can also act on particular moments because those moments exist within his eternal present.
• Anselm therefore strengthens Boethius by making eternity the higher reality within which time is contained.

AO2: The coherence of an eternal present

• Kenny argues that the eternal view of God is incoherent.
• Temporal events are not all happening in one moment.
• Some events must happen before others, such as my parents’ births before mine.
• So, if God sees all events in one eternal present, God seems to see them wrongly.
• This threatens omniscience.

Counter

• However, Kenny’s objection mainly attacks Boethius.
• Anselm gives a stronger view by treating eternity as a higher dimension.
• Katherine Rogers says Anselm sees eternity as “a kind of 5th dimension”.
• Within time, my birth and my parents’ births are not simultaneous.
• But in eternity, they are present together.

Evaluation

• Anselm gives the stronger answer.
• The criticism assumes that events cannot be both simultaneous and non-simultaneous.
• However, this only works if the same relation is being used in the same way.
• Anselm can deny this.
• Within time, my birth happens after my parents’ births.
• Within eternity, those same events are present together.
• So there is no contradiction.
• T-non-simultaneity and e-simultaneity are different relations in different frames of reality.
• This means God does not see events wrongly.
• Temporal order remains real within time, while all events are eternally present to God.

AO1: Swinburne

• Swinburne rejects the timeless view of God.
• He argues that an eternal God would be too static and “lifeless” for genuine loving relationship.
• Relationships require two-way interaction, response, and communication.
• So God must be everlasting: existing through all time without beginning or end.
• This explains divine action in time.
• Unlike Boethius or Anselm, Swinburne thinks God can respond to prayer, perform miracles, and make contingent decisions as history unfolds.
• This makes God’s relationship with humans more personal, because God actively engages with them within time.
• To preserve free will, Swinburne argues that God accepts cognitive self-limitation.
• God knows all past and present events, and any future events that are physically determined.
• However, future free choices are not yet settled facts, so they cannot be infallibly known.
• God can predict them, but not know them with certainty.
• This does not undermine omniscience, because omniscience means knowing everything logically possible to know.

AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge

• The Bible seems to support the eternal view because God and Jesus know future human actions with certainty.
• Jesus knows Judas will betray him and Peter will deny him three times before the cockerel crows.
• This looks like infallible foreknowledge, not prediction.
• That fits Boethius and Anselm better than Swinburne.

Counter

• Swinburne argues that God is everlasting rather than eternal.
• On his view, genuinely free choices cannot be known with certainty before they occur.
• If they were, freedom would be destroyed.
• God therefore knows us like a parent knows a child.
• He can predict future choices, but not know them infallibly.

Evaluation

• Swinburne’s view is weaker because the biblical examples look certain, not probabilistic.
• He weakens God’s omniscience to protect free will.
• However, Boethius and Anselm protect both.
• God does not predict future actions before they happen.
• Instead, God eternally sees them as present.
• This means God’s knowledge depends on what we freely do, rather than causing it.
• So free will is preserved without reducing God’s knowledge to probability.
• Swinburne’s larger limitation of God’s omniscience is unnecessary:
• A perfect God would not give up more omniscience than freedom requires.

AO1: God as supremely good (omnibenevolent)

• Omnibenevolence is the idea that God is perfectly good.
• This has a metaphysical meaning and a moral meaning.
• Metaphysically, goodness is linked with perfection.
• So, God is omnibenevolent because God is a supremely perfect being.
• Morally, perfect goodness means God’s will always aligns with what is good.
• Plato and Augustine connect these two ideas.
• They argue evil has no positive existence in itself.
• It is simply a lack of goodness, called privatio boni.
• So, God’s moral goodness follows from God’s metaphysical perfection.
• Christian theology usually holds that God is both the source and standard of moral value.

AO2: The Euthyphro dilemma vs Divine command theory

• Omnibenevolence defines God as the source of perfect moral goodness.
• The Euthyphro dilemma asks whether God commands things because they are already good, or whether they are good because God commands them.
• The first makes goodness independent of God.
• The second makes morality arbitrary, since God could command cruelty and make it good.

Counter

• Some thinkers, such as W. L. Craig, accept the second horn.
• They argue that if God commanded something like genocide, it would be right.
• However, the stronger response is that goodness comes from God’s nature.
• God’s commands are good because they reflect his omnibenevolent nature, not because they are arbitrary.

Evaluation

• The Euthyphro is still a serious challenge because we can ask what makes God’s nature good.
• Simply saying “God’s nature is good” can seem empty.
• However, Aquinas gives the best answer.
• For Aquinas, goodness is linked to being, actuality and perfection.
• Evil is not a positive thing, but a lack or defect.
• Since God is pure actuality, with no defect or unrealised potential, God is the fullest possible being.
• This means God’s nature can be the final explanation of goodness.
• So the Euthyphro does not show that omnibenevolence is incoherent.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

AO1: God as timeless (eternal)
AO1: God as within time (everlasting)
AO1: God as omnipotent
AO2: The in/coherence of Voluntarism about omnipotence
AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
AO2: The paradox of the stone
AO1: God as omniscient
AO1: Boethius
AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
AO1: Anselm’s four dimensionalism
AO2: The coherence of an eternal present
AO1: Swinburne
AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
AO1: God as supremely good (omnibenevolent)
AO2: The Euthyphro dilemma vs Divine command theory
AO2: The logical problem of evil (vs Augustine or Hick)

Question types:

Questions on God’s relationship to time:

Evaluate whether God is best understood as atemporal (eternal) [40]

• AO1: God as timeless (eternal)
• AO1: Anselm’s four dimensionalism
• AO2: The coherence of an eternal present
• AO1: Swinburne
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism

Omnipotence questions, whether it is:

• Logically coherent
• Defined as the ability to do the logically impossible (Descartes’ view)
• Defined by self-limitation 
• Subject to the limits of logical possibility

“God’s power is not subject to the limits of logical possibility” – Discuss [40]
Focused question: on Descartes’ view of omnipotence

• AO1: God as omnipotent (focused on Descartes’ view)
• AO2: The paradox of the stone
  
  • This features Descartes, though ultimately concludes other definitions can resolve the paradox just as well as he can.
• AO2: The in/coherence of Voluntarism about omnipotence
  
  • This attacks Descartes directly
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  
  • This paragraph debates the self-limitation view vs Aquinas’ view – but you can frame both as ideas Descartes would reject. But since we’ve shown Descartes wrong, the question is which alternative succeeds where he fails and shows where he went wrong.

Omnibenevolence questions:

Can God coherently be omnibenevolent? [40]
Focused Q: AO is for explaining omnibenevolence

• AO1: God as supremely good (omnibenevolent) (Full AO1).
  • These sections are relevant to omnibenevolence:
• AO2: The Euthyphro dilemma vs Divine command theory
  • This explicitly targets omnibenevolence
• AO1: Boethius (minimal AO1 – just to explain the link to the issue for omnibenevolence/justice of God’s punishing us in an afterlife if omniscience has undermined free will – and briefly his solution that God is eternal)
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  • This involves Swinburne’s argument that God’s omnibenevolence (esp. loving relationship) can be shown coherent – but only through an everlasting temporal God. Then the classical view of Anselm and Aquinas would object that the coherence of omnibenevolence can be secured by an eternal God.
• Then either:
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
  • This serves to evaluate whether Boethius and Anselm’s approach secured the coherence of omnibenevolence by resolving the free will / omniscience issue.
  • This can work, but the link to omnibenevolence has to be sustained which is a challenge.
• Or:
• AO2: The logical problem of evil (vs Augustine or Hick)
  • This would be slightly better – since it focuses on omnibenevolence more explicitly.

Omniscience questions:

“An omniscient God cannot exist” – Discuss [40]

• AO1: God as omniscient (full AO1)
• AO1: Boethius (moderate AO1)
  • Setting up the foreknowledge issue and Boethius’ resolution to it
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
  • Evaluating Boethius’ & Anselm’s resolution
• AO2: The coherence of an eternal present
  • Evaluating Boethius & Anselm’s resolution further
• AO1: Swinburne (minimal AO1).
  • Highlighting his alterate resolution to defend omniscience through self-limitation
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
  • Debating the theological coherence of Swinburne vs the Boethian defense of omniscience.

Scholar focused questions could be on:

• Boethius 
• Anselm
• Swinburne

Note that these scholars are debating, and could therefore have questions focused on, and be used to answer any more general question on, the following:

• The problems of: 
• Divine knowledge.
• Benevolence.
• Justice.
• eternity.
• human free will.

“Does Anselm solve the problem of divine justice” [40]
Focused Q: on Anselm’s solution to the foreknowledge & justice issue

• AO1: Boethius (minimal AO1)
  • Explain that Boethius identified the problem – that omniscience conflicts with free will, and lack of free will conflicts with omnibenevolence and divine justice if God punishes us in an afterlife when we had no free will to do otherwise than what we did.
• AO1: Anselm’s four dimensionalism (moderate AO1 – focusing on his improvement on Boethius’ theory)
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
  
  • Boethius and Anselm’s defense of their solution to the problem of omniscience and divine justice feature here.
• AO2: The coherence of an eternal present
  
  • Here Kenny attacks the coherence of the eternal view of God – which Anselm’s solution to the problem of divine justice and omniscience depends on
• AO1: Swinburne (minimal AO1 – just to explain how he would reject Anselm and take a contrary view to how the problem should be resolved.
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
  
  • This is Swinburne vs Boethius/Anselm on this issue

Critically assess Swinburne’s account of human free will [40]
Focused Q: on Swinburne’s account of human free will

• AO1: Swinburne (full AO1)
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  • Debates Swinburne’s view that free will requires God’s self-limitation of omniscience and becoming temporal – everlasting.
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
  • At this point you could use one of the paragraphs which evaluates the coherence of the opposing view – that human free will is comparable with God’s foreknowledge due to God’s eternity:
• Either:
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
  • Swinburne would make this criticism of the eternal view – though arguably conditional / following from necessity solves it
• Or:
• AO2: The coherence of an eternal present
  • Kenny makes this criticism – and it backs up Swinburne’s account.

Does Anselm’s four-dimensionalist approach adequately explain divine action in time? [40]
Focused question – on Anselm’s four-dimensionalist explanation of divine action in time

• AO1: Boethius (minimal AO1)
  • Intro sentence: Anselm’s four-dimensionalist approach is a development of Boethius’ theory of God’s eternity, which sought to explain the relationship between God and time in a way that avoided conflict with free will.
• AO1: Anselm’s four dimensionalism (full AO1)
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
  
  • Evaluation of Boethius and Anselm’s development feature in this paragraph.
• AO2: The coherence of an eternal present
  
  • Here Kenny attacks the coherence of the eternal view of God – which Anselm’s four-dimensionalism depends on for its account of divine action in time.
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  
  • Here Swinburne argues God’s action in time should be understood as self-limitation through being everlasting, not eternal, to best fit with omnibenevolence. Then Aquinas defends the eternal view Anselm relies on (Aquinas ultimately develops Anselm’s view of God’s eternity).

“Swinburne best resolves the issue of divine foreknowledge” – Discuss [40]
Focused question: on Swinburne’s solution to the omniscience vs free will issue

• AO1: Swinburne (full AO1)
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
• AO1: Boethius (minimal AO1)
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
• AO2: The coherence of an eternal present

Weirdly worded questions:

Is it possible to resolve inconsistencies between the divine attributes? [40]
General question

• The only trap with this question is that you can’t use issues which only attack one attribute. E.g. you can’t use the paradox of the stone, since that only attacks omnipotence – it doesn’t raise a potential inconsistencies ‘between’ divine attributes.
• This includes:
• AO1: Boethius – the issue he raises (and tries to solve) is that omniscience and omnibenevolence/justice conflict over free will.
• Then you could do the debate between Boethius, Anselm and Swinburne – to see who (if any of them) resolve that supposed conflict best.
• You could do a whole essay on that – but to be more comprehensive you could instead add one or both of the following:
• AO2: The logical problem of evil (vs Augustine or Hick)
  
  • This clearly involves multiple attributes
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  
  • This involves Swinburne’s argument that omnibenevolence is best preserved by accepting a self-limitation view of omniscience – to avoid conflict regarding God’s potential for a loving relationship with us.

Is it necessary to resolve the apparent inconsistencies between the divine attributes? [40]
General question

It’s odd to think who might not think apparent inconsistencies in God’s attributes need resolving. I think one option would be proponents of sceptical theism: that God cannot be understood, and therefore we should expect God to appear incoherent to our minds. But this is because of the limitations in our mental ability, not a limitation in God. I touch on this a bit in the problem of evil – since theologians sometimes reach for the mysteriousness of God to address evil. 

Karl Barth could be relevant too, since he would think our theological doctrines, including God’s nature, ought only be informed by faith; fallen human reason being a dangerously unreliable source. Aquinas’ natural theology could be made relevant as a counter-point here.

The trinity could be an interesting analogy to draw on, since it seem paradoxical but theologians like Augustine and Barth insist that this reflects our limited intellect rather than a limitation in God.

Ultimately though, the simple way to take this question would just be to say that yes it’s necessary to resolve apparent inconstencies – otherwise, God’s coherence is threatened, which if unresolved would justify atheism. Then you can just include the normal content. 

The challenge is: you can’t just focus on evaluating the success of the various resolutions to inconsistencies. The question is whether it’s necessary to resolve them, not whether we can.

But what you can do is point out how: the competing resolutions each claim various elements of God will be or not be preserved/maintained without their approach.

E.g.:

• AO1: Boethius
  
  • Boethius thinks the inconsistency between omniscience, free will and omnibenevolence needs resolving, and attempt to do so.
  • He thinks without his approach, we won’t maintain omniscience and free will.
• AO1: Anselm’s four dimensionalism
  
  • Anselm agrees with Boethius – but thinks he needs upgrading with four-dimensionalism – otherwise the eternal God resolution of the foreknowledge paradox will not preserve God’s action in time.
• AO1: Swinburne
  
  • Swinburne agrees about the need to solve the foreknowledge problem – but disagrees with the eternal God solution of Boethius and Anselm – arguing it fails to preserve God’s loving nature
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
  
  • This evaluates Boethius, Anselm and Swinburne regarding the biblical evidence, showing how philosophical explanation can also preserve biblical coherence to present a theologically full resolution to the foreknowledge problem.
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  
  • But: Swinburne isn’t done – he also has the issue of God being in loving relationship with us, and action in the world (including maintaining a plan for the world, including allowing free will and a natural order – and prayers/miracles).
  • Swinburne thinks only his self-limitation everlasting view of god can account for all these – which he thinks presents the true full theological account necessary to Christian understanding and faith.
• AO2: The logical problem of evil (vs Augustine or Hick)
  
  • Mackie claims if the inconsistencies are not resolved, God does not exist.
  • Proponents of theodicies clearly think it necesary to resolve the problem of evil.

Is omniscience subject to self-limitation? [40]
Split focused question – on omniscience and the self-limitation view of omniscience

• AO1: God as omniscient (moderate AO1)
• AO1: Boethius (minor AO1 – just to set up the foreknowledge issue)
• AO1: Swinburne (moderate AO1)
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  • Philosophically evaluates the coherence of self-limitation.
• AO2: eternal vs everlasting on the bible and foreknowledge
  • Theologically evaluates the coherence of self-limitation.
• AO2: Whether divine eternity coherently resolves foreknowledge
  • Evaluates whether Boethius has a legitimate alternative to Swinburne’s solution to the issue of foreknowledge.

Does free will conflict with omnipotence? [40]
Focused question: on omnipotence and whether it conflicts with free will

I would take this question as asking you to evaluate the 3 different definitions of omnipotence – and using free will as a hinge on which to assess their validity.

• AO1: God as omnipotent
  • The varieties of omnipotence would each claim their definition is the best and that it does not conflict with free will.
• AO2: Self-limitation, Time & Theistic Personalism
  • This evaluates the self-limitation view, that self-limiting omnipotence is necessary to account for the maintenance of human free will.
• AO2: The in/coherence of Voluntarism about omnipotence
  • Descartes would say God’s omnipotence can’t have any contradiction with anything, including free will because it’s ultimately beyond logic. But if Descartes’ definition of omnipotence fails – then it cannot be the basis to secure the coherence of omnipotence and free will.
• AO2: The logical problem of evil (vs Augustine or Hick)
  • Mackie believes in a kind of free will (compatibilist) which destroys theodicies – meaning evil conflicts with omnipotence (and/or omniscience).