Meta-ethics: Edexcel B grade notes

Edexcel
Ethics

Naturalism claims that moral properties are natural properties, meaning features or aspects of the physical world.
This makes naturalism a form of Moral realism, the view that moral properties (like goodness and badness) exist mind-independently.
Bentham’s utilitarianism is a form of meta-ethical naturalism because he claims that goodness is pleasure and that pleasure is a natural property.
Natural properties are features of the physical world, in this case a property of organisms like humans and animals.
So when we use ethical language to call an action right, wrong, good or bad, we express our belief about whether pleasure was maximised.
This makes Utilitarian naturalism cognitivist, which is the view that ethical language expresses beliefs that could be true or false.
E.g. if someone said ‘X was wrong’, it expresses belief that the action X failed to maximise pleasure.

Bentham argues naturalism is grounded in human nature, since we naturally see pleasure as good.
Mill similarly claims happiness is our ultimate desire and the only possible proof of its value.
This suggests morality is based on observable facts about human psychology.

Counter

Hume argues facts about what is cannot justify what we ought to do.
Saying we desire pleasure does not prove pleasure is truly good.
Naturalism therefore makes an unjustified leap from fact to value (from ‘is’ to ‘ought’).
This supports the view that moral judgements come from emotion, not reason.

Evaluation

Hume’s critique is powerful against simple forms of naturalism like utilitarianism.
However, virtue ethics avoids this problem by redefining values as natural facts about flourishing.
On this view, goodness is what enables human flourishing, not just what we desire.
This links morality to objective features of human life rather than subjective feelings.
So, while Hume exposes a flaw in early naturalism, he does not defeat naturalism entirely.
A revised Aristotelian approach successfully reconnects moral “oughts” with facts about human nature.

Moore rejects naturalism with the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument.
The naturalistic fallacy claims it is wrong to define goodness in terms of natural properties like pleasure.
The open question argument adds that even if something is pleasurable, it is still meaningful to ask “is it good?”, so goodness cannot simply mean pleasure.
Moore concludes goodness cannot be defined in natural terms.
However, unlike Hume, he does not deny objective morality.
Instead, he argues goodness is a real but non-natural property, meaning it exists beyond the physical world.
He compares goodness to numbers, which are not physical but still real.
He also compares it to the colour yellow, which cannot be defined but is recognised intuitively.
So, we know what is good through intuition, not reasoning.
This makes intuitionism cognitivist, since moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false, and realist, since moral properties exist independently of us.

Intuitionism is supported by cross-cultural agreement on core moral rules.
Most societies condemn killing and stealing and value education.
This suggests humans share moral intuitions about right and wrong.
Pritchard argues disagreement comes from different understanding of situations, not different moral truths.

Counter

Mackie points to widespread moral disagreement across cultures.
He argues this is better explained by social conditioning than objective moral truths.
Different societies develop different moral frameworks or “forms of life.”
So, intuition reflects upbringing rather than access to real moral properties.

Evaluation

Mackie’s explanation is stronger because it offers a simpler account of both agreement and disagreement.
Shared moral rules can be explained by evolution and the need for stable societies.
Rules against killing and stealing help societies survive, so they are widely adopted.
This removes the need to posit non-natural moral properties.
So, intuitionism is unnecessary and less convincing than anti-realism.

Ayer’s verification principle states that a statement is only meaningful if it is analytic or empirically verifiable.
He agrees with Hume and Moore that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural facts.
However, he rejects Moore’s idea of non-natural moral properties because they cannot be verified.
Ethical statements are not analytic, since they can be denied without contradiction.
They are not empirically verifiable, because we cannot observe moral properties.
So, Ayer concludes ethical language is not factually meaningful and cannot be true or false.
Instead, moral statements express emotions.
Saying “stealing is wrong” is just expressing disapproval, like saying “boo to stealing.”
Ayer also draws on Hume’s idea that beliefs do not motivate action, but desires do.
Since moral language motivates, it must express feelings rather than facts.
This means moral language does not describe reality, but functions to express attitudes and influence others’ behaviour.

Anti-realism appears to lead to moral nihilism by denying objective moral truth.
If morality is not objectively true, it loses its authority and binding force.
This raises the worry that people may ignore moral rules, risking social collapse.
Foot argued this became especially troubling after the Holocaust.

Counter

However, these consequences do not show anti-realism is false.
Ayer would say calling the Holocaust “wrong” is just an emotional reaction.
So, the nihilism objection assumes moral realism rather than proving it.
It may even support emotivism by showing how moral language expresses strong feelings.

Evaluation

Foot’s deeper point is stronger because she challenges the separation of facts and values.
She argues moral judgements can be grounded in facts about human flourishing.
If actions undermine flourishing, we can objectively say they are wrong.
This avoids both nihilism and emotivism without appealing to non-natural properties.
So, Ayer’s theory fails because it wrongly assumes values cannot be factual.
Anti-realism is therefore less convincing than a naturalist form of moral realism.

Moore argues ethical language appears cognitive because moral disagreement involves reasoning.
People give arguments and appeal to facts to justify moral views.
Disagreement implies conflicting beliefs about reality, not just emotions.
So, ethical language cannot simply express feelings, making Ayer’s view too weak.

Counter

Hare improves non-cognitivism by arguing moral language expresses prescriptions, not emotions.
Saying “stealing is wrong” means “do not steal,” applied universally.
This allows for reasoning and debate about consistency between prescriptions.
So, disagreement can still be meaningful without moral facts.

Evaluation

However, Mackie’s error theory is stronger because it explains both cognition and disagreement.
He accepts moral language expresses beliefs, not just emotions or commands.
People want to know what is truly right or wrong, not just how to feel or act.
But these beliefs are shaped by social conditioning rather than objective truth.
So, moral language is cognitive, but all moral claims are false.
This explains disagreement more convincingly than non-cognitivism.