Veri-Falsi-fication & Wittgenstein: Eduqas A grade notes

Eduqas
Philosophy

AO1: The inherent problems of religious language

Religious language involves statements about God or the supernatural, including theological works, sacred texts and everyday language like ‘God be with you’.
The issue of understanding: most theologians agree that God is beyond human understanding.
God is typically thought to be transcendent, infinite and timeless – qualities we cannot really comprehend.
However, we normally think that to meaningfully talk about something requires understanding it.
Yet if God is beyond human understanding, then there is a problem for religious language.
It must explain how it is possible to meaningfully talk about something we cannot grasp.
The issue of interpretation.
Religious language in texts can have multiple interpretations.
This raises the question of whether there can be shared understanding from religious texts.
The issue of shared experience.
If you are not religious, or belong to a different religion, you are unlikely to understand the language in the same way.
Its meaning is not universal but depends on subjective experience.
If understanding language requires a shared experience, like a congregation, then it is not fully inclusive, accessible or objective.
This raises doubts about whether it refers to reality.
The issue of whether religious language is cognitive or non-cognitive.
When words come out of someone’s mouth, they express a part of their mind.
If you say “The table is made of wood”, that expresses a belief.
Such language is cognitive.
If you are in pain and say “ouch”, that does not express a belief but a feeling.
Such language is non-cognitive, expressing an attitude rather than a belief.
Some philosophers (Mitchell, Hick) argue that when a religious person says “God exists”, they are expressing a cognitive belief.
Others (Hare, Wittgenstein) argue it expresses a non-cognitive attitude.
This becomes a psychological question about the mindset behind religious utterances.
When someone says “God exists”, are they making a claim about reality or expressing a religious attitude?
The issue of whether religious language is meaningful or meaningless.
This is separate from the cognitive/non-cognitive debate.
Different philosophers have different theories of meaning.
Some think non-cognitive language can still be meaningful, while others think only cognitive language counts.
For example, Hare thinks religious language is non-cognitive but meaningful because it affects behaviour.
However, Ayer argues that only cognitive statements are meaningful, claiming they must be verifiable.

AO1: Verificationism

Verificationism is the method of the logical positivists.
Comte’s theory of Positivism claimed only empirical knowledge is valid.
‘Logical’ refers to the use of logical analysis of language.
So a logical positivist is someone who thinks that only analytic or empirically verifiable language can be meaningful.
Ayer claims language can have different kinds of meaning, which he calls ‘significance’.
Verificationism claims that to be factually significant (synthetic), a statement must be empirically verifiable.
We must know how to verify it as true or false through experience.
Another valid type of significance is that a statement is analytic.
So Ayer allows that propositions of maths and pure logic can be meaningful.
If a proposition fails these two tests, it lacks factual significance.
Ayer says it may have emotional significance, but no ‘literal’ significance.
Metaphysical language is about things beyond experience.
So it is meaningless because we don’t know how to verify it.
This includes religious language, with Ayer calling ‘God’ a ‘metaphysical term’.
Ayer concludes religious language does not express a ‘genuinely cognitive state’.
It is unverifiable and has no factual significance.
His point is that supposed religious knowledge cannot be put into propositions testable through experience.
So religious language attempts to be cognitive but fails to be meaningful.
Original verificationists believed in ‘hard’ verification, where experience verifies something conclusively.
However, Ayer rejected this and proposed ‘weak’ verification, where experience shows something is probably true or false.
This raised the issue that God might be verifiable through arguments like design or cosmology.
So Ayer refined weak verification into direct and indirect verification.
Direct verification is when we verify something in immediate experience, such as “I see a key”.
Indirect verification involves claims connected to experience that we can in principle verify, such as “this key is made of iron”.
To be empirically verifiable, a statement must be verifiable either in practice (direct) or in principle (indirect).
Ayer illustrates this with the dark side of the moon.
The claim that there are mountains there was verifiable in principle, since it was a place we could in principle reach and observe.

AO2: Hick’s eschatological verification

Hick argues verificationism does not undermine religious language.
He accepts Ayer’s principle but claims religious statements are verifiable in principle.
After death, we would discover whether God and an afterlife exist.
Although this cannot be tested while alive, it could be verified eschatologically.
So, religious language may still meet Ayer’s requirement of verifiability in principle.

Counter

However, this assumes the afterlife exists as a place where verification could occur.
Ayer’s example of the dark side of the moon worked because we already knew it existed.
We also knew it could be reached and observed.
In contrast, we do not know that an afterlife exists or that it provides conditions for verification.
So Hick has not shown that religious claims are verifiable in principle.

Evaluation

Hick’s argument ultimately fails.
If death results in annihilation, there would be no moment of discovery or verification.
So religious claims would remain unverifiable.
Simply imagining possible verification is not enough.
We must have reason to believe the conditions for verification actually exist.
Without this, Hick’s proposal collapses into speculation.
Ayer’s principle is designed to exclude exactly this kind of unfounded metaphysical claim.
So Hick does not successfully defend religious language against verificationism.

AO2: Whether the verification principle passes its own test

The verification principle states that a statement is meaningful only if it is analytic or empirically verifiable.
However, this creates a problem.
For the principle itself to be meaningful, it must meet its own test.
It is not analytic, since it can be denied without contradiction.
It is also not empirically verifiable.
So, it appears to be meaningless by its own standard.

Counter

Ayer accepts this problem and responds that the principle is not a factual statement.
Instead, it is a methodological tool.
It is a rule adopted to distinguish meaningful empirical statements from others.
So, it does not need to be verified itself.

Evaluation

However, this response weakens Ayer’s position.
If the principle is only a tool, then it cannot be used to declare metaphysical or religious language meaningless in any absolute sense.
It simply reflects a chosen method, not an objective truth about meaning.
This means alternative approaches, such as rationalism, remain possible.
Ayer’s original aim was to dismiss metaphysics entirely, but this defence reduces his claim to a preference for empiricism.
So, the verification principle fails to justify its strong conclusions and loses much of its force.

AO1: Falsificationism

Popper argued that verificationism is not a correct theory of empiricism.
Science does not work by looking for evidence that verifies a theory.
It works by making predictions which are falsifiable.
Popper illustrates this with Einstein’s prediction about the orbit of Mercury.
Had the observations gone against it, Einstein’s theory would have been falsified.
By contrast, Popper criticises Freudians and Marxists, who do not make testable predictions but interpret everything as confirming their theories.
Antony Flew applies falsificationism to religious language.
Flew thinks religious language is cognitive, as it expresses beliefs attempting to assert something about the world.
However, those beliefs are unfalsifiable, and so fail to say anything about the world.
Unlike Ayer, Flew does not say religious language is meaningless.
Neither Popper nor Flew are making strict claims about meaning, so the falsification principle does not need to pass its own test.
It is a tool for identifying genuine empirical claims.
Flew argues that asserting “X” is equivalent to denying “not X”.
So all genuine assertions must be capable of being false.
If a statement cannot be imagined false, then it does not deny anything and so does not assert anything either.
Religious believers cannot say what would prove their belief in God false.
So religious language is a failed attempt to speak about reality.
Some believers claim there are things which could disprove their belief.
Flew uses a parable to show why he rejects this.
He adapts John Wisdom’s ‘parable of the gardener’.
Someone claims there is a gardener (God), but every time this is tested, the concept is adjusted to avoid falsification.
The gardener becomes invisible, intangible and undetectable.
This gradually empties the claim of content, leading to a “death of a thousand qualifications”.
There is no difference between a world where the gardener exists and one where it does not.
So unfalsifiable language cannot be about reality, since it makes no testable difference whether it is true or false.
Flew’s parable also reflects how religious beliefs have been modified in response to scientific developments, such as evolution and the Big Bang, to avoid falsification.

AO1: Mitchell

Mitchell argues religious language is cognitively meaningful and falsifiable.
Some theists have unfalsifiable ‘blind’ faith.
However, he argues most theistic belief is based on evidence, such as personal experience, which can be outweighed by counter-evidence like evil.
Encounter with God is personal, so the amount of evil needed to undermine faith will differ between individuals.
Crucially, Flew’s mistake was to think falsification requires knowing in advance what would falsify a belief.
But ‘falsifiable’ only means a belief could be overturned by some possible evidence.
Mitchell also disagrees with Hare, who compares believers to a paranoid student who ignores counter-evidence.
Mitchell argues believers do acknowledge contrary evidence, such as evil, but judge it insufficient to overturn their belief.
So theism can be a rational assessment of the balance of evidence.
Mitchell illustrates this with a parable.
A resistance soldier in a civil war meets a stranger who claims to be their leader.
After a powerful encounter, the soldier becomes convinced this is true.
This belief is maintained despite counter-evidence, such as seeing the stranger fighting for the enemy.
The soldier may interpret this as the leader being a double agent.
Mitchell notes there must be some level of evidence where continuing belief would become ‘ridiculous’, even if it cannot be specified in advance.
The parable shows that religious belief can be based on personal experience, while still allowing that some evidence could eventually falsify it.

AO2: Mitchell vs Flew

Flew argues Mitchell fails to show theistic belief is falsifiable.
He appeals to the logical problem of evil, claiming any evil is incompatible with an all-good, all-powerful God.
If so, any amount of evil would falsify belief in God.
The fact that believers continue to believe suggests their claims are unfalsifiable.

Counter

However, this relies on the logical problem of evil being sound.
Plantinga’s free will defence challenges this, arguing God cannot remove evil without removing free will.
Most philosophers now accept this response and focus on the evidential problem instead.
But this weaker version does not show that any evil disproves God.
So Flew’s criticism loses its force.

Evaluation

Mitchell gives a better account of religious belief, because it is validated by the observable reality of religious psychology.
He argues belief is based on experience and can be undermined by sufficient evidence.
This is supported by real cases where people lose faith after suffering.
Crucially, individuals may not know in advance what would falsify their belief.
This does not make belief unfalsifiable, only unpredictable.
Those who retain belief often use theodicies, but these become less convincing as suffering increases.
So belief remains sensitive to evidence.
Mitchell therefore successfully shows religious belief can be falsifiable and cognitively meaningful.

AO1: Hare’s non-cognitive ‘Bliks’

Ayer and Flew regard religious language as a failed attempt to describe reality because it is unverifiable (Ayer) or unfalsifiable (Flew).
Hare argues they are wrong in assuming religious language is trying to describe reality at all.
If it is not attempting that, it cannot be a failed attempt.
Hare claims religious language is a non-cognitive expression of a ‘blik’, involving attitudes, emotions and a worldview.
Our blik shapes how we perceive the world, affecting our thoughts, behaviour and expressions.
He argues this makes the expression of a blik non-cognitively meaningful.
He illustrates this with a paranoid student who believes their professors are trying to kill them.
Even after meeting kind professors, the student thinks they are pretending.
Similarly, religious belief can persist despite lack of, or contrary, evidence.
Ayer and Flew would say this shows an unfalsifiable belief.
But Hare argues the student is expressing an underlying attitude of paranoia.
When the student says “my professors are trying to kill me”, they are expressing their blik.
Likewise, when religious people say “God exists” or “God be with you”, it may appear to be a belief, but is really expressing a non-cognitive attitude or worldview.
Hare is influenced by Hume’s view that reason is a slave of the passions.
What looks like rational belief about God is actually a rationalisation of underlying emotions.

AO2: Whether Hare is too reductionist

Flew argues Hare is too reductionist.
Theists intend to express beliefs about reality, not just attitudes.
Religious arguments like Aquinas’ cosmological argument present reasons for believing God exists.
These involve observation and reasoning, not just expressions of feeling.
Even if the argument is unsound, it still aims to make a factual claim.
So, reducing religious language to attitudes ignores its cognitive aspect.

Counter

However, Hare draws on Humean psychology.
Human reasoning is often shaped by emotions and unconscious biases.
Freud and later psychology support the idea that much of our thinking is influenced by hidden motives.
Reason can act as a tool for justifying beliefs we already hold.
So religious belief may reflect underlying attitudes rather than objective reasoning.

Evaluation

Hume’s insight is partly correct, but overstated.
While emotions influence reasoning, they do not fully determine it.
Aristotle shows we can shape our desires through rational habits and virtue.
Modern psychology also suggests reason can guide and influence emotions over time.
So, it is wrong to reduce belief entirely to non-cognitive attitudes.
Religious arguments clearly aim to establish truth, even if influenced by bias.
There may be a range of religious language, from rational argument to blind faith.
But Hare’s claim that all religious language is non-cognitive is too extreme.
So, his account is overly reductionist.

AO2: Swinburne’s critique of Ayer & Flew

Swinburne argues that logical positivism is too restrictive about meaning.
A statement is meaningful if we understand the concepts it contains and how they are combined.
We do not need to know how to verify it through experience.
He illustrates this with the idea of toys coming alive when no one is watching.
We understand what this would mean, even if we cannot test or observe it.
Similarly, we can understand the claim that God exists, even if we do not know how to verify it.
So religious language can still be meaningful.

Counter

However, the restrictiveness of meaning (logical positivists) and of assertions (Flew) can be defended:
Schlick argues we only understand a statement if we know its truth conditions.
If we cannot say what would make it true or false, we cannot relate it to reality.
Ayer and Flew develop this by claiming meaningful statements must be verifiable or falsifiable.
Without this, statements do not genuinely assert anything about the world.
So Swinburne’s account risks allowing meaningless speculation.

Evaluation

Swinburne’s approach is more convincing.
Scientific practice often goes beyond strict verification or falsification.
Physicists discuss theories such as dark matter or the nature of black holes, even when direct testing is not currently possible.
These theories are still considered meaningful because they are grounded in our understanding of the world.
Similarly, Swinburne develops a cumulative case for God using evidence such as design and religious experience.
If we accept untestable scientific theories as meaningful, it seems inconsistent to reject religious claims for the same reason.
So meaning does not require immediate testability.
Religious language can therefore be cognitively meaningful, even if it is difficult or impossible to verify.

AO1: Wittgenstein’s language games

Wittgenstein argues religious language can be meaningful even if it is not cognitive.
He thinks Ayer and Flew misunderstood religious language.
They saw it as a failed attempt to describe reality, since it is unverifiable (Ayer) or unfalsifiable (Flew).
So religious belief fails to be about reality.
Wittgenstein initially agreed with Ayer, but later developed his theory of language games.
Ayer and Flew think words get meaning by referring to reality through verification or falsification.
Wittgenstein rejects this, arguing that meaning is use.
Words get their meaning from how they are used within social contexts.
The social reality is the set of different types of social interaction.
Each type of interaction is like a ‘game’, because it follows rules.
What we say depends on the social context we are in.
We speak differently with friends, family or in a job interview.
So words get their meaning from the context in which they are used.
A language game is a type of social interaction governed by rules.
Wittgenstein uses ‘game’ broadly to mean an activity with rules.
If we spoke at a job interview like we do with friends, we would likely fail, because each context has its own rules.
Most of these rules are learned unconsciously.
Religion is its own language game.
So religious language is meaningful within the religious language game to those who are part of it.
Only those socialised into a language game fully understand its meaning.
Science is a different language game from religion.
So religious language may seem meaningless within the scientific game.
Those outside the religious game may struggle to understand it.
Wittgenstein’s view has been developed by theologians.
For example, Braithwaite argues religious language expresses moral commitments and intentions, rather than beliefs about God’s existence.

AO2: Aquinas’ natural theology vs Wittgensteinian Fideism

A strength of Wittgensteinian fideism is that it explains the apparent independence of religion and science.
Religion can be seen as a distinct “language game” with its own rules and purposes.
This reflects a long fideist tradition in Christianity, such as Tertullian’s rejection of Greek philosophy.
On this view, religious belief is grounded in faith, not reason or evidence.
So conflicts between science and religion may be avoided by treating them as separate forms of life.

Counter

However, this separation is rejected by natural theology.
Aquinas argues that reason and observation can support belief in God.
His cosmological arguments aim to prove God’s existence from features of the natural world.
Modern versions, such as fine-tuning arguments, also use scientific evidence to support theism.
This shows religion and science are not always separate, but can be connected.
Religious claims often overlap with scientific claims about the same world.

Evaluation

Wittgensteinian fideism therefore goes too far in separating religion from reason.
Religious arguments clearly aim to make cognitive claims about reality.
Even if such arguments fail, they still show that believers use evidence and reasoning.
Ordinary religious belief also supports this.
When believers say God created the world, they refer to the same world studied by science.
Aquinas’ theory of analogy explains how this works: terms like “creator” apply to God in a different but related way.
This allows religious language to refer meaningfully to reality without being identical to scientific language.
So religion is not a completely separate language game.
Aquinas’ natural theology provides a more convincing account of how religious language works.

AO2: Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theological anti-realism

Wittgenstein’s approach to religious language is more convincing than other non-cognitive theories because it avoids reducing religion to purely individual feeling.
He explains religion as a social “form of life,” where meaning comes from shared practices.
Activities such as prayer, worship and scripture-reading are rule-governed, and their meaning depends on how they are used within a community.
This captures the lived, communal nature of religion better than purely emotive theories.

Counter

However, this view is criticised for leading to theological anti-realism.
If meaning is entirely based on use within a community, religious language becomes disconnected from any objective reality.
This removes religion’s “vertical dimension,” where believers see themselves as relating to a transcendent God.
Religious practices are not experienced as mere human constructions, but as responses to something beyond the human world.
Religious experience in particular is often taken as direct awareness of the divine.
So Wittgenstein risks reducing religion too much.

Evaluation

While Wittgenstein could be right that religion is socially constructed, this seems incomplete.
Many features of religion appear across different cultures, such as mystical experiences, moral insights and ideas of transcendence.
This suggests religion is not purely constructed.
Different theories explain this in different ways: traditional theism sees it as evidence for God, Hick’s pluralism as responses to a shared ultimate reality, and naturalism as a product of human social or evolutionary psychology.
Although these views are incompatible, they all agree that religion connects to something beyond mere social practice.
Wittgenstein’s account cannot easily explain this universality.
So, while his theory captures the social dimension of religion, it fails to account for its apparent link to objective reality, making it incomplete.