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Philosophy

This page contains A*/A grade level summary revision notes for the Cosmological argument topic.

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AO1: Aquinas’ 1st & second ways

Aquinas’ 1st way from motion
Following Aristotle, by motion Aquinas means any kind of change. Something can only change if it has the potential to change. So, we can understand change as the actualisation of a potential to change in a certain way.
P1. We observe motion (the actualization of a potential)
P2. The things we observe cannot move themselves (because they are secondary movers – they cannot generate motion).
C1. So, all things in motion must have been moved by something else which is actual.
P3. If there were no first mover, there would be no motion now.
C2. Therefore, the motion we observe must trace back to a primary first mover which initiated this chain of motion and be itself unmoved (pure actuality). That thing we call God.
Aquinas’ 2nd way from atemporal causation
P1. We observe efficient causation.
P2. Nothing can cause itself.
P3. There is a logical order to sustaining causes: the first primary cause, then intermediate causes, then an ultimate effect.
P4. If A is the efficient cause of B, then if A doesn’t exist neither does B.
C1. There must be a first sustaining cause, otherwise P1 would be false as there would be no further sustaining causes or effects.
C2. As there is a first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes.
C3. The first cause must itself be uncaused. That thing we call God.

Sustaining causation

By ‘first’ cause, Aquinas does not mean temporally first in time. He means ‘primary’, in the ontological sense that all other motion and causation depend on its continued sustaining causal activity.
Things we observe are ‘secondary’ causes. They do not have the power to generate causation or motion themselves, because they cannot cause or move themselves.
They may inherit their causal power from other secondary causes, which caused or moved them. But those too could not have generated that causal power, which must therefore originate in something that can, a primary cause.
Aquinas’ illustration: a hand holding a stick touching a stone. As soon as the hand moves, the stick and stone move. The hand doesn’t move ‘first’, but it is still the ‘first’ cause in that it originates the causal power in the series, which the secondary causes inherit.
If the hand hadn’t moved, neither would the stick and the stone.
That’s what Aquinas means when he says if there is no first primary cause, there would be none of the causation or motion we observe now.
God doesn’t merely explain the existence of the world. God’s sustained causal activity explains all causation and motion in the world.

AO2: Hume’s critique of the causal principle

Cosmological arguments assume every event has a cause (the causal principle).
Hume argues this can be coherently denied, so isn’t analytically true.
An uncaused event is not an inconceivable contradiction.
Swinburne argues a causal principle could instead be synthetic a posteriori.
Since, every event we experience has a cause, the evidence justifies the causal principle as an empirical generalisation.
Hume objects:
This assumes conditions observed in the universe are evidence about its ultimate origin.
The only valid evidence for the universe having a cause would be observing its creation.
So, there seems no logical nor evidential basis for the causal principle.

Counter

Aquinas’ sustaining causation avoids Hume’s critique.
We observe ‘secondary causes’, which do not contain their own causal power.
So, they must depend on another cause that does contain causal power, and this chain of dependence ultimately requires a primary (first) cause.
So, a secondary cause with no cause is an inconceivable contradiction.

Evaluation:

However, there is no reason to believe sustaining causation exists.
It is based on the metaphysical assumption that motion/causation is not explained only by prior causes, but requires an ongoing primary causal support.
The issue is, modern physics sees no basis or need for this idea.

Guth’s inflation theory claims the universe has zero total energy, requiring no energy to be created. Krauss says this shows how a universe can come from nothing.
This shows Hume took the right position. The universe’s origin could be a radically strange event.
The causation we observe could have no ultimate explanation. So it needn’t have been caused by a God.

AO1: Aquinas’ 3rd way

Aquinas’ 3rd way (contingency)
P1. We observe that there are contingent beings (things that can possibly not exist).
P2. If it is possible for something to not exist, then there is some time in which it doesn’t exist.
C1. If everything were contingent, then at one time nothing existed.
P3. If nothing once existed, nothing could begin to exist, so nothing would exist now.
C2. So, there must be something that is not contingent, “having of itself its own necessity … That thing we call God.”
Philosophers often interpret the inference from P2 to C1 as involving the impossibility of an infinite regress of explanation, which Aquinas had argued for elsewhere.
An infinite regress of contingent beings would have no explanation. So, it would have to come from nothing, which is absurd.
From there the argument can proceed that since nothing comes from nothing, yet there is something now, we can conclude that it cannot be the case that everything is contingent.

AO2: The fallacy of composition

Just because something is true of a thing’s parts, doesn’t mean it’s true of the whole.
Russell: E.g., Just because every human has a mother, doesn’t mean the human race has a mother.
Parts of the universe we experience have a cause, mover or contingent status.
That doesn’t mean the whole universe has such an explanation.
Russell concludes it’s an assumption that the universe has a cause, rather than just everything in it.

Counter

Copleston counters:
Cosmological arguments don’t claim the whole has a cause because its parts do.
Feser adds that Aquinas doesn’t even reference the whole universe, only things we experience.
The argument is:
Observed things require an explanation, so the series of contingent things requires an explanation.
Secondary causes we observe derive causal power from a series of prior causes, which must ultimately originate in a primary cause.
Copleston then argues a series must either be necessary or have an external explanation.
A chain of contingent objects, even if infinite, cannot be necessary.
So, even if a series were infinite, it still needs an external explanation.

As Aristotle put it, we could always ask why an infinite series exists.
The existence of a series requires a primary cause or necessary being.

Evaluation

However, a series is not a ‘thing’ needing its own explanation.
That idea commits the ‘reification’ fallacy, mistaking an abstract concept for a concrete thing.
Hume illustrates a collection of contingent beings (20 particles).
Explaining each particle explains the whole collection.
Requiring a further explanation of the ‘whole’ is absurd.
This is because a collection is not a concrete thing over and above its parts.
Likewise, a series is not a thing but a mental collection of events, nothing over and above its parts.
In an infinite series of contingent beings, each part is explained by what came before it.
It doesn’t need any further explanation than its parts.
Aristotle’s question ‘why’ it has always existed is superfluous.
It’s like asking “what causes the totality of causes?” when the totality could just be those causes.
As Russell puts it, our concept of a cause comes from experience of beings
Copleston’s insistence that the whole series must have its own explanation mistakes a series for a concrete thing like its parts.

AO2: The im/possibility of an infinite regress

Aquinas and Leibniz designed their arguments to work even if there was an infinite regress as they didn’t think it was disprovable.
For them, even if causation or contingent origination went back forever, the series itself still needs an explanation in a primary cause or necessary being.
Nevertheless, the cosmological argument would be strengthened if the infinite regress could be disproven.
Craig argues an actual infinite is metaphysically impossible.
E.g., a library with an infinite number of books, half of which are green.
Half infinity is still infinity.
So, the green books are paradoxically both less than and the same size as the total number of books.
Craig further argues you cannot traverse an infinite through successive addition.
We could never have gotten to this moment if an infinite number of moments had to pass to get to it.

Counter:

Hume argues there is no contradiction in an infinite regress.
This implies the a priori impossibility Craig proposes is unfounded and should instead be treated as an empirical question
Hume’s openness seems borne out by developments in modern cosmology.
The ‘big crunch’ model hypothesis claims the universe eternally cycles between expansion and collapse.
A new timeline begins each cycle, avoiding the issue of a singular infinite timeline.
Guth’s ‘inflation’ theory proposes an ‘inflation field’ of quantum energy, where fluctuations create universes.
This explains the big bang as the beginning of our finite time-line.
Some speculate that this field is not even spatiotemporal.
This would render Craig’s temporal causation irrelevant, since causation presupposes temporal priority.
The inflation field could simply exist as a brute or necessary feature of reality, requiring no “origin” at all.
This supports Hume’s view that the assumption of a first cause is unjustified, because the question “what caused it?” may not even apply at the most fundamental level of physics.

Evaluation:

Hume takes the right stance on the relationship between philosophy and science.
A priori analysis of a concept like ‘time’ is only as useful as our understanding of what time is.
Einstein joked time is ‘what clocks measure’, illustrating we know very little about what time actually is scientifically.
The ‘time’ Craig analyses might bear little resemblance to the actual phenomenon.
So, scientific models of an infinite regress being possible cannot be undermined by philosophical reasoning.
After all, the history of science has proven past metaphysical intuitions false, such as the discovery that space is non-Euclidian or the paradoxes of quantum mechanics.
So Hume’s position stands: without empirical grounds to reject an infinite regress, philosophical speculation alone cannot show it is impossible

AO2: The Im/possibility of a necessary being

Hume argues that our imagination is only constrained by necessity regarding logical matters, e.g., we ‘have to’ think 1+1=2 (Hume’s illustration).
The idea of a necessary being is inconceivable.
This is because whatever we can imagine existing, we can imagine not existing.
So, we can have no idea of a being whose non-existence implies an inconceivable contradiction.
Kant’s further argued ‘necessary being’ confuses existence for a predicate; a property of a being.
Russell concludes necessity is a property of propositions, not beings.
So, the proposition “God exists” cannot be necessary.

Counter

However, Copleston responds that this critique only targets the ontological argument.
Anselm argued God’s existence is logically necessary because of what God is. That treats existence as a predicate.
Cosmological arguments don’t argue God necessarily exists by definition.
They argue that a necessary being is the metaphysically necessary explanation of the world.
If a contingent world exists, then a necessary being must exist as its sufficient explanation.
So, cosmological arguments rely on God’s existence being metaphysically necessary, not logically necessary.
Copleston accuses Russell of reducing metaphysics to logic, treating questions about being as if they were merely about language or propositions.

Evaluation

However, Hume advances an argument that undermines even these modern defences.
Even if we grant coherence to the idea of a metaphysically necessary being, it does not follow that this being must be God.
For all we know, the necessary being could simply be the universe itself, or some fundamental form of matter.
Hume’s point anticipates modern proposals in cosmology, such as the possibility of a non-spatio-temporal quantum field that generates universes, as suggested by inflationary theory.
Naturalistic explanations could therefore play the very role that Copleston assigns to a necessary being.
Cosmological arguments cannot give us a reason to believe the necessary being must be any sort of God.

AO2: The Brute fact

Russell points out that in quantum mechanics, events can be uncaused.
Copleston objects that only some interpretations say that.
Russell presses that uncaused events are at least scientifically conceivable.
So, the universe could be such an uncaused event.
We can only say the world is “just there, and that’s all” (brute fact).
This breaks Copleston’s dilemma that a series must either contingently depend on something else or contain its own necessary explanation.
The third option is a brute fact, which has no explanation for existing.

Counter

Copleston objects we cannot ‘rule out’ an ultimate explanation.
He argues science and philosophy function by looking for causes or reasons.
Experiments aim at discovering explanations.
In practice, science must ‘tacitly’ assume everything has an explanation.
Quantum indeterminacy (e.g., the exact motion of water molecules), just shows limits in what we can know.
In such cases or others we might be limited to assessing probabilities, but that doesn’t mean there’s no actual explanation.
Copleston argues uncaused quantum events still need a physical system.
We can’t generalize to claim the entire system of the universe could have resulted in such a way, as Russell implies.
The universe needs an ultimate explanation, even if there is some quantum indeterminacy within it.

Evaluation

Most physicists today think quantum uncertainty is objective so some events are uncaused, rejecting Copleston’s epistemological interpretation.
Russell accepts scientists expect to find causes, but their probabilistic empirical knowledge wouldn’t assume causation to be absolutely universal.
Copleston’s argument that we can’t generalise from quantum indeterminacy to the universe having no cause is weak.
Causeless events being possible means the universe could be causeless, even if in a different way.
Quantum mechanics shows reality is stranger than was supposed by Copleston’s thomistic metaphysics.

Russell isn’t ‘ruling out’ a cause, he’s just showing it’s possible there isn’t one.

The cosmological argument thus rests on an assumption of universal causal intelligibility.
That assumption may be true, but it also may be false for anything Copleston has shown.
So, God is merely one possibility alongside the brute fact. We therefore are not rationally compelled to accept God’s existence as the required explanation of the universe.

Question preparation

Key paragraphs:

Aquinas’ 1st way (from motion)
Aquinas’ 2nd way (from atemporal causation)
Aquinas’ 3rd way (from contingency)
Hume’s criticism of the causal principle
Hume & Russell on the fallacy of composition
The issue of the infinite regress
Hume & Russell’s argument for the impossibility of a necessary being

Question types:

General cosmological argument questions about Aquinas, his 3 ways, or proving God’s existence based on observation

Important to get full AO1 detail for Aquinas’ arguments in.
Then, any criticisms will work. Though best to pair them in this way:
Hume’s causal principle critique attacks the 1st and 2nd way.
Fallacy of composition attacks all 3 ways.
Infinite regress attacks all 3 ways
Attack on the concept of a necessary being only attacks the 3rd way.

Question on the 1st/2nd way:

Full AO1 detail for 1st/2nd way
Hume’s critique of the causal principle
Fallacy of composition
Infinite regress

Question on 3rd way:

Full AO1 detail for 3rd way
Attack on the concept of a necessary being.
Fallacy of composition.
Infinite regress.

“the cosmo argument jumps without justification/explanation to the idea of a transcendent creator” – Discuss [40]

This is just asking whether the cosmological argument really manages to prove God – or whether it’s jumping to that explanation when there could be other explanations (e.g. Hume’s arguments aim to show that there could be another explanation of the world, other than a God.
It could be that: the universe has no cause (his critique of the causal principle)
It could be that: the universe has no cause/mover/contingent status because it may not be like it’s parts (fallacy of composition
It could be that: there is an infinite regress
It could be that: the concept of a necessary being is nonsense

‘Hume’s criticisms of the cosmological argument succeed’ – Discuss [40]

This essay will argue…. (Hume’s criticisms either do succeed or don’t succeed).
Aquinas’ 1st & 2nd ways – minor detail
The causal principle
- Intro sentence: “Aristotle and Craig would disagree that Hume’s criticisms succeeded”
Infinite regress:
- Intro sentence: “Aquinas & Craig defend the cosmological argument from critics like Hume, through their arguments against the infinite regress.”
Aquinas’ 3rd way – minor detail
The fallacy of composition
- Intro sentence: “The fallacy of composition is one of the criticisms Hume thought succeeded against the cosmological argument”.

Is Aquinas’ 3rd way more convincing than his first two ways? [40]

Hume’s critique of a necessary being: shows that the third way fails due to its reliance on the concept of a necessary being.
Hume’s critique of the causal principle: shows the first two ways fail due to their reliance on the universe having a cause.
So both arguments fail in different ways. They both then also fail because they commit the fallacy of composition – in assuming that the whole universe must have a cause or mover or must be contingent.
So, none of the ways are more convincing than the others.

Weirdly worded questions:

Whether a priori or a posteriori is the more successful type of argument [40]

They could word this question more sneakily like this:

Is God’s existence best justified a posteriori?
Is God’s existence best justified a priori?

This type of question requires that you judge whether the ontological argument (a priori) is better or worse than a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
This question combines ontological (a priori) with one or more of the a posteriori arguments (teleo/cosmo).
Do one paragraph on each of the three arguments: ontological, teleological & cosmological.
You will then have judged whether:
They all succeed (So ontological better – because it tries to prove God’s existence for deductively certain – whereas cosmo/teleo are inductive arguments trying to show the evidence supports belief – but doesn’t prove it for certain).
One type fails and the other succeeds (so the other type is more successful/convincing).
They all fail (equally unsuccessful/unconvincing).

E.g.:

Anselm vs Kant
Paley vs Evolution
Aquinas’ 3rd way vs the fallacy of composition (Hume & Russell)

You should try and sprinkle in some comparative statements even if treating the arguments separately. Or ideally – when discussing the criticisms of the theories – especially highlighting how they are problems for the a priori or a posteriori nature of the arguments they are criticising.

Do the cosmological arguments contains logical fallacies? [40]

Logical fallacy means logical mistakes, typically resulting from assumptions.
All of Hume’s critiques aim to show the cosmological arguments make logical errors of varying types.
Assuming the causal principle is true.
Assuming that what’s true of the parts is true of the whole.
Assuming an infinite regress is impossible.
Assuming the idea of a necessary being is logically coherent.