Evil & suffering: AQA A grade notes

AQA RS
Philosophy

AO1: Natural & moral evil

Natural evil is suffering caused by the natural world.
It typically involves suffering that is intense, widespread, and seemingly purposeless.
Since God is believed to have designed the natural world, it is argued that God could have created it differently or intervened to prevent such suffering.
This raises the problem that God appears responsible for natural evil.
David Hume highlights how nature is structured in ways that generate suffering.
Animals endure hunger, disease, fear, and death, with pain acting as the main driver of survival, even though less severe mechanisms seem possible.
Living beings are physically fragile, and the environment exposes them to scarcity, disease, and natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods.
This suggests suffering is built into the natural order.
William Rowe illustrates this with a fawn trapped in a forest fire.
It suffers intensely for days before dying, with no apparent benefit or purpose.
This shows how natural evil can involve prolonged suffering that serves no clear good.
Gregory S. Paul argues that suffering is embedded in the structure of life itself.
For most of human history, many children died before developing morally, due to disease, malnutrition, and natural hazards.
These deaths occur independently of human choice, making them clear examples of natural evil.
Moral evil, by contrast, is suffering caused by human actions, such as war and genocide.
It is argued that God could intervene to prevent extreme cases without removing free will entirely.
Some cases blur the distinction, such as natural disasters intensified by human-driven climate change.

AO1: the logical problem of evil

The logical problem of evil is a deductive argument, meaning if its premises are true its conclusion must be true.
It aims to show that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the God of classical theism, defined as omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient.
The classical version goes back to Epicurus, who argued that God is either unable or unwilling to prevent evil, in which case he either does not exist or is not God.
Mackie develops this into a modern form of the inconsistent triad:
P1. An omnipotent God has the power to eliminate evil.
P2. An omnibenevolent God has the motivation to eliminate evil.
C1. Evil, omnipotence and omnibenevolence form an inconsistent triad such that God and evil cannot co-exist.
The argument is a priori, since it does not reference experience.
It is based on analysing the logical implications of the concepts ‘omnipotent’, ‘omnibenevolent’ and ‘evil’.
If a being has both the power and motivation to eliminate something, it is logically impossible for that thing to exist.
So if evil exists, it is impossible that God exists.
This is a significant claim, requiring that there be no logically possible situation in which a perfect God could allow evil.

AO1: the evidential problem of evil

The evidential problem of evil claims that evil makes belief in God unjustified.
It is a posteriori, based on our experience of evil in the world.
It is inductive, using this experience to support the conclusion that there is no God.
Hume points to human and animal suffering caused by natural disasters, and the difficulty of survival due to our bodily and environmental limitations.
Hume accepts that it is logically possible that a perfect God exists and has reasons for allowing evil.
However, the evidential problem argues that the evidence does not justify believing this is actually the case.
Hume’s argument draws on empiricism:
P1. We are only justified in believing what the evidence suggests.
P2. We only have evidence of imperfection (a mixture of good and evil).
C1. So, we are only justified in believing that imperfection exists.
C2. Therefore, belief in a perfectly powerful and good being is not justified.
We cannot infer a perfect God from an imperfect world, so the evidence is insufficient to justify belief.
More modern versions, such as Rowe’s, go further by arguing that evil counts against God.
Rowe uses the example of a fawn dying slowly in a forest fire, showing suffering with no apparent purpose.
P1. There appear to be cases of gratuitous evil.
P2. If something appears gratuitous, it is reasonable to think it is.
P3. Therefore, probably, there is gratuitous evil.
C1. Therefore, God is unlikely.
Rowe’s conclusion is that evil is evidence against God, rather than merely blocking the inference to God.

AO1: Soul-making theodicy (Irenaeus & Hick)

Soul-making theodicy claims God allows evil because it is necessary for moral development.
Irenaeus interprets Genesis as meaning humans are created morally immature in God’s image and must develop into his likeness.
The best kind of world for this is one containing challenges and suffering, since these are necessary for salvation.
John Hick develops this by rejecting original perfection and a literal Fall.
Humans were always imperfect, and salvation depends on developing moral goodness rather than recovering a lost state.
Hick draws on Aristotle, arguing virtue is formed through habituation in a context of real alternatives.
Some virtues logically require evil, such as compassion needing suffering and courage needing danger.
Virtue must also be freely chosen.
Therefore, even an omnipotent God could not create fully virtuous beings, since virtue must be developed rather than implanted.
Authentic moral choice also requires epistemic distance: if God’s existence were certain, humans would act from fear or reward rather than genuinely choosing the good.
This requires a religiously ambiguous, law-governed world, where events follow consistent natural processes rather than constant divine intervention.
The apparent randomness of suffering helps preserve this ambiguity and maintain moral freedom.
Hick also argues that all will ultimately reach moral perfection, even if that requires post-mortem development.
Thus, even apparently purposeless suffering can be redeemed in the final state.

AO1: Soul-making theodicy strengths & weaknesses

Weakness: The existence of apparently pointless suffering, such as the death of children or animal suffering, undermines the claim that all evil contributes to soul-making.
Strength: The presence of seemingly random evil can be defended as necessary for maintaining epistemic distance, which allows genuine moral development.
Weakness: Soul-making appears morally unacceptable if it requires the suffering of innocents as the cost of developing virtue in others.
Strength: There appears no alternative for God than to create a world where evil risks falling on innocents, making this the best world God could create.
Strength: Soul-making explains evil as a necessary condition for free moral growth, preserving the coherence of divine goodness.
Weakness: The defence depends on libertarian free will, which may be incoherent, weakening the claim that evil is necessary for genuine freedom.

AO2: Purposeless evil (soul making vs logical & evidential)

Evidence for soul-making is that suffering can develop virtues like compassion.
However, there is also strong counter-evidence.
A child who dies young cannot learn from suffering.
Animal suffering similarly lacks moral development.
Events like the Holocaust seem soul-destroying and excessive.
D Z Phillips argues no reasonable person could see such suffering as justified.

Counter

Hick argues this misunderstands his theodicy.
If suffering always clearly served a purpose, we would see God’s control.
This would remove epistemic distance and undermine genuine virtue.
So God must allow evil to appear random.
Soul-making does not require each instance of suffering to have a purpose.
Instead, a world with apparently random evil provides the conditions for moral growth.

Evaluation

This response shows soul-making is logically possible.
It challenges the claim that a loving God must remove all evil.
However, it fails to address the evidential problem.
Hick’s defence means that any evidence against soul-making can be explained away.
If evil must appear random, then purposeless suffering is expected whether God exists or not.
This makes the theory unfalsifiable.
There is no observable difference between a world with God using evil for soul-making and one with no God at all.
So, while Hick achieves logical coherence, he cannot show his theodicy is actually true.

AO2: Dostoyevsky’s ‘Ivan’ vs soul-making

Dostoyevsky’s character Ivan attacks the coherence of soul-making theodicy.
He argues the process is immoral.
Hick claims suffering is needed to develop virtues like compassion.
But Ivan argues it is indecent to justify the suffering of innocent children for this.
Building heaven on such suffering contradicts the idea of a loving God.
So, soul-making fails to reconcile God with evil.

Counter

However, soul-making can be defended as the only possible way to create morally good beings.
A fully developed soul must freely choose good over evil.
It is logically impossible for God to create already virtuous beings.
So, God must create humans undeveloped with free will in a world containing evil.
This gives the opportunity for genuine moral development.

Evaluation

However, this defence only shifts the problem.
Even if soul-making is necessary after creation, it does not justify creating a world where innocent suffering is inevitable.
Hick argues epistemic distance requires a world where evil appears random, but this includes the suffering of children.
If such suffering is necessary for salvation, then creation itself becomes morally questionable.
A loving God would not initiate a process that depends on innocent suffering.
Ivan’s point is that it is wrong to accept a system built on such a cost.
So, Hick explains evil within the world, but not why such a world should exist at all.
This leaves soul-making unable to defend belief in a loving God.

AO1: The Free will defence

Plantinga offers a ‘defence’, meaning a response to the logical problem of evil.
He aims to show that the co-existence of God and evil is logically possible, rather than proving it is actually the case.
He develops Augustine’s approach but removes problematic ideas like inherited guilt and punishment.
Plantinga argues it is logically possible that all evil results from free will.
Moral evil clearly comes from human misuse of free will.
Natural evil could result from the free actions of non-human agents such as demons or from the consequences of the Fall.
If this is possible, then God could not remove evil without also removing free will.
Plantinga argues that free will is necessary for moral significance.
God could have created beings who always choose good, but they would be like robots, with no real moral value in their actions.
Similarly, if God constantly intervened to prevent evil, human freedom would be undermined and no longer meaningful.
Therefore, God cannot remove evil without removing the conditions for morally significant freedom.
This challenges Mackie’s assumption that an omnibenevolent God would eliminate all evil, since allowing evil may be necessary for a greater good.

AO1: Free will defence strengths & weaknesses

Strength: The Free Will Defence argues that moral evil results from human freedom, which is necessary for meaningful moral responsibility and makes a world with freedom more valuable.
Weakness: The defence depends on libertarian free will, which may be incoherent, undermining the claim that evil is a necessary condition of genuine freedom.
Strength: The Free Will Defence explains evil without claiming it is optimal, presenting it as a regrettable but necessary risk of creating free agents.
Weakness: The defence struggles to account for the scale and intensity of suffering, which can appear excessive relative to the value of free will.
Weakness: Natural evil does not appear to result from human free will, making it difficult to explain within the Free Will Defence.
Strength: The defence can appeal to far-fetched but still logical possibilities that natural evil results from the free will of non-human agents such as demons or the fall of Adam and Eve.

AO2: The problem of evil & the issue of free will

Omnipotence-preserving theodicies argue God cannot remove evil without a greater cost.
Augustine claims evil is deserved punishment.
Others argue removing evil would undermine free will, since moral evil comes from human choice.
Natural evil is linked to misuse of free will by humans or spiritual beings.
Soul-making theodicies add that suffering is needed for moral development.
So, a perfect God allows evil as the best available option.

Counter

Mackie argues a world where free beings always choose good is logically possible.
If so, a perfect God would create such a world.
He uses a compatibilist view, where freedom means acting according to one’s character.
Plantinga replies that this assumes the wrong kind of freedom.
He defends libertarian free will, where genuine freedom requires the ability to do otherwise.
If this is correct, then God cannot guarantee creatures always choose good.

Evaluation

However, libertarian free will is difficult to defend.
Mackie argues choices must be caused either by character, external factors, or randomness.
Only actions flowing from character can ground responsibility.
But character itself is shaped by prior causes.
So, the idea of uncaused free choice is incoherent.
Compatibilism offers a more plausible account of freedom.
If so, a world where people freely choose good is possible.
A perfect God would create such a world.
So, the existence of evil still counts against the existence of a perfect God.

AO2: Leibniz vs Hick & Plantinga

A strength of Leibniz’s theodicy is that it anticipates later ideas.
He argues some goods require the possibility of evil.
Virtues like compassion and courage depend on suffering and danger.
This insight is developed by Hick’s soul-making theodicy.
Leibniz also argues free will is valuable despite allowing wrongdoing, a point later developed by Plantinga.
So Leibniz offers a unified account combining these themes.

Counter

However, this leaves a problem.
While virtue and free will explain some evil, they do not justify the overall amount of suffering.
Leibniz claims this must be the best possible world, but this seems hard to accept given the scale of evil.
His argument appears to rely on assuming whatever happens is optimal, which lacks clear justification.

Evaluation

Hick and Plantinga improve on Leibniz’s approach.
They argue it is enough to show that some evil is necessary for greater goods, not that all existing evil is optimal.
This allows evil to remain genuinely tragic rather than part of a perfect plan.
Hick explains random evil as necessary for epistemic distance, while Plantinga explains it through free will.
Both accounts avoid claiming that all suffering is the best possible outcome.
This makes them more morally credible than Leibniz.
Leibniz’s claim that all evil is optimal appears implausible and overly reliant on mystery.

AO1: Process theodicy

Whitehead developed a new understanding of God to address the problem of evil within a rational, scientifically informed worldview.
Traditional theism defines omnipotence as the ability to create any logically possible state of affairs, often grounded in creatio ex nihilo as suggested by Genesis 1:1–3.
If God created everything from nothing, this implies total control over creation.
Griffin challenges this by offering an alternative reading of Genesis, suggesting it describes God ordering pre-existing chaotic matter rather than creating it from nothing.
On this view, matter may be eternal, and God’s role is to shape and direct it rather than determine everything absolutely.
God’s power is therefore persuasive rather than coercive.
God cannot force events to occur but works to influence creation toward greater complexity, harmony, and goodness over time.
Evolution is part of this process, allowing for the development of conscious beings capable of rich experiences, but also making suffering possible.
Process theologians are panentheists, holding that the universe exists within God, so God is affected by and suffers with creation.
Natural evil arises because the basic structures of reality have their own limited autonomy and cannot fully respond to God’s influence.
As a result, God cannot unilaterally prevent suffering, since divine power is limited to persuasion rather than control.

AO1: Process theodicy strengths & weaknesses

Strength: Denying omnipotence may be the best way to explain why God allows evil, given the scale and purposeless of innocent and animal suffering.
Weakness: Process theodicy gives up so much when there might be other ways of preserving God’s goodness, e.g., emphasising his suffering with us.
Weakness: A God who cannot prevent evil may seem unworthy of worship, since such a being lacks the power to save humanity from suffering.
Strength: A God defined by perfect love and moral integrity rather than coercive power can be seen as more worthy of worship than one who allows evil despite having the power to stop it.
Weakness: Process theology appears to redefine omnipotence as weakness, conflicting with biblical depictions of God acting through coercive power and miracles.
Strength: Persuasive power can be understood as a higher form of strength, exemplified by figures like Jesus, where love transforms without coercion.

AO2: Whether the God of process theology is worthy of worship

Roth argues a powerless God is not worthy of worship.
If God cannot prevent horrors like Auschwitz, then worship seems pointless.
There is no reason to worship a being who cannot save us from extreme suffering.
So, process theology appears to make God too weak to be worthy of devotion.

Counter

Griffin responds that a God who could prevent evil but does not is less worthy of worship.
He argues true divinity lies in love, not brute power.
God’s worth is shown through moral integrity and compassionate persuasion.
He appeals to Jesus’ example, where love and forgiveness are prioritised over coercion.
So, a loving but limited God is more worthy of worship than a powerful but morally troubling one.

Evaluation

Roth’s criticism is weakened by Griffin’s dilemma.
If God has the power to stop evil but does not, this undermines divine goodness.
So the choice is between a powerful but morally flawed God, or a loving but limited one.
Process theology preserves God’s moral integrity.
It also gives a clear explanation of why evil exists: God cannot prevent it.
Classical theism struggles to explain extreme suffering without morally problematic claims.
Although process theology limits God’s power, it offers a more coherent and ethically acceptable view.
So Griffin’s response is more convincing than Roth’s objection.

AO2: Whether process theology is true to omnipotence

Process theology’s view of omnipotence can seem like weakness rather than power.
God is unable to act coercively, which suggests God is not truly all-powerful.
The Bible presents God as using coercive power, such as performing miracles and influencing human decisions.
For example, God hardens Pharaoh’s heart.
The traditional view of atonement also implies God acts decisively to defeat evil.
So, process theology appears inconsistent with both scripture and classical omnipotence.

Counter

However, process theologians argue true power is not coercion but persuasion.
Jesus never used force, instead choosing to suffer rather than dominate.
Mesle argues enduring suffering without hatred shows greater strength than using violence.
Examples like Jesus and Martin Luther King suggest moral transformation comes through persuasion.
Process theology reinterprets atonement as God drawing humanity through love rather than forcing change.

Evaluation

Mesle’s argument is convincing because coercive power often creates further violence or corruption.
Persuasive love requires greater restraint and moral strength.
Jesus’ teaching to “turn the other cheek” reflects this higher form of power.
Figures like Martin Luther King achieved change through non-violence rather than force.
This suggests true omnipotence is not about control, but about transforming others freely.
Process theology therefore offers a deeper understanding of power as moral strength rather than domination.
Although it departs from traditional views, it provides a more ethically compelling account of divine power.