AQA Philosophy
Metaphysics of God

Summary notes for Teleological arguments

The design argument from analogy (as presented by Hume)

Design arguments infer God’s existence as the explanation of the way the world is.
This makes them a posteriori, based on experience of the world.
Hume presents an analogical version of the design argument.
Analogical reasoning involves inferring the cause of a thing from its likeness to something else of which we do know the cause.
P1. The way that the means of complexity is fitted to ends in nature is analogous to human design.
P2. Like effects have like causes.
P3. The cause of human-made things is an intelligent mind.
C1. So, the cause of nature is an intelligent mind.
Human-made thing (artifacts) are made of complex parts. These are fitted together in complex ways as the means of achieving a function or purpose. Hume gives the example of a house.
Nature contains analogous things, such as animals being composed of complex parts fitted together in complex ways as the means of achieving a function or purpose.
So, by analogy, the cause of nature is analogous to the cause of artefacts, i.e., an intelligent mind.

William Paley’s design argument from spatial order/purpose

Imagine walking on a heath and seeing a rock. The rock seems like it could have existed forever. Nothing about it suggests otherwise.
However Paley claims we would think differently if we found a watch, because it has complexity enabling purpose.
Its purpose depends on the exact individually intricate structure of its parts and their precise arrangement in relation to each other. That complexity is an example of spatial order, the orderly arrangement of things in space.
So we can infer design when a thing has the property of purpose enabled by complexity.
This property we observe in the watch, we also observe in nature.
E.g. the human eye, wings of a bird and fins of a fish are made of individually complex parts precisely arranged to enable the purpose of sight.
So, nature must have a designer.
Nature is much grander and greater than any human design, so the designer of the nature must be greater and more powerful than any human designer.
Furthermore, a designer is a mind which is distinct from what is designed.
So, a mind which designed the world and is distinct from it exists.
This argument is typically interpreted as inductive and a posteriori, because its premises involve observations of the world which are used as evidence for the conclusion that God exists.

Swinburne’s design argument from temporal order/regularity

Swinburne points to temporal order, the order of things over time. E.g. a hydrogen atom behaves the same now as it did yesterday.
This suggests there are laws of physics which determine that behaviour.
A scientific explanation of the laws of physics is impossible, because science can tell us what the laws are, but not why they are that way. It cannot tell us why the laws of physics exist at all, or why we have these laws.
So it’s valid to turn to other explanations.
We know human minds can create temporal order all the time, we impose behavioural order on our lives, e.g. brushing teeth.
So, we know that temporal order can have a ‘personal explanation’, i.e., be caused by a mind.
So, a mind is the best explanation we have of the temporal order in the laws of physics.
Only a God would be capable of designing the laws of the universe.
So, God exists.

Hume’s objections to the design argument from analogy

Hume objects to analogical design arguments in two ways.
Firstly, things which are like each other can have very different causes – e.g. dry ice and fire produce very analogous effects (smoke) – but they are very different as causes.
So, even if things in nature are like a watch or an arrow – that doesn’t mean the cause of nature is like the cause of a watch/arrow (i.e., an intelligent mind).
So even if Paley/Aquinas are right about the likeness between artifacts and nature, that doesn’t mean their cause is alike (a designing mind).
Secondly, Hume argues the analogy between artefacts and natural objects is weak.
There is not a likeness between them, because the artefacts are mechanical, i.e., quite mathematically precisely constructed. Whereas Hume says the universe is more like an organic thing. Things in the universe are more jumbled, less neatly structured.

The problem of spatial disorder (as posed by Hume and Paley)

Paley himself posed the problem of spatial disorder. Parts of nature lack spatial order. There are vast area of space where there are no parts organised to perform a purpose. He analogised this to finding a watch that was broken or had one of its hands missing.
Hume also made this objection, arguing that we have only experienced a very small percentage of the universe, over a very short period of time, and in a very imperfect way.
This is insufficient evidence to state anything decisively about the whole universe, such as that the universe is orderly.
There could be vast disorder and chaos which might outweigh the amount of order we have observed.
Hume adds the problem of evil to this objection. Spatial disorder can be more than merely chaotic, it can actually be natural evil. Natural disasters result from the disordered randomness of our planet. If the world were designed differently, they would not happen. So, some of the spatial disorder we observe is evidence against it being designed by a perfect creator.

Hume’s unique case criticism

Hume points out that we do not experience causation, only constant conjunction, which is one type of event consistently being followed by another particular type.
We can only justifiably infer causation when two events are experienced to be constantly conjoined.
E.g. We only know a watch is caused by a designer, because we have seen or heard of multiple instances of watches, or similar things, constantly conjoined with the activity of watchmakers who were making them.
So, to know that a universe was designed we would have to observe it and/or multiple other universes conjoined with designers.
The issue is, the creation of the universe is only one event, one unique case.
We haven’t experienced the creation or our universe, nor other universes.
So, we do not have the evidence required to justifiably infer what the cause of our universe was, including whether it was designed.

Whether God is the best or only explanation

There are explanations other than God which seem capable of explaining spatial or temporal order.
These are typically scientific explanations. They tend to be simpler explanations as they do not posit the existence of supernatural beings.
They often provide more explanatory power, making them better explanations than supernatural explanations.
Evolution by natural selection explains spatial order.
It explains how animals could gain the appearance of design without a designer.
There is variation in species. Members of a species that are better adapted to their environment are more likely to survive and pass on the genes which code for that adaptation.
Over time, this results in a greater prevalence of those traits in the species. This causes the species to change as it becomes increasingly adapted to its environment.
This can make animals appear designed for survival, when really those traits evolved over millions of years due to natural selection causing increasing adaptation.
So, the spatial order in organs like the eye are the result of evolution, not design.
The Multiverse theory explains spatial and temporal order.
Physicist Max Tegmark objects that the multiverse counters all design arguments.
Design arguments attempt to identify a feature of our universe which they claim must be or is best explained by a God.
The multiverse issue counters this. It claims that our universe is just one of an infinite number of every possible type of universe. Other universes will have every possible range of the laws of physics and thus of temporal order. They will also have every possible permutation of spatial order.
The existence of a universe like ours, e.g., with our exact spatial and temporal order, is explained by every type of universe existing in the multiverse.
A special explanation like God is unnecessary.

Teleological argument model essay plan

Note that this model essay plan is merely one possible way to write an essay on this topic.

Points highlighted in light blue are integration points
Points highlighted in green are weighting points

Note that this is merely one possible way to write an essay on this topic

Points highlighted in light blue are integration points
Points highlighted in green are weighting points

Teleological arguments

Paley’s design argument

Paley starts by noting that complexity existing by itself requires no special explanation because it can come about by chance.
E.g. Rocks are technically quite complex, but they do not serve any particular purpose.
However, when complexity is combined with serving a purpose, that makes it almost impossible to have come about by chance.
E.g. A watch is made of small parts, each individually complex. The combined operation of each part performs an overall purpose.
The best explanation of complexity and purpose is an intelligent mind. This mind must have had that purpose in mind and deliberately organised the parts accordingly, i.e., designed.
The universe also contains cases of complexity and purpose.
Paley uses the examples of the human eye, the wings of a bird and fins of a fish.
They are made of complex parts complex arranged to perform a purpose.

Counter:

Hume’s criticism of the use of analogy
Hume criticises the idea that analogy can allow us to infer a thing’s cause.
Just because the universe is like a watch, doesn’t mean the cause of the universe is like the cause of a watch.
Things that are alike can have very different causes.
E.g. dry ice and fire both produce smoke which is very similar – yet the cause is very different.
So, even if the universe and watch are similar (for having complexity and purpose) it doesn’t follow that their cause is similar.
Hume further argues that we can’t even claim an analogy between the universe and man-made things, since man-made things are mechanical, yet the universe is more organic, like a plant. Man-made things are mathematically precisely made, whereas the universe is a bit more of a mess – like an organic thing.

Evaluation:

Modern philosophers tend to interpret Paley’s argument as not based on analogy.
Paley is arguing that complexity and purpose is best explained by a designing mind.
The universe doesn’t have a designer because it’s like the watch, it has a designer because it has complexity and purpose.
The watch is just an illustration of how complexity and purpose implies a designing mind.
If Paley said the universe has a designer because it’s like the watch which has a designer, he would be making an argument from analogy.
However, Paley’s argument really is that the universe has a designer because it has complexity and purpose.
Complexity and purpose are extremely unlikely to come about by chance – so it’s a better explanation that a God created it.

Evolution vs Swinburne vs Multiverse

The issue that evolution is a better explanation than God is a stronger criticism than Hume’s critique of analogy, because Paley’s argument cannot be reformulated to avoid it.
Animals and their features, like eyes, appear designed, but evolution explains how they can come to exist without a designer.
In every species there is variation. The traits which best enable survival are more likely to be passed on and thus increase in their levels in the animal population.
So, over time, animals become better adapted to their environment, giving them the appearance of having been designed for that purpose.
Actually, it is the result of the laws of physics, not a designer.

Criticism:

Swinburne’s teleological argument is in a stronger position than Paley’s due to his use of temporal order, which gets around the issue of evolution.
Paley’s argument is based on spatial order – the order of things in space – e.g. the parts of the watch and eye are arranged in a certain order in space.
Swinburne rejects this method of arguing as too weak, simply because there could be other possibilities for how spatial order can come about than God – e.g. evolution.
Swinburne instead turns to temporal order – the order of things over time. E.g. a hydrogen atom behaves the same now as it did yesterday and a billion years ago. The behaviour of objects remains the same over time – suggesting there are laws of physics which determine their behaviour.
This is Swinburne’s focus – he’s going to argue that the laws of physics themselves are what is designed.
Unlike spatial order, Swinburne argues that we have no other better or even scientific explanation of the laws of physics.
Science can tell us what the laws are, but not why they are that way – why do the laws of physics exist, and why do we have the laws we do? Science can tell us that E=MC2, but not why E=MC2.
Swinburne thinks that since science can’t explain this, it’s valid to turn to other explanations.
We know that human minds can create temporal order – we impose all sorts of behavioural order on our lives – e.g. brushing our teeth in the morning.
So, we know that temporal order can be caused by minds.
So, a mind is the best explanation we have of the temporal order in the laws of physics.
Only a God would be capable of designing the laws of the universe.
So, God exists.

Evaluation:

Multiverse theory – our universe could be one of an infinite number of every type of universe.
Swinburne’s argument is that we have no scientific explanation of the laws of physics – so we have to turn to God for the explanation.
However, if every type of universe exists, that means every possible type of laws of physics exist.
In that case, we don’t need some special explanation about why a universe like ours with the laws it has exists.
We don’t need a God to explain why a universe with our laws of physics exists if every type of universe exists. So there could be a scientific explanation.
Swinburne tries to object that there’s no evidence for the multiverse theory.
However, it’s still a possibility – just like God is a possibility.
At that point, we can say we have a possible scientific explanation – and we simply don’t need to propose a possible supernatural explanation.
At the very least, Swinburne can’t say God is more likely than the multiverse. So, the design argument fails to show that we should believe in God over other explanations.

Hume’s unique case criticism of the teleological argument

Hume points out that we do not experience causation – only constant conjunction – only one event following another.
It is only when two events are experienced to be constantly conjoined that we can justifiably infer causation.
E.g. We only know a watch is caused by a designer, because we have seen or heard of watches being made – being caused by watchmakers (conjoined with watchmakers).
The creation of the universe is only one event.
So, we do not have enough data to justifiably infer what the cause of our universe was.
Hume furthermore points out that we haven’t even experienced the cause of our universe. Hume says if we had experienced other worlds being created that might work, but we haven’t.
We didn’t experience our world being created – nor have we experienced similar worlds being created – so we can’t know what caused it.
Hume concludes we should admit that we simply don’t know why the universe is the way it is.
Hume’s unique case is the strongest criticism of design arguments because it does more than simply point to alternative explanations or criticise the strength of analogy. It aims to show that inferring a designer from our current evidence is actually impossible.

Counter:

We could read design arguments as abductive – inferences to the best explanation, e.g. of:

Natural laws (Aquinas & Swinburne)
Complexity & purpose (Paley)

Swinburne especially can be put into this form. He argues we lack a scientific explanation, and that in fact a scientific explanation is impossible. This justifies us in seeking a ‘personal explanation’ as that’s the best explanation we have.
Hume argued that we lack evidence required for induction to infer a designer, but it seems abduction is possible. This would avoid Hume’s critique.

Evaluation:

However, this response fails to deal with Hume’s critique.
We could grant Swinburne his premise (which physicists like Max Tegmark dispute) that a scientific explanation is impossible.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that we are justified in seeking another explanation. Hume’s point is that there is a minimum standard of evidence required to infer a designer. If we don’t have an inductive or scientific explanation, we have no explanation.
Swinburne’s ‘personal’ explanation fails to meet Hume’s standard. This is because when it comes to the cause of the universe, inference merely from causes we observe in the universe is inadequate. So, we should suspend judgement and accept that we do not know why the universe is the way it is.