Kantian ethics A*/A summary notes

OCR
Ethics

This page contains A*/A grade level summary revision notes for the Kantian ethics topics.

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AO1: Kantian ethics

  • One concern of intellectuals like Kant during the European enlightenment period was the problem of religious conflict.
  • Kant thought the issue was basing morality on differing faiths which can’t come to agreement.
  • His solution was to base morality on reason, which allows the potential for agreement.
  • This would create a harmonious society.
  • Kant was impressed at the way scientists like Newton had revolutionised their field through grounding inquiry on reason. Kant wanted to achieve the same for morality.
  • As the laws of maths and physics show, the laws discovered by reason are universal.
  • So, morality based on reason will involve universal moral laws which are ‘categorical’, meaning apply in all cases.
  • An ‘imperative’ is a statement which is moral due to containing terms like ‘should’.
  • A categorical imperative states what we should do in all cases.
  • A hypothetical imperative states what we should do in order to achieve certain goals.  E.g., ‘you should do X if you want Y’. They are therefore dependent on our personal goals/desires/wants. 
  • Universal laws apply in all cases so much be categorical. They can’t be ‘hypothetical’, meaning conditional on our personal feelings, consequences or the particularities of a moral situation. So, Kant rejects hypothetical imperatives as not genuine morality.
  • Only categorical imperatives are valid.  They are of the form ‘you should do X’. 
  • Kant thought there was only one categorical imperative, but it comes in 3 formulations.
  • A universal moral law would be something everyone could follow. So, a good test of whether an action accords with the moral law is to check whether everyone could do it. This is the first formulation of the CA – only do an action if it is universalizable – if it is possible for everyone to do it.
  • E.g. It’s not actually possible for everyone to steal, since if everyone stole there’d be no property and then no one could steal.
  • E.g. It’s not possible for everyone to lie, since if everyone lied there’s be no honesty/trust, and then no one could lie.
  • If it’s not possible for everyone to do an action, then that action can’t be part of the universal moral law since that must apply to everyone in all situations. 
  • The second formulation – always treat persons, never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end.
  • Always treat people as if they have their own goals in life.
  • The third formulation – just act as if you were part of a society where everyone was following Kant’s ethics.
  • Kant has strict views about moral motivation. A “good will” is one which has the right moral motivation. We must do our duty out of a sense of duty – not because of our own personal feelings or desires. E.g. we should give to charity because it’s our duty – not because we feel sympathy.
  • The three postulates. 
  • Kant thinks ethics can’t make sense without free will, because then there would be no such thing as moral responsibility. It is what separates us from animals and explains why humans can be morally bad, but animals cannot.
  • Kant noted that in life, sometimes bad people go unpunished and good people go unrewarded. 
  • He argued ethics cannot make sense unless we postulate the existence of an afterlife where virtuous people are rewarded and unvirtuous punished. Reward in the afterlife is the ‘summum bonum’.
  • Our reason tells us there is an objective ethics which we must follow. Yet, for it to make sense, we must postulate:
  • Free will. 
  • Immortality of the soul (afterlife)
  • God
  • Kant didn’t think we could prove these things, but he said we have to assume they exist in order for the ethics we know to be valid to make sense. This is what is meant by a ‘postulate’.
  • for us to be morally responsible and deserving of punishment/reward.

AO2: Clashing duties

  • Sartre claimed duties can clash.
  • A soldier could either go to war to defend their country, or they could stay home and look after their sick parent.
  • Both actions are universalizable and neither treats persons as mere means, therefore both actions are their duty according to Kant’s ethics.
  • Yet, they cannot do both.
  • Prima facie duties clashing appears like a practicality issue, showing Kantian ethics to be overly abstract and disconnected from the reality of moral decision-making. Closer analysis shows it to present a deeper problem than that.
  • We must be capable of doing an action for it to be our duty. Kant himself said ‘ought implies can’.
  • If maxims clash and one cannot be followed, then it can’t be our duty. 
  • So, if those duties were obtained through Kant’s formula of the categorical imperative, then Kant’s ethical theory cannot tell us our duty.
  • This suggests Kantian ethics fails in its aim as a normative theory, to identify what is morally right and guide action accordingly.

Counter

  • Kant responds that some duties are ‘perfect’, where there is only one means of fulfilling it, e.g. always telling the truth.
  • Cases like the soldier that appear to clash involve ‘imperfect duties’, where there are multiple ways to fulfil them.
  • E.g. the soldier could help his country by staying home and making bombs
  • Or, they could pay someone else to look after their sick parent.
  • So Kant’s response is that imperfect duties don’t clash because you can find a way to fulfil both.

Evaluation

  • However, Kant’s defence fails because there are situations where we can’t fulfil both imperfect duties. 
  • E.g. What if the soldier had no way to get anyone else to look after their sick parent – and what if their country didn’t need anyone else to stay home to make bombs..? Then the duties do clash.
  • So, Kantian ethics cannot tell us our duty and thus fails in its primary objective.

AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions

  • Michael Stocker asks us to imagine a friend visiting you while you are in hospital saying they only came because it was their duty.
  • B. Williams argues such cases show how Kantian morality is unnatural and requires “one thought too many”. When doing good, a virtuous person need not be thinking about moral laws. They simply do good out of habit.
  • Stocker argues that if we act out of duty, it’s not possible to also act out of virtuous habits like friendliness or love. These are vital to our humanity and the means by which we ethically relate to others, yet Kant excludes them.

Counter:

  • A strength of Kant’s approach is that emotions are transient and fickle. Kant uses this to argue emotions are too unreliable for ethical motivation. Reason’s ability to produce respect for the moral law is more stable.
  • For Kant, acting on emotion isn’t morally wrong, it just can’t be morally good. His argument is that when we act on emotion, our action depends on the way we feel. If we help others because we feel like it, then we aren’t helping others because it is good. 
  • Barbara Herman interprets Kant’s issue as that emotions can only lead to a right action by luck.
  • Kant concludes we aren’t really acting morally unless we act out of duty.

Evaluation

  • However, Kant’s defence is unsuccessful.
  • Emotions can be unreliable, but Aristotle argued we can develop good emotional & behavioural habits. Aristotle called this cultivating virtue. We can rationally control of our emotions, and then they can be relied on to motivate us in moral situations.
  • E.g., cultivating the virtue of friendliness and acting out of love when visiting a friend in hospital. Emotion can be the reliable result of the rational cultivation of virtue and thus have moral value. So, Kant’s views on emotion & moral motivation are unconvincing.

AO2: Kant vs Hume’s meta-ethics

  • Hume’s motivation argument challenges whether reason can ever play the role Kantian ethics assigns it.
  • He argues that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will”.
  • This means we are fundamentally motivated by emotion, not reason, which is merely a ‘slave of the passions’.
  • Reason only produces motivationally inert beliefs.
  • e.g., believing it’s raining only motivates carrying an umbrella if there’s desire not to get wet.
  • Moral judgements are motivating, so must be rooted in desire.
  • This undermines Kant’s attempt to separate duty from emotional inclination.
  • Freud and modern psychology deepen this: unconscious emotion, bias and conditioning may shape our moral judgements without our knowledge.
  • So, Kant’s ideal of acting purely from duty seems psychologically unrealistic.

Counter

  • However, Hume arguably goes too far.
  • Haidt’s rider and elephant analogy gives a better account: emotion is like an elephant, while reason is like its rider.
  • The elephant is more powerful and often pulls the rider along, but over time the rider can still influence its direction through learning its inclinations.
  • This fits Aristotle’s virtue ethics better than either Kant or Hume.
  • Reason cannot directly control emotion, but it can train and redirect desire through habit.

Evaluation

  • Aristotle’s account fits best with our understanding of human struggle for autonomy and self-control
  • E.g., a student may not want to revise, but reason can use breaks, rewards and routines to gradually align desire with the rational goal.
  • So, Hume is wrong to cast rason as a slave, making Kant right that morality can involve rational self-direction.
  • But Kant goes too far to require rational moral judgement to operate independently of emotion; Hume is right that this is impossible.
  • The best view is not Kant’s rational purity or Hume’s emotional slavery, but an Aristotelian middle ground: morality requires reason, but reason works by training desire, not escaping it.

AO2: Kant vs consequentialism 

  • Kantian ethics violates our moral intuitions because of the terrible consequences to telling the truth in some situations.
  • Benjamin Constant created the murderer at the door scenario. If a murderer asked us where their victim was, and we knew, Constant argued we should lie. Telling the truth seems situational, not an absolute duty.
  • To use a more modern example, if a Nazi asked whether we were hiding Jews and we were, it seems Kant is committed to the view that it’s wrong to lie. In that situation even if we said nothing we would reveal the truth, lying is the only hope.
  • If successful, this issue would show that Kant’s deontological approach fails and consequentialism seems stronger. Morality can’t reduce to acting on a universal duty regardless of the situation. 
  • So, if Kant is indeed wrong to leave out consequences, that would show that Kantian ethics is false.

Counter

  • Kant defends himself by presenting the issue of calculation as a strength of his deontological approach. 
  • Kant illustrates that if we lied about where the victim was, yet unknown to us the victim had actually moved there, then we would be responsible for their death.
  • We cannot control consequences, so we cannot be responsible for them. So, they cannot be relevant to our moral decision-making.

Evaluation

  • However, Kant’s logic is flawed. He claims we cannot completely control consequences and thus cannot be responsible for them. 
  • The truth seems to be, however, that we can control consequences to some degree. It seems to follow that we are responsible for them to that degree.
  • Consequentialism doesn’t claim we can completely control the consequences, just that we should consider them when acting.
  • So, although we can’t perfectly predict or control what the murderer will do, we have what Singer calls a ‘reasonable expectation’ about the consequences and so it is reasonable to act with them in mind and lie.
  • Kant’s argument against consequentialism fails to address this.

Question preparation

Revision paragraphs:

  • AO1: Kantian ethics
  • AO2: Clashing duties
  • AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions
  • AO2: Kant vs Hume’s meta-ethics
  • AO2: Kant vs consequentialism

Question types:

Questions could be focused on:

  • Duty (acting morally according to the good regardless of consequences)
  • Deontological / absolutist ethics
  • Hypothetical imperatives (a command to act to achieve a desired result)
  • Categorical imperatives (a command to act that is good in itself regardless of consequences)
  • The three formulations of the categorical imperative
  • The three postulates (Freedom, immortality & God).

“Kantian ethics is too reliant on reason, it fails to take empathy and love into account.” – Discuss [40]

  • AO1: Kantian ethics (focused on duty and the good will when acting on the categorical imperative)
  • AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions
  • AO2: Kant vs Hume’s meta-ethics
  • AO2: Clashing duties
    • If duties clash, maybe we can’t rely on abstractly determining our duty, and so emotion may be a better guide in practical reality.

Is Kant correct that consequences are irrelevant to the morality of an action? [40]

  • AO2: Kant vs consequentialism
  • AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions
    • It’s inhuman to act without emotion, actually acting on emotions can be good, and emotions often relate to the consequences of actions. E.g. we visit a friend in hospital to cheer them up – to produce good consequences. 
  • AO2: Clashing duties
    • The fact that duties clash, shows that Kant’s deontological approach fails, and we should therefore favor a consequentialist approach which would e.g. weigh up the pleasure/pain and decide which action to do on that basis. E.g. the soldier staying home might make his relative happy, but if his country loses the war that would be much worse.

Weirdly worded questions:

Is Kantian ethics too abstract? [40]

  • AO1: Kantian ethics
  • Too abstract means theoretical – too detached from practical reality – failing to take practical things into account, such as: 
  • AO2: Clashing duties
    • Kantian ethics too abstract because: in practical reality, duties can clash
  • AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions
    • Kantian ethics too abstract because: not taking into account the practical reality of human emotions & desires, Kant takes too logical and robotic an approach
  • AO2: Kant vs consequentialism
    • Kantian ethics too abstract because: he’s only focused on the action rather than the practical results of the action, which can mean people might be harmed. E.g. murderer at the door.

Is Kant right about how to achieve a society of rationality? [40]
Focused question: on Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative.

Kant thinks a society of rationality will be achieved if everyone follows his ethics, and that we should follow his ethics regardless of whether others follow it too. The question is really about whether following Kantian ethics would or could successfully create the harmonious society Kant imagines. 

  • AO1: Kantian ethics (focused on the 3rd formulation)
  • AO2: Clashing duties
    • Suggests we realistically can’t follow Kantian ethics, there will be no harmonious society because Kant’s supposed perfect moral guidance is actually conflicting.
  • AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions
    • Suggests the society of rationality will have an inhuman relationship with emotion, failing to grant emotion its proper place in ethics.
  • AO2: Kant vs Hume’s meta-ethics
    • Suggests we actually can’t hope to be rational in our motivation in the way Kant wants, meaning his vision is a utopian fantasy.
  • AO2: Kant vs consequentialism
    • Suggests that the society of rationality will have to allow terrible outcomes because we can’t take consequences into account even to save lives.
    • Could argue this is either not very rational, or that perhaps even if it is rational it’s not something we would want from ethics. 

“Kant’s three postulates must be accepted in obeying a moral command” – Discuss. [40]
Focused question: on the three postulates and their role in Kantian ethics.

This question would be quite difficult. You could bring in some soul topic content, since if there is no such thing as an afterlife then Kant has an issue. Also if you enjoy criticising free will that could technically work. Or, if you know much about compatibilism / soft-determinism, that suggests moral responsibility doesn’t require the sort of free will Kant claims ethics requires (Kant hated Hume’s compatibilism, calling it ‘wretched subterfuge’).

There’s also one paragraph from another topic that would work great which I’ll post at the end.

However aside from that, you could make the normal criticisms of Kant work, it would just be a bit indirect and slightly boring/not ideal:

You could argue: Kant claims the postulates are necessary for his duty-based ethics to work. But if his ethics doesn’t work – then the postulates are unnecessary. Any of the criticisms of his ethics then technically indirectly show that the posulates are unnecessary.

Here’s some deeper ideas about how to link though:

  • AO2: Kant vs consequentialism
    • Other theories can function to generate moral commands or moral judgements, without the three postulates. 
    • E.g., utilitarianism – which the murderer at the door scenario suggests is better than Kantian ethics.
    • If morality is about maximisation of utility rather than duty, then the three posulates are unnecessary.
  • AO2: Kant ignoring the moral value of emotions
    • This is the virtue ethics critique of Kantian ethics. Virtue ethics generates moral judgements without need for the three posulates. 
    • So if the theory proves better than Kantian ethics – which this criticism aims to do – then the postulates are not necessary for morality

One thing that would actually work really well for this question is a paragraph from my secularism notes in the Christianity topic. It involves Freud and Mill arguing that the notion of an afterlife actually undermines ethics – which directly counters Kant’s claim that it’s necessary for ethics. It would need a bit of editing to make relevant to a Kant question. E.g., I’d replace the part in the counter about natural law enabling autonomy with Kant enabling autonomy. Here it is:

AO2: Freud’s views on Christian ethics as infantile

  • Freud argues religious ethics extends infantile moral socialisation into adulthood.
  • Children’s obedience is managed through fear of the disciplinarian father. 
  • Religion projects this authority onto God the father.
  • Religious adults are left with an infantile moral orientation, motivated by fear and the need to appease God.
  • Freud thinks a more developed mode is possible: rational recognition that laws are for the social good.
  • Such autonomy makes humans happier and more effective in their self-control and virtue.

Counter

  • However, natural law ethics incorporates a degree of autonomy: appreciating and applying God’s precepts, while virtuously aligning our intentions with our telos.
  • Furthermore, Jung shows religious ethics isn’t simply external imposition of law, but enables virtue through psychological development.
  • Its archetypal stories help us understand the narrative of our lives and cease unhealthy repression.
  • E.g., the Cain and Abel story helps us acknowledge envy rather than dangerously repress it.

Evaluation

  • Nonetheless, these refinements do not overcome Freud’s deepest objection:
  • Christian ethics still infantilises moral psychology under God as a disciplinarian father. 
  • This psychological critique is strengthened by Mill’s ethical insight:
  • A moral system involving heaven and hell inevitably imbues motivation with self-interest, contrary to virtue.

  • Aquinas attempts to integrate Aristotle’s view that virtues are intrinsic goods, not mere instruments of self-interest.
  • But the problem remains that Christian ethics still contains the greatest carrot and stick imaginable: infinite heaven and hell.
  • This requires a superhuman discipline to avoid being motivated by them, and superhuman insight to even know whether we are motivated by them.
  • The promise of heaven and threat of hell are so powerful that they dominate motivation.
  • Moral psychology becomes child-like: merely responsive to reward and punishment.
  • So, Freud and Mill show that even refined afterlife teleology inevitably instrumentalises virtue.
  • Christian ethics remains an underdeveloped mode of psychology.