Self, death & the afterlife: AQA A grade notes

AQA
Philosophy

AO1: Views on the body/soul relationship and the possibility of continuing personal existence after death

The soul is thought to contain the features of personhood, such as consciousness, memory and personality.
So, if the soul survives death, the person survives.
Christians believe in the immortality of the soul.
It is immaterial, not subject to decay, and survives the death of the body.
In the afterlife, the soul retains personal identity rather than merging into the divine.
Plato and Aristotle influenced two major Christian views of the soul.
Plato argued that the person is an immaterial soul separate from the body.
This influenced early Christian Platonists like Augustine and later Descartes’ substance dualism.
It supports the idea that the soul leaves the body at death and continues to exist.
Aquinas developed Aristotle’s hylomorphic view, where the person is a unity of soul and body.
The soul is the form of the body, making it a living rational being.
Aristotle thought the soul could not survive death, but Aquinas argued it can exist in an incomplete state.
Full personal identity is only restored at resurrection, when body and soul are reunited.
Hick argues for psycho-physical unity.
He claims personal identity depends on the body, so survival requires continued embodied existence.
His replica theory explains this.
An exact psycho-physical replica, identical in every respect, would count as the same person.
So, resurrection involves God creating a replica in a “resurrection world”.
Materialists reject the idea of a soul.
They are monists, believing only physical things exist.
Modern science suggests humans are purely physical, shaped by evolution.
Mental features like consciousness and reason are reducible to brain processes.
So, there is no need for a soul.
As Russell put it, when we die, nothing of the self survives.
On this view, personal identity depends on the brain, so survival after death is not possible without advanced technology.

AO1: Descartes’ argument for the existence of the soul

Descartes is a substance dualist, meaning mind and body are distinct types of being.
Physical substance is characterised by extension (it occupies space).
Mental substance is characterised by thinking.
Descartes uses a priori intuition to find indubitable knowledge.
He argues “cogito ergo sum”, I think therefore I am.
Doubting our existence presupposes that we exist.
However, the body can be doubted, since we could be dreaming.
This suggests a distinction: the body is separable from what we are, while thinking is not.
Descartes develops this with two deductive arguments:
Descartes’ indivisibility argument:
All extended things can be divided.
The mind is indivisible because it is essentially thinking.
P1. Physical substance is divisible (since it is extended).
P2. The mind is indivisible (since it is non-extended).
P3. By Leibniz’ law, identical things must share all properties.
C1. Therefore, the mind cannot be identical with the body.
This shows the mind and body have different properties and so are not identical.
Descartes’ conceivability argument:
Identical things cannot be conceived apart, like a triangle and three sides.
But the mind without the body seems conceivable, such as imagining existing without a body.
P1. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing.
P2. I have a clear and distinct idea of my body as a non-thinking, extended thing.
C1. So, the mind can be conceived without the body.
P3. What is conceivably separate is possibly separate.
P4. What is possibly separate is actually non-identical.
C2. Therefore, the mind and body are not identical.

AO2: Descartes’ Indivisibility argument

Descartes argues all extended things are divisible, since they can be divided across the space they occupy.
The mind is indivisible, as it has no parts and thinking is essential to it.
P1. Physical substance is divisible (since it is extended).
P2. The mind is indivisible (since it is non-extended).
P3. Identical things must share the same properties (Leibniz’ law).
C1. So, the mind cannot be identical to any physical substance like the body.
If mind and body were identical, they would be both divisible and indivisible, which is impossible.

Counter

Scholastics argued the mind can be divided into feelings, perceptions and memories.
Descartes replies that the mind is a single consciousness.
These are not parts but modes of one unified subject.
So, the mind itself remains indivisible.

Evaluation

A stronger challenge comes from split-brain cases.
The brain’s hemispheres can be separated, leading to divided behaviour.
Patients may act in conflicting ways, such as one hand helping while the other resists.
This suggests a division within consciousness itself.
So, the mind may not be truly indivisible.
If the mind can be divided, Descartes’ key premise is false.
This undermines his argument that the mind is non-physical.

AO2: Descartes’ conceivability argument

Descartes’ rationalism claims we can gain knowledge through clear and distinct ideas.
P1. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing.
P2. I have a clear and distinct idea of my body as a non-thinking, extended thing.
C1. So, we can conceive of mind and body as separate.
P3. What is conceivably separate is possibly separate.
P4. What is possibly separate is actually non-identical.
C2. Therefore, mind and body are not identical.
Identical things cannot be conceived as separate.
But we can imagine a disembodied mind, such as a ghost or out-of-body experience.

Counter

However, the masked man fallacy shows conceivability does not entail possibility.
Someone may imagine the masked robber is not their father, yet it could be.
So they have imagined an impossibility.
This shows conceivability can reflect ignorance.
Descartes may similarly be imagining an impossibility when he conceives of a disembodied mind.

Evaluation

Descartes might argue such errors arise from ignorance, whereas we know our mind with certainty.
However, this overstates our self-knowledge.
We may know that we exist, but not what we are.
Cognitive psychology shows much mental processing is unconscious.
The Socratic ideal of self-knowledge suggests it is not immediate.
So we lack the transparency Descartes assumes.
This means conceivability may reflect limits of introspection rather than genuine possibility.
The masked man fallacy therefore still applies.
So, the argument fails to show mind and body are distinct.

AO2: Reductive materialism

Reductive materialism claims the mind is just the brain.
Drugs that affect the brain also affect consciousness.
Brain damage affects specific mental abilities depending on location.
Brain development and ageing change the mind.
Brain imaging shows consistent correlations between brain activity and mental states.
Smart uses Occam’s razor to argue the simplest explanation is identity.
Mental states are identical to brain states.
For example, pain is just C-fibre stimulation.

Counter

Chalmers argues science has only solved the “easy problem” of consciousness.
This explains functions like memory and perception.
The “hard problem” is explaining why physical processes produce subjective experience.
Neuroscience has made little progress here.
So, it may be premature to conclude the mind is reducible to the brain.

Evaluation

However, this does not refute materialism.
If the mind is the brain, we should expect it to be difficult to understand.
So, the hard problem’s difficulty is not evidence against reduction.
It may simply reflect current limits of knowledge.
It is more reasonable to extend physical explanations than introduce non-physical entities.
Science has a strong track record of explaining previously mysterious phenomena.
So, while dualism remains possible, the balance of evidence still favours materialism.

AO2: Aristotle (& Aquinas) vs Descartes on the soul

Aristotle grounds hylomorphism in psychology, claiming “the soul never thinks without an image”.
Sensory experience produces mental ideas, which enable knowledge, imagination and memory.
So, human intellect depends on the body for thinking.
Aquinas adds that the soul may subsist after death, but only in an incomplete, “unnatural” state.
It is not the whole person until reunited with the body.

Counter

Descartes rejects this, arguing the soul is not dependent on the body.
Personal identity is grounded in a unified immaterial consciousness.
He claims we can doubt the body as illusion, but not the thinking self.
The “I” that doubts is known more clearly than any physical thing.
This gives privileged access to the self through rational intuition.
He argues consciousness is unified, unlike the divisible body.
So identity lies in the unity of consciousness, not the organism.

Evaluation

However, Descartes assumes introspection is reliable.
He thinks he can conceive the mind apart from the body.
But this may ignore that thought depends on embodied development.
Thought is intentional and requires content supplied by sensory experience.
Without images, it is unclear what thought would be about.
So the idea of a disembodied mind may be an abstraction rather than a real possibility.
This is supported by developmental psychology, which shows mental faculties emerge through experience.
Descartes’ reliance on intuition fits his method, but here it is weaker than an empirical account.

AO2: The resurrection/replication of ailments dilemma

Christian resurrection faces a problem when a person dies with ailments.
Conditions like dementia affect memory, personality and rationality, which seem central to identity.
This creates a dilemma.
If such conditions are not resurrected, identity is not preserved.
If they are, then heaven is not a perfected state.

Counter

However, this assumes a “time-slice” view of identity, based on mental states at a moment.
This suggests identity must match the mind at death.
The narrative view instead sees identity as developing over time.
Dementia then interferes with the expression of identity, rather than constituting it.
So resurrection could preserve the underlying person while removing the impairment.

Evaluation

Hick cannot adopt this, since his view involves replication of the psycho-physical state at death.
A hylomorphic account is more plausible, as it sees the soul as the form of the body, not reducible to mental states.
So removing dementia restores proper functioning rather than removing identity.
However, dementia affects personality, agency and values, everything we associate with identity.
So it seems false to say the person is still fully there.
The narrative account struggles because dementia is not just a blockage, but part of who the person becomes.
So the dilemma remains unresolved.

AO2: evaluating near death experiences

Near-death experiences occur under extreme stress.
Such conditions are known to produce hallucinations, dissociation and altered consciousness.
They also distort memory.
So, a naturalistic explanation sees NDEs as brain-generated experiences caused by neurochemical processes.
This explanation is simpler and relies on known mechanisms.
It does not require positing a non-physical afterlife.

Counter

However, NDEs are often highly structured rather than random.
Reports show strong similarities across cultures.
This supports James and Stace’s idea that consistent experiences may have an objective source.
Swinburne’s principle of credulity also suggests we should trust experiences unless there is reason not to.
Since NDEs are vivid and life-changing, they may provide evidence of an afterlife.

Evaluation

However, similarity does not require a supernatural cause.
Human brains are similar, so similar conditions can produce similar experiences.
NDEs occur when the brain is under abnormal stress, giving reason to doubt their reliability.
This weakens the principle of credulity in this case.
So, the evidence is better explained by natural processes.
NDEs may reveal something about the brain under stress, but they do not establish an afterlife.

AO2: Evaluation of past lives evidence

Reports of children recalling past lives are often used as evidence for rebirth.
Researchers like Stevenson and Tucker collected cases where children recall details of deceased individuals.
Some claims were later matched to historical records in ways difficult to explain by ordinary learning.
For example, James Leininger described being a World War II pilot, with details matching a real individual.

Counter

However, this research faces serious methodological problems.
Verification often happens after a supposed previous life is identified.
Researchers may selectively match statements to historical records rather than test independent claims.
Children are also highly suggestible and imaginative, especially in cultures where rebirth is believed.
With many children producing stories, some will match real events by chance.
Coincidence, suggestion and confirmation bias provide more plausible explanations.

Evaluation

Even if the evidence were stronger, the phenomenon would remain underdetermined.
At most, it would show children have access to unusual information.
It would not prove this comes from past lives.
Even a perfect case would not identify the cause.
Many alternative explanations could be proposed, such as telepathy or other unknown processes.
There is no logical basis to prefer reincarnation over these alternatives.
Only identifying the mechanism could justify such a conclusion.
So, the evidence at best points to something unexplained.
Given the weak and messy data, psychological explanations remain more convincing.