Veri-Falsi-fication & Wittgenstein: Eduqas B grade notes

Eduqas
Philosophy

AO1: The inherent problems of religious language

Religious language involves statements about God or the supernatural, including theological works, sacred texts and everyday phrases like ‘God be with you’.
The issue of understanding: most theologians agree that God is beyond human understanding.
God is often described as transcendent, infinite and timeless – qualities we struggle to grasp.
But meaningful language usually requires some understanding of what we are talking about.
So if God cannot be understood, it is unclear how religious language can be meaningful at all.
The issue of interpretation.
Religious texts can be interpreted in different ways.
This creates a problem for shared understanding, since people may read the same text but reach different meanings.
The issue of shared experience.
People from different religions, or none, may not understand religious language in the same way.
Its meaning depends on personal or communal experience rather than being universal.
This suggests it is not fully objective or accessible, which raises doubts about whether it describes reality.
The issue of whether religious language is cognitive or non-cognitive.
Cognitive language expresses beliefs about reality, like “The table is made of wood”.
Non-cognitive language expresses feelings or attitudes, like saying “ouch” in pain.
Some philosophers (Mitchell, Hick) argue that saying “God exists” expresses a belief.
Others (Hare, Wittgenstein) argue it expresses a way of seeing the world rather than a factual claim.
So the issue becomes whether religious believers are describing reality or expressing attitudes.
The issue of whether religious language is meaningful or meaningless.
This is a separate issue from whether it is cognitive.
Some philosophers think non-cognitive language can still be meaningful.
For example, Hare argues it matters because it affects behaviour.
However, Ayer argues that only statements that can be verified are meaningful, so religious language is meaningless.

AO1: Verificationism

Verificationism is the method of the logical positivists.
Comte’s Positivism claimed only empirical knowledge is valid.
‘Logical’ refers to analysing language.
So only analytic or empirically verifiable statements are meaningful.
Ayer says language can have different kinds of meaning, which he calls ‘significance’.
A statement is factually significant if it can be verified through experience.
Analytic statements, like maths and logic, are also meaningful.
If a statement fails these tests, it has no factual meaning, only emotional significance.
Metaphysical language is about things beyond experience, so it is meaningless.
This includes religious language, since ‘God’ cannot be verified.
Ayer concludes religious language does not express genuine knowledge.
It tries to make claims about reality but cannot be tested through experience.
So it fails to be meaningful.
Early verificationists supported ‘hard’ verification, where claims are proven conclusively.
Ayer rejected this and proposed ‘weak’ verification, where claims are only ‘probably’ true.
He later realised this could make almost anything meaningful, so finally distinguished between direct and indirect verification.
Direct verification is immediate experience, like “I see a key”.
Indirect verification involves claims that could be tested in principle, like “this key is made of iron”.
So, a statement is meaningful if it can be verified either directly or in principle.
Ayer uses the example of the dark side of the moon.
Even before observation, claims about it were meaningful because they could in principle be tested.

AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification

Hick argues religious language can be verified in principle.
He says that after death we would find out whether God and an afterlife exist.
So even if we cannot test this now, it could still be verified later.

Counter

However, this assumes an afterlife exists where verification could happen.
Ayer’s example of the dark side of the moon worked because we already knew it existed.
We also knew it could be reached.
But we do not know that an afterlife exists at all.
So there is no clear way to verify religious claims even in principle.

Evaluation

Hick’s argument is unconvincing.
If death leads to nothing, there would be no chance to verify anything.
So religious claims would remain unverifiable.
Simply imagining a situation where verification happens is not enough.
We need reason to think such a situation actually exists.
Without this, Hick’s idea becomes speculation rather than real verification.
Ayer’s point is that meaningful statements must be linked to possible observation.
Hick fails to show this link.
So religious language still does not meet the verification principle.

AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test

The verification principle says a statement is meaningful only if it is analytic or can be tested by experience.
But this creates a problem.
The principle itself is not analytic or testable.
So, it seems to be meaningless by its own rule.

Counter

Ayer accepts this and says the principle is not a factual statement.
Instead, it is a tool used to decide what counts as meaningful.
So it does not need to pass its own test.

Evaluation

However, this weakens Ayer’s argument.
If the principle is just a tool, then it cannot prove that religious or metaphysical language is meaningless in general.
It only shows they are meaningless within his chosen method.
Other approaches, like rationalism, can reject this method and still treat such language as meaningful.
So Ayer no longer proves his view is correct, but only assumes it.
This means the verification principle fails to justify its strong claim and loses its force.

AO1: Falsificationism

Popper argued that verificationism is wrong about how science works.
Science does not try to verify theories but to falsify them through testing and prediction.
Einstein’s theory made a prediction about Mercury’s orbit, which could have been shown false by observation.
By contrast, Freud and Marx interpret all evidence as supporting their theories, making them unfalsifiable.
Flew applies this idea to religious language.
He argues religious language is cognitive, as it tries to make claims about the world.
However, these claims are unfalsifiable and so fail to say anything about reality.
Unlike Ayer, Flew does not call them meaningless, but they fail to genuinely assert anything about the world.
Flew argues that to assert something is to deny its opposite.
So a meaningful claim must be capable of being false.
If nothing could count against it, it does not really assert anything.
Religious believers cannot clearly say what would prove God false, so their claims fail this test.
Flew illustrates this with the parable of the gardener.
Someone claims a gardener exists, but every time this is tested, the idea is changed to avoid disproof.
The gardener becomes invisible, intangible and undetectable.
This weakens the claim until it says nothing at all, a “death of a thousand qualifications”.
There is no difference between a world where the gardener exists and one where it does not.
So religious language fails to describe reality because it makes no testable difference whether it is true or false.

AO1: Mitchell

Mitchell argues religious language is cognitively meaningful and can be falsified.
Some believers may have blind faith, but most base their belief on evidence, such as personal experience.
This belief can be challenged by counter-evidence like evil.
The amount of evidence needed to overturn faith will vary between individuals.
Flew’s mistake is thinking believers must know in advance what would falsify their belief.
Instead, falsifiable just means a belief could be overturned by some possible evidence.
Mitchell also rejects Hare’s idea that believers ignore all counter-evidence.
He argues they do recognise challenges, but do not think they are strong enough to disprove their belief.
So belief in God can still be rational.
His parable describes a soldier who trusts a stranger claiming to be their leader after a powerful meeting.
Even when the stranger appears to support the enemy, the soldier keeps faith, perhaps thinking they are a double agent.
Mitchell says there must be some point where belief becomes unreasonable, even if this is not known in advance.
This shows religious belief can be based on evidence while still being open to falsification.

AO2: Mitchell vs Flew

Flew argues religious belief is unfalsifiable.
He says evil contradicts the idea of an all-good and all-powerful God.
So even a small amount of evil should disprove belief in God.
Since believers continue to believe, Flew says their belief is unfalsifiable.

Counter

However, this depends on the logical problem of evil being correct.
Plantinga argues God cannot remove evil without removing free will.
Many philosophers accept this, so evil does not logically disprove God.
Instead, evil becomes a matter of evidence, not strict contradiction.

Evaluation

Mitchell gives a better account of religious belief, because it is validated by the observable reality of religious psychology.
He says belief can be weakened or lost depending on how much evil a person experiences.
People sometimes lose faith after events like the death of a loved one.
They may not know in advance what would change their belief, but it can still be challenged by experience.
Others keep their faith but use explanations like free will or soul-making.
However, these become less convincing as suffering increases.
This shows belief responds to evidence.
So Mitchell is right that religious belief can be falsifiable and meaningful.

AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’

Ayer and Flew say religious language is a failed attempt to describe reality because it cannot be verified or falsified.
Hare argues this is mistaken because religious language is not trying to describe reality in the first place.
So it cannot be a failed attempt.
He says religious language expresses a ‘blik’, which is a way of seeing the world based on attitudes and emotions.
This shapes how people think, behave and speak.
So religious language can still be meaningful, even if it is not about facts.
Hare illustrates this with a paranoid student who believes their professors are trying to kill them.
Even when shown evidence they are kind, the student thinks they are pretending.
This belief is not based on evidence, but on an underlying attitude.
Hare argues religious belief works in a similar way.
When someone says “God exists”, they may be expressing a worldview rather than stating a fact.
He is influenced by Hume’s idea that reason follows emotion.
So religious beliefs may be expressions of underlying feelings rather than rational claims about reality.

AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist

Flew argues Hare is too reductionist.
He says religious believers are making real claims about God, not just expressing attitudes.
For example, Aquinas’ arguments try to prove God exists using reasoning and evidence.
This shows religious language can be cognitive.

Counter

However, Hare argues our thinking is strongly influenced by emotions.
Psychology shows we often justify beliefs we already hold.
So religious beliefs may come from attitudes rather than objective reasoning.

Evaluation

Hare’s point has some truth, since emotions do influence how we think.
However, it goes too far to say reason is only a tool for our feelings.
People can reflect on their beliefs and sometimes change them through reasoning.
Philosophical arguments about God clearly aim to show something is true, not just express attitudes.
Even if emotions play a role, they do not fully control belief.
There is a mix of reason and feeling in religion.
So Hare’s view is too extreme and reduces religious language too much.

AO2: Swinburne’s critique of Ayer & Flew

Swinburne argues meaning should not be restricted to what we can test.
If we understand the words in a sentence, then it is meaningful.
For example, we understand what it would mean for toys to come alive, even though we cannot test it.
In the same way, we can understand the idea of God, even if we cannot verify it.

Counter

However, the restrictiveness of meaning (logical positivists) and of assertions (Flew) can be defended:
They argue a statement is only meaningful if we know what would make it true or false.
Without this, it does not connect to reality.
So religious language is seen as meaningless or empty.

Evaluation

Swinburne’s view is stronger because science often uses ideas that cannot currently be tested.
Theories about things like black holes or dark matter are still meaningful even without direct evidence.
They are based on what we already know about the world.
Similarly, arguments for God use evidence such as design and religious experience.
If scientific theories can be meaningful without clear tests, it seems unfair to reject religious language for the same reason.
So meaning does not require testability.
Religious language can still be meaningful.

AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games

Wittgenstein argues religious language can be meaningful even if it is not cognitive.
He thinks Ayer and Flew misunderstood religious language.
They saw it as a failed attempt to describe reality, since it cannot be verified or falsified.
So they concluded it fails to say anything about the world.
Wittgenstein later rejected this view and developed his theory of language games.
He argues that meaning is use.
Words do not get their meaning by referring to reality, but by how they are used within social contexts.
Social life consists of many different types of interaction, each with its own rules.
Wittgenstein calls these ‘language games’.
We speak differently depending on the context, such as with friends, family or in a job interview.
So the meaning of words depends on the situation in which they are used.
A language game is an activity governed by rules, often learned unconsciously.
If we break the rules of a context, what we say will seem inappropriate or not make sense.
Religion is its own language game.
So religious language is meaningful within that context for those who are part of it.
Only those who are socialised into the religious language game fully understand its meaning.
Science is a different language game from religion.
So religious language may seem meaningless within a scientific context.
Those outside the religious language game may struggle to understand it.
Some thinkers, like Braithwaite, develop this idea further.
He argues religious language expresses moral commitments and intentions, rather than beliefs about God’s existence.

AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism

Wittgensteinian fideism says religion is a separate language game from science.
Religious belief is based on faith, not reason or evidence.
This can explain why religion and science do not always conflict.

Counter

However, natural theology shows they are not completely separate.
Aquinas argues we can use reason and evidence to support belief in God.
His arguments, and modern ones like fine-tuning, use the natural world as evidence.
So religion can connect with science.

Evaluation

Fideism goes too far in separating religion from reason.
Religious arguments clearly try to show that God exists, which is a factual claim.
Even if these arguments are wrong, they still aim at truth.
Also, when believers say God created the world, they mean the same world science studies.
Aquinas’ idea of analogy explains how religious language can refer to this shared reality.
So religion is not a completely separate language game.
Natural theology gives a more convincing account of religious language than fideism.

AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism

Wittgenstein explains religion as a social “form of life.”
The meaning of religious language comes from how it is used in shared practices like prayer, worship and reading scripture.
This helps explain religion as something communal rather than just based on individual feelings.

Counter

However, this can make religion seem purely human and constructed.
Believers usually think they are relating to a real, transcendent God, not just taking part in social practices.
Religious experience is often understood as contact with something beyond human life.
So Wittgenstein’s view risks removing this “vertical” dimension of religion.

Evaluation

Wittgenstein’s theory explains the social side of religion well, but it seems incomplete.
Many religions share similar features, such as moral teachings and experiences of transcendence.
This suggests religion is not just a local social construction.
Different explanations exist, such as belief in God, Hick’s idea of a shared ultimate reality, or natural explanations from psychology.
But they all agree religion connects to something beyond society itself.
Wittgenstein cannot fully explain this wider pattern.
So his theory captures part of religious language, but reduces it too much overall.